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
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THE

MISCELLANEOUS PROSE WORKS

OF

SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

VOL. XII.

LIFE OF NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

VOL. V.

THE

PROSE WORKS

OF

SIR WALTER SCOTT, BART.

VOL. 12

Mayence

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
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

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

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LIFE

OF

NAPOLEON BUONAPARTE.

CHAPTER XXX.

Napoleon meditates a change of title from Chief Consul to Emperor.—A Motion to this purpose brought forward in the Tribunate—Opposed by Carnot—Adopted by the Tribunate and Senate.—Outline of the New System.—Coldly received by the People.—Napoleon visits Boulogne, Aix-la-Chapelle, and the Frontiers of Germany, where he is received with respect.—The Coronation.—Pius VII. is summoned from Rome to perform the Ceremony at Paris.—Details.—Reflections.—Changes that took place in Italy.—Napoleon appointed Sovereign of Italy, and Crowned at Milan.—Genoa annexed to France.

THE time seemed now propitious for Buonaparte to make the last remaining movement in the great game, which he had hitherto played with equal skill, boldness, and success. The opposing factions of the state lay in a great measure prostrate before him. The death of the Duke d'Enghien and of Pichegru had intimidated the Royalists, while the exile of Moreau had left the Republicans without a leader.

These events, while they greatly injured Buonaparte's character as a man, extended, in a like proportion, the idea of his power, and of his determination to employ it to the utmost extremity against whoever might oppose him. This moment, therefore, of general submission and intimidation was the fittest to be used for transmuting the military baton of the First Consul into a sceptre, resembling those of the ancient and established sovereignties of Europe; and it only remained, for one who could now dispose of France as he listed, to dictate the form and fashion of the new emblem of his sway.

The title of King most obviously presented itself; but it was connected with the claims of the Bourbons, which it was not Buonaparte's policy to recall to remembrance. That of Emperor implied a yet higher power of sovereignty, and there existed no competitor who could challenge a claim to it. It was a novelty also, and flattered the French love of change; and though, in fact, the establishment of an empire was inconsistent with the various oaths taken against royalty, it was not, in terms, so directly contradictory to them. As the re-establishment of a kingdom, so far it was agreeable to those who might seek, not indeed how to keep their vows, but how to elude, in words at least, the charge of having broken them. To Napoleon's own ear, the word King might sound as if it restricted his power within the limits of the ancient kingdom; while that of Emperor might comprise dominions equal to the wide sweep of ancient Rome herself, and the bounds of the

habitable earth alone could be considered as circumscribing their extent.

The main body of the nation being passive or intimidated,[1] there was no occasion to stand upon much ceremony with the constitutional bodies, the members of which were selected and paid by Buonaparte himself, held their posts at his pleasure, had every species of advancement to hope if they promoted his schemes, and every evil, of which the least would be deprivation of office, to expect, should they thwart him.

On the 30th of April, 1804, Curée,[2] an orator of no great note, (and who was perhaps selected on that very account, that his proposal might be disavowed, should it meet with unexpected opposition,) took the lead in this measure, which was to destroy the slight and nominal remains of a free constitution which France retained under her present form of government. "It was time to bid adieu," he said, "to political illusions. The internal tranquillity of France had been regained, peace with foreign states had been secured by victory.

[1] ["I advised Buonaparte to make himself master of the crisis, and cause himself to be proclaimed Emperor, in order to terminate all our uncertainties, by the foundation of his dynasty. I knew that his resolution was taken. Would it not have been absurd, on the part of the men of the Revolution, to compromise every thing, in order to defend our principles, while we had nothing further to do but enjoy the reality?"—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 268.]

[2] [Curée was born at St André, near Lodève, in 1756. When, in 1807, the Tribunate was dissolved, he was appointed a member of the Conservative Senate. In 1808, Napoleon bestowed on him the title of Count de Labédissières.]

The finances of the country had been restored, its code of laws renovated and re-established. It was time to ascertain the possession of these blessings to the nation in future, and the orator saw no mode of doing this, save rendering the supreme power hereditary in the person and family of Napoleon, to whom France owed such a debt of gratitude. This, he stated, was the universal desire of the army and of the people. He invited the Tribunate, therefore, to give effect to the general wish, and hail Napoleon Buonaparte by the title of Emperor, as that which best corresponded with the dignity of the nation."[1]

The members of the Tribunate contended with each other who should most enhance the merits of Napoleon, and prove, in the most logical and rhetorical terms, the advantages of arbitrary power over the various modifications of popular or limited governments. But one man, Carnot, was bold enough to oppose the full tide of sophistry and adulation. This name is unhappily to be read among the colleagues of Robespierre in the Revolutionary Committee, as well as amongst those who voted for the death of the misused and unoffending Louis XVI.; yet his highly honourable conduct in the urgent crisis now under discussion, shows that the zeal for liberty which led him into such excesses was genuine and sincere; and that, in point of firmness and public spirit, Carnot equalled the ancient patriots whom he aspired to imitate.

[1] [Moniteur, No. 222, An. xii; Montgaillard, Hist. de France, t. vi. p. 57.]

His speech was as temperate and expressive as it was eloquent. Buonaparte, he admitted, had saved France, and saved it by the assumption of absolute power; but this, he contended, was only the temporary consequence of a violent crisis of the kind to which republics were subject, and the evils of which could only be stemmed by a remedy equally violent. The present head of the government was, he allowed, a dictator; but in the same sense in which Fabius, Camillus, and Cincinnatus, were so of yore, who retired to the condition of private citizens when they had accomplished the purpose for which temporary supremacy had been intrusted to them. The like was to be expected from Buonaparte, who, on entering on the government of the state, had invested it with republican forms, which he had taken a solemn oath to maintain, and which it was the object of Curée's motion to invite him to violate. He allowed that the various republican forms of France had been found deficient in stability, which he contended was owing to the tempestuous period in which they had been adopted, and the excited and irritable temper of men fired with political animosity, and incapable at the moment of steady or philosophical reflection; but he appealed to the United States of America, as an example of a democratical government, equally wise, vigorous, and permanent. He admitted the virtues and talents of the present governor of France, but contended that these attributes could not be rendered hereditary along with the throne. He reminded the Tribunate that Domitian had been

the son of the wise Vespasian, Caligula of Germanicus, and Commodus of Marcus Aurelius. Again, he asked, whether it was not wronging Buonaparte's glory to substitute a new title to that which he had rendered so illustrious, and to invite and tempt him to become the instrument of destroying the liberties of the very country to which he had rendered such inestimable services? He then announced the undeniable proposition, that what services soever an individual might render to the state of which he was a member, there were bounds to public gratitude prescribed by honour as well as reason. If a citizen had the means of operating the safety, or restoring the liberty of his country, it could not be termed a becoming recompense to surrender to him that very liberty, the re-establishment of which had been his own work. Or what glory, he asked, could accrue to the selfish indivi dual, who should claim the surrender of his country's independence in requital of his services, and desire to convert the state which his talents had preserved into his own private patrimony?[1]

Carnot concluded his manly and patriotic speech by declaring, that though he opposed on grounds of conscience the alteration of government which had been proposed, he would, nevertheless, should it be adopted by the nation, give it his unlimited obedience. He kept his word accordingly, and retired to a private station, in poverty most honourable to a statesman who had filled the highest offices

[1] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 76; Moniteur, No. 222, An. xii.]

of the state, and enjoyed the most unlimited power of amassing wealth.[1]

When his oration was concluded, there was a contention for precedence among the time-serving speakers, who were each desirous to take the lead in refuting the reasoning of Carnot. It would be tedious to trace them through their sophistry. The leading argument turned upon the talents of Buonaparte, his services rendered to France, and the necessity there was for acknowledging them by something like a proportionate act of national gratitude. Their eloquence resembled nothing so nearly as the pleading of a wily procuress, who endeavours to persuade some simple maiden, that the services rendered to her by a liberal and gallant admirer, can only be rewarded by the sacrifice of her honour. The speaking (for it could neither be termed debate nor deliberation) was prolonged for three days, after which the motion of Curée was adopted by the Tribunate,[2] without one negative voice, excepting that of the inflexible Carnot.

The Senate, to whom the Tribunate hastened to present their project of establishing despotism under its own undisguised title, hastened to form a senatus consultum, which established the new constitution of France. The outline,—for what would

[1] ["When a member of the Tribunate, Carnot spoke and voted against the establishment of the empire; but his conduct, open and manly, gave no uneasiness to the administration."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iv. p. 141.]

[2] [For the decree, passed the Tribunate on the 3d of May, and carried up to the Conservative Senate on the following day, see *Annual Register*, vol. xlvi. p. 658.]

it serve to trace the minute details of a design sketched in the sand, and obliterated by the tide of subsequent events,[1]—was as follows:—

1st, Napoleon Buonaparte was declared hereditary Emperor of the French nation. The empire was made hereditary, first in the male line of the Emperor's direct descendants. Failing these, Napoleon might adopt the sons or grandsons of his brothers, to succeed him in such order as he might point out. In default of such adoptive heirs, Joseph and Louis Buonaparte were, in succession, declared the lawful heirs of the empire. Lucien and Jerome Buonaparte were excluded from this rich inheritance, as they had both disobliged Napoleon by marrying without his consent.

2d, The members of the Imperial family were declared Princes of the Blood, and by the decree of the Senate, the offices of Grand Elector, Archchancellor of the Empire, Archchancellor of State, High Constable, and Great Admiral of the Empire, were established as necessary appendages of the empire. These dignitaries, named of course by the Emperor himself, consisting of his relatives, connexions, and most faithful adherents, formed his Grand Council. The rank of Marshal of the Empire was conferred upon seventeen of the most distinguished generals, comprehending Jourdan, Augereau, and others, formerly zealous Republicans.[2] Duroc was named Grand Marshal of the

[1] [See Organic Senatus Consultum, May 18, Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 664.]

[2] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 103; Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 663.]

Palace; Caulaincourt, Master of the Horse; Berthier, Grand Huntsman, and the Compte de Ségur, a nobleman of the old court, Master of Ceremonies.

Thus did republican forms, at length and finally, give way to those of a court; and that nation, which no moderate or rational degree of freedom would satisfy, now contentedly, or at least passively, assumed the yoke of a military despot. France, in 1792, had been like the wild elephant in his fits of fury, when to oppose his course is death; in 1804, she was like the same animal tamed and trained, who kneels down and suffers himself to be mounted by the soldier, whose business is to drive him into the throng of the battle.

Measures were taken, as on former occasions, to preserve appearances, by obtaining, in show at least, the opinion of the people, on this radical change of their system.[1] Government, however, were already confident of their approbation, which,

[1] ["In the army the proposed change went down of itself; this is easily accounted for. The dragoons gave the first impulsion. They sent an address to the First Consul, in which they alleged that their efforts would be of no service if wicked men should succeed in taking away his life; that the best way to thwart their designs and to fix the irresolute was to put the imperial crown on his head, and to fix that dignity in his family. After the dragoons came the cuirassiers, then all the corps of infantry, and then the seamen; and lastly, those of the civil orders who wished for the change, followed the example of the army. The spirit spread in an instant to the smallest parishes; the First Consul received carriages full of such addresses. A register for the reception of votes was opened in every parish in France. It was the summary of all these votes, laid before the senate, that formed the basis of the *procès-verbal* of inauguration of the Buonaparte family to the imperial dignity."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 69.]

indeed, had never been refused to any of the various constitutions, however inconsistent, that had succeeded each other with such rapidity. Secure on this point, Buonaparte's accession to the empire was proclaimed with the greatest pomp, without waiting to enquire whether the people approved of his promotion or otherwise. The proclamation was coldly received, even by the populace, and excited little enthusiasm.[1] It seemed, according to some writers, as if the shades of D'Enghien and Pichegru had been present invisibly, and spread a damp over the ceremony. The Emperor was recognised by the soldiery with more warmth. He visited the encampments at Boulogne, with the intention, apparently, of receiving such an acknowledgment from the troops as was paid by the ancient Franks to their monarchs, when they elevated them on their bucklers. Seated on an iron chair, said to have belonged to King Dagobert, he took his place between two immense camps, and having before him the Channel and the hostile coasts of England. The weather, we have been assured, had been tempestuous, but no sooner had the Emperor assumed his seat, to receive the homage of his shouting host, than the sky cleared, and the wind dropt, retaining just breath sufficient gently to wave the banners. Even the elements seemed to acknowledge the imperial dignity, all save the sea, which rolled as carelessly to the feet of Napoleon as

[1] ["Napoleon's elevation to the imperial dignity met, from all quarters, with the most chilling reception; there were public *fêtes* without animation, and without joy."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 272.]

it had formerly done towards those of Canute the Dane.

The Emperor, accompanied with his Empress, who bore her honours both gracefully and meekly, visited Aix-la-Chapelle, and the frontiers of Germany. They received the congratulations of all the powers of Europe, excepting England, Russia, and Sweden, upon their new exaltation; and the German princes, who had every thing to hope and fear from so powerful a neighbour, hastened to pay their compliments to Napoleon in person, which more distant sovereigns offered by their ambassadors.[1]

But the most splendid and public recognition of his new rank was yet to be made, by the formal act of coronation, which, therefore, Napoleon determined should take place with circumstances of solemnity, which had been beyond the reach of any temporal prince, however powerful, for many ages. His policy was often marked by a wish to revive, imitate, and connect his own titles and interest with some ancient observance of former days; as if the novelty of his claims could have been rendered more venerable by investing them with antiquated forms, or as men of low birth, when raised to wealth and rank, are sometimes desirous to conceal the obscurity of their origin under the blaze of heraldic honours. Pope Leo, he remembered, had placed a golden crown on the head of Charlemagne, and proclaimed him Emperor of the Romans. Pius VII., he determined, should do the same for a suc-

[1] [Fouché, t. ii. p. 280.]

cessor to much more than the actual power of Charlemagne. But though Charlemagne had repaired to Rome to receive inauguration from the hands of the Pontiff of that day, Napoleon resolved that he who now owned the proud, and in Protestant eyes profane, title of Vicar of Christ, should travel to France to perform the coronation of the successful chief, by whom the See of Rome had been more than once humbled, pillaged, and impoverished, but by whom also her power had been re-erected and restored, not only in Italy, but in France itself.

Humiliating as the compliance with Buonaparte's request must have seemed to the more devoted Catholics, Pius VII. had already sacrificed, to obtain the Concordat, so much of the power and privileges of the Roman See, that he could hardly have been justified if he had run the risk of losing the advantages of a treaty so dearly purchased, by declining to incur some personal trouble, or, it might be termed, some direct self-abasement. The Pope, and the cardinals whom he consulted, implored the illumination of Heaven upon their councils; but it was the stern voice of necessity which assured them, that, except at the risk of dividing the Church by a schism, they could not refuse to comply with Buonaparte's requisition. The Pope left Rome on the 5th November. He was every where received on the road with the highest respect, and most profound veneration; the Alpine precipices themselves had been secured by parapets wherever they could expose the venerable Father of the Catholic Church to danger, or

even apprehension. Upon the 25th November he met Buonaparte at Fontainbleau;[1] and the conduct of the Emperor Napoleon was as studiously respectful towards him as that of Charlemagne, whom he was pleased to call his predecessor, could have been towards Leo.

On the 2d December, the ceremony of the coronation took place in the ancient cathedral of Notre Dame, with the addition of every ceremony which could be devised to add to its solemnity.[2]

[1] ["The Emperor went to meet the Pope on the road to Nemours. To avoid ceremony, the pretext of a hunting party was assumed; the attendants, with his equipages, were in the forest. The Emperor came on horseback, and in a hunting dress, with his retinue. It was at the half moon at the top of the hill that the meeting took place. There the Pope's carriage drew up; he got out at the left door in his white costume; the ground was dirty; he did not like to step upon it with his white silk shoes, but was obliged to do so at last. Napoleon alighted to receive him. They embraced; and the Emperor's carriage, which had been purposely driven up, was advanced a few paces; but men were posted to hold the two doors open; at the moment of getting in, the Emperor took the right door, and an officer of the court handed the Pope to the left, so that they entered the carriage by the two doors at the same time. The Emperor naturally seated himself on the right; and this first step decided, without negotiation, upon the etiquette to be observed during the whole time that the Pope was to remain at Paris."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 73.]

[2] ["The departure of the Pope from the Tuileries for the archiepiscopal palace, was delayed for a short time by a singular cause. Every body was ignorant in France, that it was customary at Rome when the Pope went out to officiate in the great churches, for one of his principal chamberlains to set off a little before him, mounted on an ass, and carrying a large cross, such as is used in processions. It was not till the very moment of departure that this custom was made known. The chamberlain would not, for all the gold in the world, have derogated from the practice, and accepted a nobler animal. All the grooms of the Tuileries were instantly despatched in quest of an ass; and they were fortunate

Yet we have been told, that the multitude did not participate in the ceremonial with that eagerness which characterises the inhabitants of all capitals, but especially those of Paris, upon similar occasions.[1] They had, within a very few years, seen so many exhibitions, processions and festivals, established on the most discordant principles, which, though announced as permanent and unchangeable, had successively given way to newer doctrines, that they considered the splendid representation before them as an unsubstantial pageant, which would fade away in its turn. Buonaparte himself seemed absent and gloomy, till recalled to a sense of his grandeur by the voice of the numerous deputies and functionaries sent up from all the several departments of France, to witness the coronation.[2] These functionaries had been selected with due attention to their political opinions; and many of them holding offices under the government, or expecting benefits from the Emperor, made up, by the zealous vivacity of their acclamations, for the coldness of the good citizens of Paris.

enough to find a tolerably well-looking one, which was hastily caparisoned. The chamberlain rode with a composure which nothing could disturb, through the innumerable multitudes who lined the quays, and could not help laughing at this odd spectacle, which they beheld for the first time."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 75.]

[1] ["At the ceremony of the coronation, the acclamations, at first extremely few, were afterwards reinforced by the multitude of men in office, (*fonctionnaires,*) who were summoned from all parts of France to be present at the coronation. But upon returning to his palace, Napoleon found cold and silent spectators." —FOUCHÉ, t. ii. p. 285.]

[2] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 142.]

The Emperor took his coronation oath, as usual on such occasions, with his hands upon the Scripture, and in the form in which it was repeated to him by the Pope. But in the act of coronation itself, there was a marked deviation from the universal custom, characteristic of the man, the age, and the conjuncture. In all other similar solemnities, the crown had been placed on the sovereign's head by the presiding spiritual person, as representing the Deity, by whom princes rule. But not even from the Head of the Catholic Church would Buonaparte consent to receive as a boon the golden symbol of sovereignty, which he was sensible he owed solely to his own unparalleled train of military and civil successes. The crown having been blessed by the Pope, Napoleon took it from the altar with his own hands, and placed it on his brows. He then put the diadem on the head of his Empress, as if determined to show that his authority was the child of his own actions. *Te Deum* was sung; the heralds (for they also had again come into fashion) proclaimed, "that the thrice glorious and thrice august Napoleon, Emperor of the French, was crowned and installed." Thus concluded this remarkable ceremony. Those who remember having beheld it, must now doubt whether they were waking, or whether fancy had framed a vision so dazzling in its appearance, so extraordinary in its origin and progress, and so ephemeral in its endurance.[1]

[1] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 144; Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 680; Savary, t. ii. p. 75.]

The very day before the ceremony of coronation, (that is, on the 1st of December,) the Senate had waited upon the Emperor with the result of the votes collected in the departments, which, till that time, had been taken for granted. Upwards of three millions five hundred thousand citizens had given their votes on this occasion; of whom only about three thousand five hundred had declared against the proposition. The vice-president, Neufchateau, declared, "this report was the unbiassed expression of the people's choice. No government could plead a title more authentic."[1]

This was the established language of the day; but when the orator went farther, and mentioned the measure now adopted as enabling Buonaparte to guide into port the vessel of the *Republic*, one would have thought there was more irony than compliment in the expression.

Napoleon replied, by promises to employ the power which the unanimous consent of the Senate, the people, and the army, had conferred upon him, for the advantage of that nation which he himself, writing from fields of battle, had first saluted with the title of the Great. He promised, too, in name of his Dynasty, that his children should long preserve the throne, and be at once the first soldiers in the army of France, and the first magistrates among her citizens.[2]

[1] [Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 685.]

[2] ["I ascend the throne, to which the unanimous wishes of the Senate, the people, and the army have called me, with a heart penetrated with the great destinies of that people, whom, from the midst of camps, I first saluted with the name of GREAT.

As every word on such an occasion was scrupulously sifted and examined, it seemed to some that this promise, which Napoleon volunteered in behalf of children who had as yet no existence, intimated a meditated change of consort, since from his present Empress he had no longer any hope of issue. Others censured the prophetic tone in which he announced what would be the fate and conduct of unborn beings, and spoke of a reign, newly commenced, under the title of a Dynasty, which is usually applied to a race of successive princes.

We pause for a moment to consider the act of popular accession to the new government; because there, if any where, we are to look for something like a legal right, in virtue of which Napoleon might claim obedience. He himself, when pleading his own cause after his fall, repeatedly rests his right to be considered and treated as a legitimate monarch, upon the fact, that he was called to the crown by the voice of the people.[1]

From my youth, my thoughts have been solely fixed upon them, and I must add here, that my pleasures and my pains are derived entirely from the happiness or misery of my people. My descendants shall long preserve this throne; in the camps they will be the first soldiers of the army, sacrificing their lives in the defence of their country. As magistrates, they will never forget that the contempt of the laws, and the confusion of social order, are only the result of the imbecility and unsteadiness of princes. You, senators, whose counsels and support have never failed me in the most difficult circumstances; your spirit will be handed down to your successors. Be ever the props and first counsellors of that throne, so necessary to the welfare of this vast empire."]

[1] ["If I was not a legitimate sovereign, William the Third was a usurper of the throne of England, as he was brought in

We will not stop to enquire how the registers, in which the votes of the citizens were enrolled, were managed by the functionaries who had the charge of them;—it is only necessary to state in passing, that these returning officers were in general accessible to the influence of government, and that there was no possibility of instituting any scrutiny into the authenticity of the returns. Neither will we repeat, that instead of waiting for the event of the popular vote, he had accepted of the empire from the Senate, and had been proclaimed Emperor accordingly. Waving those circumstances entirely, let it be remembered, that France is usually reckoned to contain upwards of thirty millions of inhabitants, and that three millions five hundred thousand, only gave their votes. This was not a third part, deducing women and children, of those who had a title to express their opinion, where it was to be held decisive of the greatest change which the state could undergo; and it must be allowed that the authority of so limited a portion of the people is far too small to bind the remainder. We have heard it indeed argued, that the question having been formally put to the nation at large, every one was under an obligation to make a specific reply; and they who did not vote, must be held to have acquiesced in the opinion expressed by the majority of such as did. This argument, being directly contrary to the presumption

chiefly by the aid of foreign bayonets. George the First was placed on the throne by a faction, composed of a few nobles. I was called to that of France by the votes of nearly four millions of Frenchmen."—NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c. vol. ii. p. 113.]

of law in all similar cases, is not more valid than the defence of the soldier, who, accused of having stolen a necklace from an image of the Virgin, replied to the charge, that he had first asked the Madonna's permission, and, receiving no answer, had taken silence for consent.

In another point of view, it must be remembered that this vote, by which Napoleon claimed the absolute and irredeemable cession of the liberties of France in his favour, was not a jot more solemn than those by which the people had previously sanctioned the Constitutional Monarchy of 1791, the Republic of 1792, the Directory of 1795, and the Consular Government of 1799. Now, either the vote upon all those occasions was binding and permanent, or it was capable of being denied and recalled at the pleasure of the people. If the former was the case, then the people had no right, in 1804, to resume the votes they had given, and the oaths they had sworn, to the first form of government in 1791. The others which they sanctioned in its stead, were in consequence, mere usurpations, and that now attempted the most flagrant of all; since three constitutions, each resting on the popular consent, were demolished, and three sets of oaths broken and discarded, to make room for the present model. Again, if the people, in swearing to one constitution, retained inalienably the right of substituting another whenever they thought proper, the imperial constitution remained at their mercy as much as those that preceded it; and then on what could Buonaparte rest the inviolability of his authority, guarded with such jealous precaution,

and designed to descend to his successors, without any future appeal to the people? The dynasty which he supposed himself to have planted, was in that case not the oak-tree which he conceived it, but, held during the good pleasure of a fickle people, rather resembled the thistle, whose unsubstantial crest rests upon the stalk only so long as the wind shall not disturb it.

But we leave these considerations; nor do we stop to enquire how many, amid the three millions and upwards of voters, gave an unwilling signature, which they would have refused if they had dared, nor how many more attached no greater consequence to the act than to a piece of formal complaisance, which every government expected in its turn, and which bound the subject no longer than the ruler had means to enforce his obedience. Another and more formidable objection remains behind, which pervaded the whole pretended surrender by the French nation of their liberties, and rendered it void, null, and without force or effect whatever. It was, from the commencement, what jurists call a *pactum in illicito*:—the people gave that which they had no right to surrender, and Buonaparte accepted that which he had no title to take at their hands. In most instances of despotic usurpation—we need only look at the case of Cæsar—the popular party have been made the means of working out their own servitude; the government being usurped by some demagogue who acted in their name, and had the art to make their own hands the framers of their own chains. But though such consent on the part of the people,

elicited from an excess of partial confidence or of gratitude, may have rendered such encroachments on the freedom of the state more easy, it did not and could not render it in any case more legal. The rights of a free people are theirs to enjoy, but not theirs to alienate or surrender. The people are in this respect like minors, to whom law assures their property, but invests them with no title to give it away or consume it; the national privileges are an estate entailed from generation to generation, and they can neither be the subject of gift, exchange, nor surrender, by those who enjoy the usufruct or temporary possession of them. No man is lord even of his person, to the effect of surrendering his life or limbs to the mercy of another; the contract of the Merchant of Venice would now be held null from the beginning in any court of justice in Europe. But far more should the report of 1804, upon Buonaparte's election, be esteemed totally void, since it involved the cession on the part of the French people of that which ought to have been far more dear to them, and held more inalienable, than "the pound of flesh nearest the heart,"[1] or the very heart itself.

As the people of France had no right to resign their own liberties, and that of their posterity, for ever, so Buonaparte could not legally avail himself of their prodigal and imprudent cession. If a blind man give a piece of gold by mistake instead of a piece of silver, he who receives it acquires no legal title to the surplus value. If an ignorant

[1] [Merchant of Venice, Act iv. sc. 1.]

man enter unwittingly into an illegal compact, his signature, though voluntary, is not binding upon him. It is true, that Buonaparte had rendered the highest services to France by his Italian campaigns in the first instance, and afterwards by that wonderful train of success which followed his return from Egypt. Still the services yielded by a subject to his native land, like the duty paid by a child to a parent, cannot render him creditor of the country, beyond the amount which she has legal means of discharging. If France had received the highest benefits from Buonaparte, she had in return raised him as high as any subject could be advanced, and had, indeed, in her reckless prodigality of gratitude, given, or suffered him to assume, the very despotic authority, which this compact of which we treat was to consolidate and sanction under its real name of Empire. Here, therefore, we close the argument; concluding the pretended vote of the French people to be totally null, both as regarding the subjects who yielded their privileges, and the emperor who accepted of their surrender. The former could not give away rights which it was not lawful to resign, the latter could not accept an authority which it was unlawful to exercise.

An apology, or rather a palliation, of Buonaparte's usurpation, has been set up by himself and his more ardent admirers, and we are desirous of giving to it all the weight which it shall be found to deserve. They have said, and with great reason, that Buonaparte, viewed in his general conduct, was no selfish usurper, and that the mode in which

he acquired his power was gilded over by the use which he made of it. This is true; for we will not under-rate the merits which Napoleon thus acquired, by observing that shrewd politicians have been of opinion, that sovereigns who have only a questionable right to their authority, are compelled, were it but for their own sakes, to govern in such a manner as to make the country feel its advantage in submitting to their government. We grant willingly, that in much of his internal administration Buonaparte showed that he desired to have no advantage separate from that of France; that he conceived her interests to be connected with his own glory; that he expended his wealth in ornamenting the empire, and not upon objects more immediately personal to himself. We have no doubt that he had more pleasure in seeing treasures of art added to the Museum, than in hanging them on the walls of his own palace; and that he spoke truly, when asserting that he grudged Josephine the expensive plants with which she decorated her residence at Malmaison, because her taste interfered with the prosperity of the public botanical garden of Paris.[1] We allow, therefore, that Buonaparte fully identified himself with the country which he had rendered his patrimony; and that while it should be called by his name, he was desirous of investing it with as much external splendour, and as much internal prosperity, as his gigantic schemes were able to compass. No doubt it may be said, so completely was the country iden-

[1] [Las Cases, t. vii. p. 120.]

tified with its ruler, that as France had nothing but what belonged to its Emperor, he was in fact improving his own estate when he advanced her public works, and could no more be said to lose sight of his own interest, than a private gentleman does, who neglects his garden to ornament his park. But it is not fair to press the motives of human nature to their last retreat, in which something like a taint of self-interest may so often be discovered. It is enough to reply, that the selfishness which embraces the interests of a whole kingdom, is of a kind so liberal, so extended, and so refined, as to be closely allied to patriotism; and that the good intentions of Buonaparte towards that France, over which he ruled with despotic sway, can be no more doubted, than the affections of an arbitrary father whose object it is to make his son prosperous and happy, to which he annexes as the only condition, that he shall be implicitly obedient to every tittle of his will. The misfortune is, however, that arbitrary power is in itself a faculty, which, whether exercised over a kingdom, or in the bosom of a family, is apt to be used with caprice rather than judgment, and becomes a snare to those who possess it, as well as a burden to those over whom it extends. A father, for example, seeks the happiness of his son, while he endeavours to assure his fortunes, by compelling him to enter into a mercenary and reluctant marriage; and Buonaparte conceived himself to be benefiting as well as aggrandizing France, when, preferring the splendour of conquest to the blessings of peace, he led the flower of her young men to perish in foreign

fields, and finally was the means of her being delivered up, drained of her population,[1] to the mercy of the foreign invaders, whose resentment his ambition had provoked.

Such are the considerations which naturally arise out of Napoleon's final and avowed assumption of the absolute power, which he had in reality possessed and exercised ever since he had been created First Consul for life. It was soon after made manifest, that France, enlarged and increased in strength as she had been under his auspices, was yet too narrow a sphere for his domination. Italy afforded the first illustration of his grasping ambition.[2]

The northern states of Italy had followed the example of France through all her change of models. They had become republican in a direc-

[1] ["The Emperor constantly insisted on subjecting the whole nation to the laws of the conscription. 'The conscription,' he said, 'is the root of a nation, its moral purification, the real foundation of its habits. Organized, built up in this way, the French people might have defied the world, and might with justice have renewed the saying of the proud Gauls; If the sky should fall, we will keep it up with our lances.'"—LAS CASES, t. vii. p. 98.]

[2] ["We soon perceived that Napoleon meditated a great diversion. When he mentioned in council his idea of going to be crowned King of Italy, we all told him he would provoke a new continental war. 'I must have battles and triumphs,' replied he. And yet he did not relax his preparations for the invasion of England. One day, upon my objecting to him that he could not make war at the same time, against England and against all Europe, he replied, 'I may fail by sea, but not by land; besides, I shall be able to strike the blow before the old coalition machines are ready. The people of the old school (*têtes à perruques*) understand nothing about it, and the kings have neither activity nor decision of character. I do not fear old Europe.'"—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 285.]

torial form, when Napoleon's sword conquered them from the Austrians; had changed to an establishment similar to the consular, when that was instituted in Paris by the 18th Brumaire; and were now destined to receive, as a king, him who had lately accepted and exercised with regal authority the office of their president.

The authorities of the Italian (late Cisalpine) republic had a prescient guess of what was expected of them. A deputation[1] appeared at Paris, to declare the absolute necessity which they felt, that their government should assume a monarchical and hereditary form. On the 17th March, 1805, they obtained an audience of the Emperor, to whom they intimated the unanimous desire of their countrymen, that Napoleon, founder of the Italian Republic, should be monarch of the Italian King dom. He was to have power to name his successor, such being always a native of France or Italy. With an affectation of jealous independence, however, the authors of this "humble petition and advice" stipulated, that the crowns of France and Italy should never, save in the present instance, be placed on the head of the same monarch. Napoleon might, during his life, devolve the sovereignty of Italy on one of his descendants, either natural or adopted; but it was anxiously stipulated, that such delegation should not be made during the period while France continued to occupy the

[1] [Consisting of M. Melzi, vice-president of the Italian republic; M. Mareschalchi, ambassador of that republic; and the representatives of its principal bodies.]

Neapolitan territories, the Russians Corfu, and the British Malta.[1]

Buonaparte granted the petition of the Italian states, and listened with indulgence to their jealous scruples. He agreed with them, that the separation of the crowns of France and Italy, which might be useful to their descendants, would be in the highest degree dangerous to themselves; and therefore he consented to bear the additional burden which their love and confidence imposed, at least until the interest of his Italian subjects should permit him to place the crown on a younger head, who, animated by his spirit, should, he engaged, "be ever ready to sacrifice his life for the people over whom he should be called to reign, by Providence, by the constitution of the country, and by the will of Napoleon."[2] In announcing this new acquisition to the French Senate, Buonaparte made use of an expression so singularly audacious, that to utter it required almost as much courage as to scheme one of his most daring campaigns. "The power and majesty of the French empire," he said, "are surpassed by the moderation which presides over her political transactions."

[1] [See official proceedings relative to the assumption of the crown of Italy by Napoleon, Emperor of the French—*Annual Register*, vol. xlvii. p. 720.]

[2] ["I shall keep this crown; but only so long as your interests shall require; and I shall with pleasure see the moment arrive, when I can place it on the head of a younger person, who, animated by my spirit, may continue my work, and be on all occasions ready to sacrifice his person and interests to the security and the happiness of the people over whom Providence, the constitutions of the kingdom, and my wish, shall have called him to reign."]

Upon the 11th April, Napoleon, with his Empress, set off to go through the form of coronation, as King of Italy.[1] The ceremony almost exactly resembled that by which he had been inaugurated Emperor. The ministry of the Pope, however, was not employed on this second occasion, although, as Pius VII. was then on his return to Rome, he could scarcely have declined officiating, if he had been requested by Buonaparte to take Milan in his route for that purpose. Perhaps it was thought too harsh to exact from the Pontiff the consecration of a King of Italy, whose very title implied a possibility that his dominion might be one day extended, so as to include the patrimony of Saint Peter. Perhaps, and we rather believe it was the case, some cause of dissatisfaction had already occurred betwixt Napoleon and Pius VII. However this may be, the ministry of the Archbishop of Milan was held sufficient for the occasion, and it was he who blessed the celebrated iron crown, said to have girded the brows of the ancient Kings of the Lombards. Buonaparte, as in the ceremony at Paris, placed the ancient emblem on his head with his own hands,

[1] ["Napoleon remained three weeks at Turin, and was in that city when the Pope arrived there. His holiness had lodgings provided for him in the royal palace; the Emperor went thither to see him, and set out the next day by Asti for Alexandria; the Pope took the road to Casal on his way back to Rome. At Alexandria the Emperor inspected the immense works which, by his direction, were carrying on there. He held a review on the field of Marengo; he put on that day the same coat and laced hat which he wore in the engagement; the coat was quite moth-eaten." —Savary, t. ii. p. 80.]

assuming and repeating aloud the haughty motto attached to it by its ancient owners, *Dieu me l'a donné ; Gare qui la touche.* "God has given it me ; Let him beware who touches it."[1]

The new kingdom was, in all respects, modelled on the same plan with the French empire. An order, called "of the Iron Crown," was established on the footing of that of the Legion of Honour. A large French force was taken into Italian pay, and Eugene Beauharnois,[2] the son of Josephine by her former marriage, who enjoyed and merited the confidence of his father-in-law, was created viceroy, and appointed to represent, in that character, the dignity of Napoleon.[3]

Napoleon did not leave Italy without further extension of his empire. Genoa, once the proud and the powerful, resigned her independence, and her Doge presented to the Emperor a request that the Ligurian republic, laying down her separate

[1] [See official account of the coronation of the Emperor of the French, as King of Italy, at Milan, 26th May, 1805—*Annual Register*, vol. xlvii. p. 723. See also Botta, Storia d'Italia, t. iv. p. 209 ; Jomini, Vie Politique, t. ii. p. 86.]

[2] ["After the ceremony of the coronation, the Emperor went in procession to the Italian Senate, where he invested Prince Eugene with the viceroyalty of Italy."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 80.]

[3] ["During Napoleon's stay at Milan, he directed his attention towards the embellishment of that city, with the same zeal as if it had been Paris. He had always regretted that none of the governments of that country had undertaken the completion of the cathedral of Milan, the largest edifice of the kind after St Peter's at Rome. He ordered the works to be immediately resumed, forbidding them to be interrupted on any pretext whatever, and created a special fund for defraying the expenses. To him the Milanese are indebted for the completion of that noble structure."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 81.]

rights, should be considered in future as a part of the French nation. It was but lately that Buonaparte had declared to the listening Senate, that the boundaries of France were permanently fixed, and should not be extended for the comprehension of future conquests. It is farther true, that, by a solemn alliance with France, Genoa had placed her arsenals and harbours at the disposal of the French government; engaged to supply her powerful ally with six thousand sailors, and ten sail of the line, to be equipped at her own expense; and that her independence, or such a nominal share of that inestimable privilege as was consistent with her connexion with this formidable power, had been guaranteed by France. But neither the charge of inconsistency with his own public declarations, nor consideration of the solemn treaty acknowledging the Ligurian republic, prevented Napoleon from availing himself of the pretext afforded by the petition of the Doge. It was convenient to indulge the city and government of Genoa in their wish to become an integral part of the Great Nation.[1]

[1] ["The Doge and Senate had come to Milan to beg the Emperor to accept them, and to incorporate them with the French empire. I have no doubt that this resolution had been somewhat assisted. Such was the state of this unfortunate republic, that its inhabitants were almost famishing: the English closely blockaded it by sea; the French *douanes* cooped it up by land: it had no territory, and could not, without difficulty, procure wherewithal to subsist. Add to this, that whenever a quarrel took place in Italy, the first thing was to send it a garrison, which it had not the means of refusing. It had, therefore, all the inconveniences arising from a union with France, without possessing any of the advantages: it determined, therefore, to make application to be incorporated with the empire."—SAVARY, t. ii. p.

Buonaparte was well aware, that, by recognising them as a department of France, he was augmenting the jealousy of Russia and Austria, who had already assumed a threatening front towards him; but, as he visited the splendid city of the Dorias, and saw its streets of marble palaces, ascending from and surrounding its noble harbours, he was heard to exclaim, that such a possession was well worth the risks of war.[1] The success of one mighty plan only induced him to form another; and while he was conscious that he was the general object of jealousy and suspicion to Europe, Napoleon could not refrain from encroachments, which necessarily increased and perpetuated such hostile sentiments towards him.[2]

83. See also Botta, t. iv. p. 214; Dumas, Précis des Evénemens Militaires; and Jomini, Vie Politique, t. ii. p. 87.]

[1] ["In order to show himself to his new subjects, Napoleon traversed his kingdom of Italy. Upon seeing the magnificent city of Genoa and its picturesque environs, he exclaimed—'This is indeed worth a war.'"—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 286.]

[2] ["All the organizations of Italy were provisional. Napoleon wished to make a single power of that great peninsula; for which reason he reserved the iron crown to himself, in order to keep in his own hands the direction of the different people of Italy. "He preferred uniting Genoa, Rome, Tuscany and Piedmont to the empire, rather than to the kingdom of Italy, because the people of those countries preferred it; because the imperial influence would be more powerful; because it was a means of calling a great number of the inhabitants of those countries into France, and of sending a number of French thither in exchange; and because it would bring the conscripts and sailors of those provinces to strengthen the French regiments, and the crews of Toulon."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, t. ii. p. 234.]

CHAPTER XXXI.

Napoleon addresses a Second Letter to the King of England personally—Answered by the British Secretary of State to Talleyrand.—Alliance formed betwixt Russia and England.—Prussia keeps aloof, and the Emperor Alexander visits Berlin.—Austria prepares for War, and marches an Army into Bavaria.—Her impolicy in prematurely commencing Hostilities, and in her Conduct to Bavaria.—Unsoldierlike Conduct of the Austrian General Mack.—Buonaparte is joined by the Electors of Bavaria and Wirtemberg, and the Duke of Baden.—Skilful Manœuvres of the French Generals, and successive losses of the Austrians.—Napoleon violates the Neutrality of Prussia, by marching through Anspach and Bareuth.—Further Losses of the Austrian Leaders, and consequent Disunion among them.—Mack is cooped up in Ulm—Issues a formidable Declaration on the 16th October—and surrenders on the following day.—Fatal Results of this Man's Poltroonery, want of Skill, and probable Treachery.

BUONAPARTE, Consul, had affected to give a direct testimony of his desire to make peace, by opening a communication immediately and personally with the King of Great Britain. Buonaparte, Emperor, had, according to his own interpretation of his proceedings, expiated by his elevation all the crimes of the Revolution, and wiped out for ever

the memory of those illusory visions of liberty and equality, which had alarmed such governments as continued to rest their authority on the ancient basis of legitimacy. He had, in short, according to his own belief, preserved in his system all that the Republic had produced of good, and done away all the memory of that which was evil.

With such pretensions, to say nothing of his absolute power, he hastened to claim admission among the acknowledged Princes of Europe; and a second time (2d January, 1805), by a letter addressed to King George III., personally, under the title of "Sir my Brother," endeavoured to prove, by a string of truisms,—on the preference of a state of peace to war, and on the reciprocal grandeur of France and England, both advanced to the highest pitch of prosperity,—that the hostilities between the nations ought to be ended.[1]

[1] ["Sir and Brother,—Called to the throne of France by Providence, and by the suffrages of the senate, the people, and the army, my first sentiment is a wish for peace. France and England abuse their prosperity. They may contend for ages; but do their Governments well fulfil the most sacred of their duties, and will not so much blood, shed uselessly and without a view to any end, condemn them in their own consciences? I consider it as no disgrace to make the first step. I have, I hope, sufficiently proved to the world, that I fear none of the chances of war; it, besides, presents nothing that I need to fear: peace is the wish of my heart, but war has never been inconsistent with my glory. I conjure your majesty not to deny yourself the happiness of giving peace to the world, nor to leave that sweet satisfaction to your children; for certainly there never was a more fortunate opportunity, nor a moment more favourable, to silence all the passions, and listen only to the sentiments of humanity and reason. This moment once lost, what end can be assigned to a war which all my efforts will not be able to terminate! Your

We have already stated the inconveniences which must necessarily attach to a departure from the usual course of treating between states, and to the transference of the discussions usually intrusted to inferior and responsible agents, to those who are themselves at the head of the nation. But if Napoleon had been serious in desiring peace, and saw any reason for directly communicating with the English King rather than with the English Government, he ought to have made his proposal something more specific than a string of general propositions, which, affirmed on the one side, and undisputed on the other, left the question between the belligerent powers as undecided as formerly. The question was, not whether peace was desi-

majesty has gained more within ten years, both in territory and riches, than the whole extent of Europe. Your nation is at the highest point of prosperity; what can it hope from war? To form a coalition with some powers of the continent? The continent will remain tranquil: a coalition can only increase the preponderance and continental greatness of France. To renew intestine troubles? The times are no longer the same. To destroy our finances? Finances founded on a flourishing agriculture can never be destroyed. To take from France her colonies? The colonies are to France only a secondary object; and does not your majesty already possess more than you know how to preserve? If your majesty would but reflect, you must perceive that the war is without an object, without any presumable result to yourself. Alas! what a melancholy prospect to cause two nations to fight merely for the sake of fighting. The world is sufficiently large for our two nations to live in it, and reason is sufficiently powerful to discover means of reconciling every thing, when the wish for reconciliation exists on both sides. I have, however, fulfilled a sacred duty, and one which is precious to my heart. I trust your majesty will believe in the sincerity of my sentiments, and my wish to give you every proof of it."—NAPOLEON.]

rable, but on what terms it was offered, or could be obtained. If Buonaparte, while stating, as he might have been expected to do, that the jealousies entertained by England of his power were unjust, had agreed, that for the tranquillity of Europe, the weal of both nations, and the respect in which he held the character of the monarch whom he addressed, Malta should remain with Britain in perpetuity, or for a stipulated period, it would have given a serious turn to his overture, which was at present as vague in its tendency, as it was unusual in the form.

The answer to his letter, addressed by the British Secretary of State[1] to M. Talleyrand, declared, that Britain could not make a precise reply to the proposal of peace intimated in Napoleon's letter, until she had communicated with her allies on the continent, and in particular with the Emperor of Russia.

These expressions indicated, what was already well known to Buonaparte, the darkening of another continental storm, about to be directed against his power. On this occasion, Russia was the soul of the confederacy. Since the death of the unfortunate Paul had placed that mighty country under the government of a wise and prudent prince, whose education had been sedulously cultivated, and who had profited in an eminent degree by that advantage, her counsels had been dignified, wise, and moderate. She had offered her mediation

[1] [Lord Mulgrave. For the letter see *Annual Register*, vol. xlvii. p. 616.]

betwixt the belligerent powers, which, accepted willingly by Great Britain, had been somewhat haughtily declined by France, whose ruler was displeased, doubtless, to find that power in the hands of a sharp-sighted and sagacious sovereign, which, when lodged in those of Paul, he might reckon upon as at his own disposal, through his influence over that weak and partial monarch.

From this time, there was coldness betwixt the French and Russian Governments. The murder of the Duke d'Enghien increased the misunderstanding. The Emperor of Russia was too high-spirited to view this scene of perfidy and violence in silence; and as he not only remonstrated with Buonaparte himself, but appealed to the German Diet on the violation of the territories of the Empire,[1] Napoleon, unused to have his actions censured and condemned by others, how powerful soever, seems to have regarded the Emperor Alexander with personal dislike.[2] Russia and Sweden,

[1] [See Note presented to M. Talleyrand, by M. d'Oubril, relative to the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien, April 20, 1804; and also Note of the Minister Resident of Russia, communicated to the Diet of Ratisbon, May 5; Annual Register, vol. xlvi. pp. 642, 654.]

[2] ["As to the Emperor of Russia, he possesses wit, grace, information, is fascinating; but he is not to be trusted; he is a true Greek of the Lower Empire. Would you believe what I had to discuss with him? He maintained that inheritance was an abuse of monarchy, and I had to spend more than an hour, and employ all my eloquence and logic in proving to him that this right constituted the peace and happiness of the people. It may be that he was mystifying; for he is cunning, false, and expert. If I die in St Helena, he will be my real heir in Europe."—Napoleon, *Las Cases*, t. i. p. 300.]

and their monarchs, became the subject of satire and ridicule in the *Moniteur;*[1] and, as every one knew, such arrows were never discharged without Buonaparte's special authority. The latter prince withdrew his ambassador from Paris, and in a public note, delivered to the French envoy at Stockholm, expressed his surprise at the "indecent and ridiculous insolences which Monsieur *Napoleon Buonaparte* had permitted to be inserted in the *Moniteur*."[2] Gustavus was, it is true, of an irregular and violent temper, apt to undertake plans, to the achievement of which the strength of his kingdom was inadequate;[3] yet he would scarcely have expressed himself with so little veneration for the most formidable authority in Europe, had he not been confident in the support of the Czar. In fact, on the 10th of January, 1805, the King of Sweden had signed a treaty of close alliance with Russia; and, as a necessary consequence, on the 31st of October following, he published a declara-

[1] [See Moniteur, 14th August, 1804.]

[2] [See Note presented by order of the King of Sweden to M. Caillard, the French Chargé d'Affaires at Stockholm, Sept. 7, 1804; Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 697.]

[3] ["On my accession to the sovereignty, Gustavus declared himself my great antagonist; it might have been supposed, that nothing short of renewing the exploits of the great Gustavus Adolphus would have satisfied him. He ran over the whole of Germany, for the purpose of stirring up enemies against me. At the time of the catastrophe of the Duke d'Enghien, he swore he would exact vengeance in person; and at a later period, he insolently sent back the black eagle to the King of Prussia, because the latter had accepted my Legion of Honour."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. v. p. 168.]

tion of war against France, in terms personally insulting to Napoleon.[1]

Russia and England, in the mean time, had engaged in an alliance, the general purpose of which was to form a league upon the continent, to compel the French Government to consent to the re-establishment of the balance of Europe. The objects proposed were briefly the independence of Holland and Switzerland; the evacuation of Hanover and the north of Germany by the French troops; the restoration of Piedmont to the King of Sardinia; and the complete evacuation of Italy by the French.[2] These were gigantic schemes, for which suitable efforts were to be made. Five hundred thousand men were to be employed; and Britain, besides affording the assistance of her forces by sea and land, was to pay large subsidies for supporting the armies of the coalition.

Great Britain and Russia were the animating sources of this new coalition against France; but it was impossible, considering the insular situation of the first of those powers, and the great distance of the second from the scene of action, that they alone, without the concurrence of the Emperor of Austria and the King of Prussia, should be able to assail France with any prospect of making a successful impression. Every effort, therefore, was used to awaken those states to a sense of the daily repeated encroachments of Buonaparte, and

[1] [See Annual Register, vol. xlvii. p. 717.]
[2] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 82.]

of the extreme danger to which they were respectively exposed by the rapidly increasing extent of his empire.

But since the unsuccessful campaign of the year 1792, Prussia had observed a cautious and wary neutrality. She had seen, not perhaps without secret pleasure, the humiliation of Austria, her natural rival in Germany, and she had taken many opportunities to make acquisition of petty objects of advantage, in consequence of the various changes upon the continent; so that she seemed to find her own interest in the successes of France. It is imagined, also, that Buonaparte had found some of her leading statesmen not altogether inaccessible to influence of a different kind, by the liberal exercise of which he was enabled to maintain a strong interest in the Prussian councils.[1] But the principles of these ministers were far from being shared by the nation at large. The encroachments on the German Empire intimately concerned the safety of Prussia, and the nation saw, in the decay of the Austrian influence, the creation and increase of a strong German party in favour of France, to whom Bavaria, Wirtemberg, and almost all the petty princes upon the Rhine, and its vicinity, began now to look up with the devotion and reverence which had hitherto been paid to the great states of Austria and Prussia. The subjects of the Great Frederick also remembered his numerous victories, and, proud of the army which he had created and bequeathed to his successor, felt neither apprehen-

[1] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 165.]

sion nor unwillingness at the thought of measuring forces with the Dictator of Europe. The councils, therefore, of Prussia were divided; and though those which were favourable to France prevailed so far as to prevent her immediately becoming a member of the coalition, yet, by increasing her army to the war establishment, and marching forces towards the country which appeared about to become the scene of hostilities, Prussia gave plain intimation that the continuance of her neutrality depended upon the events of war.

To animate her councils, if possible, with a more decided spirit, Alexander visited the court of Berlin in person. He was received with the utmost distinction, and both the King of Prussia, and his beautiful and interesting queen, gave manifest tokens of the share they took personally in the success of the alliance. An oath was taken by the two sovereigns at the tomb of the Great Frederick, by which they are said to have devoted themselves to the liberation of Germany,[1] —a vow which, though at a distant period, they amply redeemed. Still, whatever might be the personal opinions of the King of Prussia, the counsels of Haugwitz continued to influence his Cabinet; and the Emperor withdrew from Berlin, to place himself at the head of his troops, while the Prussian monarch, assembling an army of observation, assumed the menacing air of a neutral who feels himself able to turn the scale in favour of either of the belligerent powers at his pleasure.

Oct. 25.

[1] [Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 170; Jomini, t. ii. p. 137.]

This was not the moment for Buonaparte to take offence at these demonstrations, as the doing so might convert a doubtful friend into an avowed and determined enemy. But the dubious policy of Prussia was not forgotten,—it was carefully treasured in Napoleon's memory, as that for which she was to be called to account at a future period. In the mean time, he had the full advantage of her hesitating councils and doubtful neutrality.

Austria was more accessible to the application of the allies. Notwithstanding the disasters of the last two wars, the loss of a large portion of Italy, the disasters of Bellegarde, Alvinzi, and Wurmser, and the disastrous defeats of Marengo and Hohenlinden, the extent and military character of her population, amongst whom a short interval of peace was sufficient to recruit the losses of the most bloody war,—above all, the haughty determination of a Cabinet remarkable for the tenacity with which they retain and act upon the principles which they have once adopted, induced her Government to accede to the alliance betwixt Russia and Great Britain. She had not forgotten the successes which her generals and armies had obtained when fighting by the side of Suwarrow, and might hope to see once more renewed the victories of Trebia and of Novi. She therefore increased her force in every quarter; and while the Archduke Charles took the command of eighty thousand men in Italy, on which country Austria always kept a wishful eye, eighty thousand more, destined to act upon the Lech, and it was hoped upon the Rhine, were placed under the charge of

General Mack, whose factitious and ill-merited reputation had, unfortunately for Austria, remained unabated, notwithstanding his miserable Neapolitan campaign in 1799. The Archduke Ferdinand, a prince of great courage and hopes, was the nominal commander of the last-mentioned army, while the real authority was lodged in this old and empty professor of tactics. To conclude this detail of preparation, the Archduke John was appointed to command in the Tyrol.[1]

It remained only to try the event of negotiation, ere finally proceeding to military extremities. It was not difficult to state the causes of the war, which was now about to break out anew. By the peace of Luneville, finally concluded between Austria and France, the independence of the Italian, Helvetian, and Batavian republics had been stipulated; but instead of such terms being complied with, Napoleon, rendering himself Grand Mediator of Switzerland and King of Italy, had at the same time filled Holland with troops, and occupied the whole three countries in such a manner, as made them virtually, and almost avowedly, the absolute dependencies of France.

Complaints on these heads, warmly urged by Austria, were sharply answered by France, who in her turn accused Austria of want of confidence, and of assuming arms in the midst of peace.[2] The Emperor of Russia interfered, and sent a special

[1] [Jomini, Vie Politique et Militaire, t. ii. p. 97-101.]

[2] [See two Notes, delivered on the 13th and 16th April, by M. de Talleyrand to Count Cobentzel, Annual Register, vol. xlvii. pp. 644, 648.]

ambassador to Paris, with the purpose of coming, if possible, to an amicable accommodation, which might even yet preserve the tranquillity of Europe. But ere Novosiltzoff had reached his place of destination, the union of Genoa with the French empire was announced; an encroachment which, joined to Napoleon's influence in Switzerland, rendered the whole north-western frontier of Italy completely open for the march of French armies, and precluded the possible hope of that fine country assuming any character of independence, even if, at a future time, its crown should be vested in a person different from the ruler of France.[1]

Upon hearing of this new usurpation, made at the very time when Napoleon's steps towards the aggrandisement of his power were under challenge, Russia countermanded her ambassador; and Austria, after the exchange of some more angry notes, began her daring enterprise by marching a large army upon Bavaria.[2] It would have been better, probably, had the Emperor Francis suspended this decisive measure, and continued to protract, if possible, the negotiation, until the Russian auxiliary

[1] [Mémoires de Savary, t. ii. p. 123; Jomini, t. ii. p. 93.]

[2] [" The public, who had been solely occupied with the projected invasion of England, saw, with astonishment, in the *Moniteur* of the 21st September, the announcement of the invasion of Bavaria by Austria, without any rupture or previous declaration of war. What a fortunate diversion for the French Emperor! It saved his maritime honour, and probably preserved him from a disaster which would have destroyed both himself and his ancient empire. The army hastened to abandon the Boulogne coast. It was a magnificent one, and felt the highest enthusiasm at quitting a state of irksome inaction, to march on towards the Rhine."—Fouché, t. i. p. 291.]

armies, two in number, of fifty thousand men each, could have advanced to the assistance of their allies; or until a sense of the approaching crisis had removed the indecision in the Prussian councils, and induced the King to join the coalition. Either of these events, and more especially both, might have given a very different turn to this disastrous campaign.[1]

But Austria was not alone to be blamed for precipitating the war—she exposed herself to censure by the mode in which she conducted it. Occupying Bavaria with numerous forces, the elector was required to join the confederacy. Maximilian of Bavaria was not disinclined to unite his forces with those which proposed for their object the defence of Germany; but he pleaded that his son, now travelling in France, would be made responsible, should he join the coalition. "On my knees," he said, in a letter [September 8] to the Emperor Francis, "I implore you for permission to remain neutral."[2] His reasonable request was rejected, and the elector was required to join the confederacy with a violence of urgency, both unjust and impolitic. He was farther given to understand, that his troops would not be permitted to remain as a separate army, but must be incorporated with those of Austria. These were terms so harsh, as

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 95.]

[2] ["I pledge," he added, "my most sacred word to your majesty, that my troops shall not, in the smallest degree, interfere with the operations of your army. It is a father, a prey to the most frightful despair, that applies for mercy in favour of his son."—See *Annual Register*, vol. xlvii. p. 710.]

to render even the precarious alliance of France preferable to submission. Maximilian, retreating from his capital of Munich to Wurtzburg, and withdrawing his army into Franconia, again endeavoured to negotiate for neutrality. It was again imperiously refused; and while the Austrian Government insisted that the elector should join them with his whole forces, the Austrian troops were permitted to conduct themselves as in an enemy's country; requisitions were raised, and other measures resorted to, tending to show that the invaders remembered the ancient grudge which had so long subsisted between Bavaria and Austria. It was natural that the Bavarian prince, incensed at this treatment, should regard the allies as enemies, and wait the arrival of the French as liberators.

The military manœuvres of the Austrian army were not more able, than her conduct towards the neutral state of Bavaria was politic or just. There are two errors, equally fatal, into which a general of middling or inferior talent is apt to fall, when about to encounter with an adversary of genius. If he mixes presumption with his weakness of parts, he will endeavour to calculate the probable motions of his antagonist; and having, as he supposes, ascertained what they are likely to be, will attempt to anticipate and interrupt them, and thereby expose himself to some signal disaster, by mistaking the principle on which his enemy designs to act. Or, if intimidated by the reputation of the commander opposed to him, such a general is apt to remain passive and irresolute, until the motions

of the enemy make his purpose evident, at a time when it is probably impossible to prevent his attaining it. It was left for General Mack,[1] within the space of a very brief campaign, to unite both characters; and fall first into errors of rashness and presumption, afterwards into those of indecision and cowardice.

It required little experience to know, that, after two singularly unfortunate wars, every precaution should have been taken to bring the Austrian troops into contact with their enemy, under such advantages of position and numbers as might counterbalance the feelings of discouragement with which the bravest soldiers must be affected, in consequence of a course of defeat and disaster so uniform, that there seemed to be a fate in it. In this point of view, the Austrian armies ought to have halted on their own territories, where the river Inn forms a strong and excellent line of defence, extending betwixt the Tyrol and the Danube, into which the Inn empties itself at Passau. Supposing Mack's large force concentrated, with this formidable barrier in front, it seems as if the Austrians might have easily maintained a defensive position until the armies of Russia appeared to support them.

If, determined upon the imperious and unjust aggression on Bavaria, Mack found it necessary to

[1] ["The Austrian army was nominally under the command of the Archduke Ferdinand; but orders had been given him to follow implicitly the advice of Mack, whom all Germany fancied a great general notwithstanding the glaring incapacity he had already shown in Flanders and at Naples."—JOMINI, t. ii. p. 101.]

advance more to the westward than the line of the Inn, in order to secure the country of the elector, the Lech, in its turn, offered him a position in which he might have awaited the Russians, though their junction must necessarily have been protracted, in proportion to the extent of his advance. But it was the choice of this unlucky tactician to leave Bavaria also behind him, and, approaching the frontiers of France, to take possession of Ulm, Memmingen, and the line of the Iller and Danube, where he fortified himself with great care, as if to watch the defiles of the Black Forest. It can only be thought by those who judge most favourably of Mack's intentions, that, as the passes of that celebrated forest had been frequently the route by which the French invaded Germany, he had concluded it must therefore be by that road, and no other, that their approach on the present occasion was to be expected. Knowing with whom he had to contend, the Austrian general ought to have suspected the direct contrary; for Buonaparte's manœuvres were not more distinguished by talent, than by novelty and originality of design.[1]

It is not to be supposed that this great confederacy took at unawares one who had so many reasons for being alert. The Austrian forces, though they had commenced the campaign so hastily, were not more early ready for the field, than were the immense armies of the French empire. The camps at Boulogne, so long assembled on the shores of the Channel, were now to be

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 107.]

relieved from their inactivity;[1] and serious as the danger was in which their assistance was required, Buonaparte was perhaps not displeased at finding a fair pretext to withdraw from the invasion to which he had hastily pledged himself. This formidable assemblage of troops, laying aside the appellation of the Army of England, was hereafter distinguished by that of the Grand Army. At the same time, the armies maintained in Holland, and in the North of Germany, were put into motion.

In this remarkable campaign Buonaparte commenced, for the first time, the system of issuing official bulletins, for the purpose of announcing to the French nation his accounts of success, and impressing upon the public mind what truths he desired them to know, and, at the same time, what falsehoods he was desirous they should believe. In every country, such official accounts will naturally have a partial character, as every government must desire to represent the result of its measures in as favourable a light as possible. Where there

[1] ["The Emperor, before he left Boulogne, had in haste sent orders to the banks of the Rhine to collect draught horses, and to provide as large a quantity as possible of *materiel* for artillery. We were taken quite unawares; and it required all the activity of the Emperor to supply that army, on the spur of the occasion, with what it needed for the campaign, into which it was so suddenly forced. He, however, had already calculated and foreseen every thing. The maps of England had disappeared: those of Germany alone were admitted into his cabinet. He made us follow the march of the troops; and one day addressed to us these remarkable words: 'If the enemy comes to meet me, I will destroy him before he has repassed the Danube; if he waits for me, I will take him between Augsburg and Ulm.' He issued the last orders to the navy and to the army, and set out for Paris." —Savary, t. ii. p. 91.]

is a free press, however, the deception cannot be carried to extremity; imposture cannot be attempted, on a grand scale at least, where it can be contrasted with other sources of information, or refuted by arguments derived from evidence. But Buonaparte had the unlimited and exclusive privilege of saying what he pleased, without contradiction or commentary, and he was liberal in using a license which could not be checked. Yet his bulletins are valuable historical documents, as well as the papers in the *Moniteur*, which he himself frequently composed or superintended. Much correct information there certainly is; and that which is less accurate is interesting, since it shows, if not actual truths, at least what Napoleon desired should be received as such, and so throws considerable light both on his schemes and on his character.

Buonaparte communicated to the Senate the approach of war, by a report, dated 23d September,[1] in which, acquainting them with the cause of quarrel betwixt himself and the allied powers, he asked, and of course obtained, two decrees; one for ordering eighty thousand conscripts to the

[1] ["The wishes of the eternal enemies of the continent are accomplished; war has commenced in the midst of Germany, Austria and Russia have united with England; and our generation is again involved in all the calamities of war. But a very few days ago I cherished a hope that peace would not be disturbed. Threats and outrages only showed that they could make no impression upon me; but the Austrians have passed the Inn; Munich is invaded; the Elector of Bavaria is driven from his capital; *all* my hopes are therefore vanished. I tremble at the idea of the blood that must be spilt in Europe; but the French name will emerge with renovated and increased lustre."]

field, another for the organization of the National Guard.[1] He then put himself at the head of his forces, and proceeded to achieve the destruction of Mack's army, not as at Marengo by one great general battle, but by a series of grand manœuvres, and a train of partial actions necessary to execute them, which rendered assistance and retreat alike impossible. These manœuvres we can only indicate; nor can they perhaps be well understood without the assistance of the map.

While Mack expected the approach of the French upon his front, Buonaparte had formed the daring resolution to turn the flank of the Austrian general, cut him off from his country and his resources, and reduce him to the necessity, either of surrender, or of giving battle without a hope of success. To execute this great conception, the French army was parted into six grand divisions. That of Bernadotte, evacuating Hanover, which it

[1] [He started next day for Strasburg, and on reaching that city issued the following proclamation to the army :—

"Soldiers! The war of the third coalition has begun. The Austrian army has passed the Inn, violated treaties, and has attacked and driven our ally from his capital. You yourselves have been compelled to advance by forced marches to the defence of our frontiers. Already you have passed the Rhine. We will not again make peace without a sufficient guarantee. Our policy shall no more give way to our generosity. Soldiers, your Emperor is in the midst of you. You are only the advanced guard of a great people. If it should be necessary, they will all rise at my voice to confound and dissolve this new league which has been formed by the hatred and the gold of England. But, soldiers, we shall have forced marches to make, fatigues and privations of every kind to endure. Whatever obstacles may be opposed to us, we will overcome them, and we shall take no rest until we have planted our eagles on the territory of our enemy."]

had hitherto occupied, and traversing Hesse, seemed as if about to unite itself to the main army, which had now reached the Rhine on all points. But its real destination was soon determined, when, turning towards the left, Bernadotte ascended the river Maine, and at Wurtzburg formed a junction with the Elector of Bavaria, who, with the troops which had followed him into Franconia, immediately declared for the French cause.

The Elector of Wirtemberg and the Duke of Baden followed the same line of politics; and thus Austria had arrayed against her those very German princes, whom a moderate conduct towards Bavaria might perhaps have rendered neutral; France, at the outset of the contest, scarce having the power to compel them to join her standard. The other five columns of French troops, under Ney, Soult, Davoust, Lannes, and Marmont, crossed the Rhine at different points, and entered Germany to the northward of Mack's position; while Murat, who made his passage at Kehl, approaching the Black Forest, manœuvred in such a manner as to confirm Mack in his belief, that the main attack was to come from that quarter. But the direction of all the other divisions intimated that it was the object of the French Emperor to move round the right wing of the Austrians, by keeping on the north or left side of the Danube, and then by crossing that river, to put themselves in the rear of Mack's army, and interpose betwixt him and Vienna. For this purpose, Soult, who had crossed at Spires, directed his march upon Augsburg; while, to interrupt the communication

betwixt that city and Ulm, the Austrian headquarters, Murat and Lannes had advanced to Wertingen, where a smart action took place. The Austrians lost all their cannon, and it was said four thousand men—an ominous commencement of the campaign. The action would have been termed a battle, had the armies been on a smaller scale; but where such great numbers were engaged on either side, it did not rank much above a skirmish.[1]

With the same purpose of disquieting Mack in his headquarters, and preventing him from attending to what passed on his left wing and rear, Ney, who advanced from Stutgard, attacked the bridges over the Danube at Guntzburg, which were gallantly but fruitlessly defended by the Archduke Ferdinand, who had advanced from Ulm to that place. The archduke lost many guns, and nearly three thousand men.[2]

In the mean time, an operation took place, which marked, in the most striking manner, the inflexible and decisive character of Napoleon's counsels, compared with those of the ancient courts of Europe. To accomplish the French plan, of interposing betwixt Mack and the supplies and reinforcements, both Austrian and Russian, which were in motion towards him, it was necessary that all the French divisions should be directed upon Nordlingen, and particularly that the division under Bernadotte, which now included the Bavarian troops, should accomplish a simultaneous movement in that direc-

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 108; Savary, t. ii. p. 99.]
[2] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 112.]

tion. But there was no time for the last-mentioned general to get into the desired position, unless by violating the neutrality of Prussia, and taking the straight road to the scene of operations, by marching through the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, belonging to that power. A less daring general, a more timid politician than Napoleon, would have hesitated to commit such an aggression at such a moment. Prussia, undecided in her counsels, was yet known to be, in point of national spirit, hostilely disposed towards France; and a marked outrage of this nature was likely to raise the indignation of the people in general to a point which Haugwitz and his party might be unable to stem. The junction of Prussia with the allies at a moment so critical, might be decisive of the fate of the campaign, and well if the loss ended there.

Yet, with these consequences before his eyes, Napoleon knew, on the other hand, that it was not want of pretexts to go to war which prevented Prussia from drawing the sword, but diffidence in the power of the allies to resist the arms and fortune of France. If, therefore, by violating the territory of Prussia, he should be able to inflict a sudden and terrible blow upon the allies, he reckoned truly, that the court of Berlin would be more astounded at his success, than irritated at the means which he had taken to obtain it. Bernadotte received, therefore, the Emperor's commands to march through the territory of Anspach and Bareuth, which were only defended by idle protests and reclamations of the rights of neutrality.

The news of this aggression gave the utmost offence at the Prussian court; and the call for war, which alone could right their injured honour, became almost unanimous through the nation. But while the general irritation, which Buonaparte of course foresaw, was thus taking place on the one side, the success which he had achieved over the Austrians acted on the other as a powerful sedative.[1]

The spirit of enterprise had deserted Mack as soon as actual hostilities commenced. With the usual fault of Austrian generals, he had extended his position too far, and embraced too many points of defence, rendering his communications difficult, and offering facilities for Buonaparte's favourite tactics, of attacking and destroying in detail the divisions opposed to him. The defeat at Guntzburg induced Mack at length to concentrate his army around Ulm; but Bavaria and Suabia were now fully in possession of the French and Bavarians; and the Austrian General Spangenberg, surrounded in Memmingen, was compelled to lay down his arms with five thousand men.[2] The

[1] ["Sir Walter Scott blames the violation of the territory of Bareuth; but, how little have these neutralities been respected by conquerors! Witness the invasion of Switzerland at the end of 1813, so fatal to France!"—Louis Buonaparte, p. 43.]

[2] ["This intelligence reached Napoleon in a wretched bivouac, which was so wet, that it was necessary to seek a plank for him to keep his feet out of the water. He had just received this capitulation, when Prince Maurice Lichtenstein, whom Mack had sent with a flag of truce, was announced. He came to treat for the evacuation of Ulm: the army which occupied it demanded permission to return to Austria. The Emperor could not forbear smiling, and said, 'What reason have I to comply

French had crossed the Rhine about the 26th September; it was now the 13th October, and they could scarcely be said to have begun the campaign, when they had made, on various points, not fewer than twenty thousand prisoners. Napoleon, however, expected that resistance from Mack's despair, which no other motive had yet engaged him to offer; and he announced to his army the prospect of a general action. He called on his soldiers to revenge themselves on the Austrians for the loss of the plunder of London, of which, but for this new continental war, they would have been already in possession. He pointed out to them, that, as at Marengo, he had cut the enemy off from his reserves and resources, and he summoned them to signalize Ulm by a battle, which should be yet more decisive.[1]

with this demand? in a week you will be in my power, without conditions?' Prince Maurice protested, that without the conditions which he demanded, the army should not leave the place. 'I shall not grant them,' rejoined the Emperor; 'there is the capitulation of Memmingen; carry it to Marshal Mack, and whatever may be your resolutions in Ulm, I will never grant him any other terms: besides, I am in no hurry; the longer he delays, the worse he will render his own situation, and that of you all. For the rest, I shall have the corps which took Memmingen here to-morrow, and we shall then see.'"—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 96.]

[1] ["Soldiers! But for the army which is now in front of you, we should this day have been in London; we should have avenged ourselves for six centuries of insults, and restored the freedom of the seas! But bear in mind to-morrow, that you are fighting against the allies of England; that you have to avenge yourselves on a perjured prince, whose own letters breathed nothing but peace, at the moment when he was marching his army against our ally! Soldiers! to-morrow will be a hundred

No general action, however, took place, though several sanguinary affairs of a partial nature were fought, and terminated uniformly to the misfortune of the Austrians. In the mean time, disunion took place among their generals. The Archduke Ferdinand, Schwartzenberg, afterwards destined to play a remarkable part in this changeful history, with Collowrath and others, seeing themselves invested by toils which were daily narrowed upon them, resolved to leave Mack and his army, and cut their way into Bohemia at the head of the cavalry. The archduke executed this movement with the greatest gallantry, but not without considerable loss. Indeed, the behaviour of the Austrian princes of the blood throughout these wars was such, as if Fate had meant to mitigate the disasters of the Imperial House, by showing forth the talents and bravery of their ancient race, and proving, that although Fortune frowned on them, Honour remained faithful to their line. Ferdinand, after much fighting, and considerable damage done and received, at length brought six thousand cavalry in safety to Egra, in Bohemia.[1]

Mean while, Mack found himself, with the remains of his army, cooped up in Ulm, as Wurmser had been in Mantua. He published an order of the day, which intimated an intention to imitate the persevering defence of that heroic veteran. He forbade the word surrender to be used by any one —he announced the arrival of two powerful armies,

times more celebrated than the day of Marengo. I have placed the enemy in the same position."]

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 123.]

one of Austrians, one of Russians, whose appearance would presently raise the blockade—he declared his determination to eat horse-flesh rather than listen to any terms of capitulation. This bravado appeared on the 16th October, and the conditions of surrender were subscribed by Mack on the next day, having been probably in the course of adjustment when he was making these notable professions of resistance.[1]

The course of military misconduct which we have traced, singular as it is, might be perhaps referred to folly or incapacity on the part of Mack, though it must be owned it was of that gross kind which civilians consider as equal to fraud. But another circumstance remains to be told, which goes far to prove that this once celebrated and trusted general had ingrafted the traitor upon the fool. The terms of capitulation, as subscribed on the 17th October, bore, that there should be an armistice until 26th October at midnight; and that if, during this space, an Austrian or Russian army should appear to raise the blockade, the army at Ulm should have liberty to join them, with their arms and baggage. This stipulation allowed the Austrian soldiers some hope of relief, and in any event it was sure to interrupt the progress of Buonaparte's successes, by detaining the principal part of his army in the neighbourhood of Ulm, until the term of nine days was expired. But Mack consented to a revision of these terms, a thing which

[1] [For the terms of the capitulation of Ulm, see Annual Register, vol. xlvii. p. 662.]

would scarcely have been proposed to a man of honour, and signed on the 19th a second capitulation, by which he consented to evacuate Ulm on the day following;[1] thus abridging considerably, at a crisis when every minute was precious, any advantage, direct or contingent, which the Austrians could have derived from the delay originally stipulated. No reason has ever been alleged for this concession. Buonaparte, indeed, had given Mack an audience[2] previous to the signing of this additional article of capitulation, and what arguments he then employed must be left to conjecture.[3]

The effects of Mack's poltroonery, want of skill,

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 126.]

[2] ["Marshal Mack paid the Emperor a visit at the abbey of Elchingen. He kept him a long time, and made him talk a great deal. It was on this interview that he learned all the circumstances which had preceded the resolution of the Austrian Cabinet to make war upon him. He was made acquainted with all the springs which the Russians had set to work to decide it; and lastly, with the plans of the coalition."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 98.]

[3] ["It must owned, that Napoleon did not think himself justified in resting his sole dependence upon his excellent troops. He recollected the saying of Machiavel: that a prudent prince must be both a fox and a lion at the same time. After having well studied his new field of battle, (for it was the first time he made war in Germany,) he told us, that we should soon see that the campaigns of Moreau were nothing in comparison with his. In fact, he acted admirably in order to derange Mack's plans, who permitted himself to be petrified in his position of Ulm. All the Emperor's spies were more easily purchased than may be conceived. Almost all the Austrian staff-officers were virtually gained over. I had intrusted Savary, who was employed in the management of the *espionage* at the grand headquarters, with all my secret notes upon Germany, and, with his hands full, he worked quickly and successfully."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 291.]

and probable treachery, were equal to the results of a great victory. Artillery, baggage, and military stores, were given up to an immense extent. Eight general officers surrendered upon parole, upwards of 20,000 men became prisoners of war, and were marched into France. The numbers of the prisoners taken in this campaign were so great, that Buonaparte distributed them amongst the agriculturists, that their work in the fields might make up for the absence of the conscripts, whom he had withdrawn from such labour. The experiment was successful; and from the docile habits of the Germans, and the good-humour of their French employers, this new species of servitude suited both parties, and went some length to soften the hardships of war. For not the field of battle itself, with its wounded and dead, is a more distressing sight to humanity and reflection, than prison-barracks and hulks, in which hundreds and thousands of prisoners are delivered up to idleness, and all the evils which idleness is sure to introduce, and not unfrequently to disease and death. Buonaparte meditated introducing this alteration into the usages of war upon a great scale, and thought of regimenting his prisoners for the purpose of labouring on public works. His jurists objected to the proposal as contrary to the law of nations.[1]

[1] ["I intended to enrol them in regiments, and to make them labour under military discipline, at public works and monuments. They should have received whatever money they earned, and would thus have been secured against the misery of absolute idleness, and the disorders arising out of it. They would have

This scruple might have been avoided, by employing only volunteers, which would also have prevented the appearance of retrograding towards those barbarous times, when the captive of the sword became the slave of his victor. But national character would, in most instances, render the scheme impracticable. Thus, an attempt was afterwards made to dispose of the Spanish prisoners in a similar way, who in most cases made their escape, and in some rose upon and destroyed their task-masters. A French soldier would, in like manner, make an indifferent serf to an English farmer, an English prisoner a still more intractable assistant to a French agriculturist. The advantages of comparative freedom would be in both cases counterbalanced, by a feeling of degradation in the personal subjection experienced.

When the general officers of the Austrians[1] were admitted to a personal interview with the French

been well fed and clothed, and would have wanted for nothing, without being a burden on the state. But my idea did not meet the approval of the Council of State, which, in this instance, was swayed by the mistaken philanthropy, that it would be unjust and cruel to compel men to labour."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. vii. p. 45.]

[1] ["The 19th October arrived. The drums beat—the bands played; the gates of Ulm opened; the Austrian army advanced in silence, filed off slowly, and went, corps by corps, to lay down its arms on a spot which had been prepared to receive them. The ceremony occupied the whole day. The Emperor was posted on a little hill in front of the centre of his army; a great fire had been lighted, and by this fire he received the Austrian generals, to the number of seventeen. They were all very dull: it was the Emperor who kept up the conversation."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 100.]

Emperor, he behaved with courtesy to Klenau and others of reputation, whose character had become known to him in the Italian campaigns. But he complained of the politics of their court, which he said had forced him into war when he knew not what he was fighting for. He prophesied the fall of the House of Austria, unless his brother the Emperor hastened to make peace, and reprobated the policy which brought the uncivilized Russians to interfere in the decision of more cultivated countries than their own. Mack[1] had the impudence to reply, that the Emperor of Austria had been forced into the war by Russia. "Then," said Napoleon, "you no longer exist as an independent power." The whole conversation appeared in the bulletin[2] of the day, which also insinuates, with little probability, that the Austrian officers and soldiers concurred generally in blaming the alliance between their own Emperor and Alexander.[3] From this we infer, that the union between those two

[1] It will be unnecessary again to mention this man's name, of which our readers are doubtless as much tired as we ourselves are. He was committed to a state prison, in a remote part of the Austrian dominions; and whether he died in captivity, or was set at liberty, we have not learned, nor are we anxious to know. —[On his return to Austria, Mack was arrested, and sent to the citadel of Brunn, in Moravia, whence he was transferred to the fortress of Josephstadt, in Bohemia. He was tried by a military commission and condemned to death; but the penalty was commuted by the Emperor for two years' imprisonment, and the loss of rank.]

[2] [Tenth Official Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

[3] ["This conversation was not lost upon all: none of them, however, made any reply."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 100.]

powerful sovereigns was, even in the moment of this great success, a subject of apprehension to Buonaparte; whose official notes are sometimes expressed with generosity towards the vanquished, who had ceased to struggle, but always with an eager tone of reproach and offence towards those from whom an animated resistance was to be apprehended.

CHAPTER XXXII.

Position of the French Armies—Napoleon advances towards Vienna.—The Emperor Francis leaves his Capital.—French enter Vienna on the 13th November.—Review of the French Successes in Italy and the Tyrol.—Schemes of Napoleon to force on a general Battle.—Battle of Austerlitz is fought on the 2d December, and the combined Austro-Russian Armies completely defeated.—Interview betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon.—The Emperor Alexander retreats towards Russia.—Treaty of Presburgh signed on the 26th December—Its Conditions—Fate of the King of Sweden—and of the Two Sicilies.

THE tide of war now rolled eastward, having surmounted and utterly demolished the formidable barrier which was opposed to it. Napoleon placed himself at the head of his central army.[1] Ney, upon

[1] [From Elchingen, Oct. 21, Napoleon issued the following address to the army :—" Soldiers of the Grand Army ! In a fortnight we have finished a campaign : we have expelled the troops of the house of Austria from Bavaria, and re-established our ally in the sovereignty of his estates. That army which, with equal ostentation and imprudence, had posted itself on our frontiers, is annihilated. Soldiers ! you owe this success to your unbounded confidence in your Emperor ; to your patience in supporting fatigues and privations of every description ; and to your singular intrepidity. But we will not stop here. You are impatient to commence a second campaign. We are about to make the Russian army, which the gold of England has transported from

his right, was ready to repel any descent which might be made from the passes of the Tyrol. Murat, on his left, watched the motions of the Austrians, under the Archduke Ferdinand, who, refusing to join in the unworthy capitulation of Ulm, had cut their way into Bohemia, and there united themselves with other forces, either stationed in that kingdom, or who had, like themselves, escaped thither. Lastly, the division of Augereau (who had recently advanced from France at the head of an army of reserve), occupying part of Swabia, served to protect the rear of the French army against any movement from the Vorarlberg; and at the same time menaced the Prussians, in case, acting upon the offence given by the violation of their territory, they should have crossed the Danube, and engaged in the war.[1]

If, however, the weight of Prussia had been thrown into the scale with sufficient energy at this decisive moment, it would not probably have been any resistance which Augereau could have offered that could have saved Napoleon from a perilous situation, since the large armies of the new enemy would have been placed in his rear, and, of course, his communications with France entirely cut off. It was a crisis of the same kind which opened to Austria in the year 1813; but she was then taught

the extremities of the universe, undergo the same fate. Here there are no generals in combating against whom I can have any glory to acquire. All my care shall be to obtain the victory with the least possible effusion of blood. My soldiers are my children."]

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 133.]

wisdom by experience, and availed herself of the golden opportunity which Prussia now suffered to escape. Buonaparte had reckoned with accuracy upon the timid and fluctuating councils of that power. The aggression on their territories of Anspach and Bareuth was learned at Berlin; but then the news of the calamity sustained by the Austrians at Ulm succeeded these tidings almost instantly, and while the first article of intelligence seemed to urge instant hostilities, the next was calculated to warn them against espousing a losing cause.

Thus trusting to the vacillating and timid policy of Prussia,[1] Napoleon, covered on his flank and rear as we have stated, continued to push forward[2] with his central forces towards Vienna, menaced repeatedly in the former wars, but whose fate seemed decided after the disaster of Ulm. It is true, that an army, partly consisting of Russians and partly of Austrians, had pressed forward to prevent that disgraceful calamity, and, finding that the capitulation had taken place, were now retreating step by

[1] ["The conduct of Prussia at this period was conformable to the wholesome policy which had so long connected this power with France. It is not for us, Frenchmen, to reproach her inaction at this important crisis, even while criticising her raising the shield before Jena. Until then, Prussia had showed herself reasonable, in not allowing herself to be drawn into new coalitions."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 44.]

[2] ["Napoleon was always on horseback whatever weather it might be, travelling in his carriage only when his army was two or three marches in advance. This was a calculation on his part, the point always entered into in his combinations, and to him distances were nothing: he traversed them with the swiftness of eagles."—Savary, t. ii. p. 103.]

step in front of the advancing French; but, not exceeding forty-five thousand men, they were unable to make any effectual stand upon the Inn, the Traun, the Ens, or in any other position which might have covered Vienna. They halted, indeed, repeatedly, made a considerable show of resistance, and fought some severe though partial actions; but always ended by continuing their retreat, which was now directed upon Moravia, where the grand Russian army had already assembled, under the command of the Emperor Alexander, and were expecting still further reinforcements under General Buxhowden.[1]

Some attempts were made to place Vienna in a state of defence, and the inhabitants were called upon to rise in mass for that purpose. But as the fortifications were ancient and in disrepair, an effort at resistance could only have occasioned the destruction of the city. The Emperor Francis saw himself, therefore, under the necessity of endeavouring to provide for the safety of his capital by negotiation, and for that of his person by leaving it. On the 7th November, accordingly, he departed from Vienna for Brunn in Moravia, in order to place himself under the protection of the Russian forces.

On the same day, but late in the evening, Count Giulay arrived at Buonaparte's headquarters, then established at Lintz, with a proposal for an armistice, previous to a general negotiation for peace. Napoleon refused to listen to the proposal, unless Venice and the Tyrol were put into his hands.

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 133; Savary, t. ii. p. 101. Fourteenth and Fifteenth Bulletins of the Grand Army.]

These terms were too hard to be accepted.[1] Vienna, therefore, was left to its fate; and that proud capital of the proud House of Austria remained an unresisting prize to the invader.

On the 13th November the French took possession of Vienna, where they obtained an immense quantity of military stores, arms, and clothing;[2] a part of which spoils were bestowed by Napoleon on his ally the Elector of Bavaria, who now witnessed the humiliation of the Imperial House which had of late conducted itself so haughtily towards him. General Clarke was appointed Governor of Vienna; and by a change as rapid as if it had taken place on the stage, the new Emperor of France occupied Schonbrunn, the splendid palace of the long-descended Emperor of Austria. But though such signal successes had crowned the commencement of the campaign, it was necessary to defeat the haughty Russians, in whose aid the Emperor of Austria still confided, before the object of the war could be considered as attained. The broken and shattered remnant of the Austrian forces had rallied from different quarters around the yet untouched army of Alexander; and although the latter retreated from Brunn towards Olmutz, it was only with the purpose of forming a junction with Buxhowden, before they hazarded a general battle.

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 145.]

[2] ["In the magazines and arsenals of Vienna were found artillery and ammunition enough for two campaigns: we had no farther occasion to draw upon our stores at Strasburg or Metz; but could, on the contrary, despatch a considerable *materiel* to those two great establishments."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 107.]

In the mean time, the French army following close on their back into Moravia, fought one or two partial actions, which, though claimed as victories, were so severely disputed as to make Napoleon aware that he had to do with a more obstinate enemy than he had of late encountered in the dispirited Austrians. He waited, therefore, until the result of his skilful combinations should have drawn around him the greatest force he could expect to collect, ere venturing upon an engagement, of which, if he failed to obtain a decisive victory, the consequences were likely to be fatal to him.

At this period, success had smiled on the French in Italy, and in the Tyrol, as well as in Germany. In the former country, it may be remembered that the Archduke Charles, at the head of seventy-five or eighty thousand men, exclusive of garrisons, was opposed to Massena, whose forces considerably exceeded that amount. The prince occupied the left bank of the Adige, with the purpose of maintaining a defensive warfare, until he should hear news of the campaign in Germany. Massena, however, after some fighting, succeeded in forcing the passage of the river at Verona, and in occupying the village of St Michael. This was on the 20th October. Soon afterwards, the account of the surrender at Ulm reached the Frenchman, and determined him on a general attack along the whole Austrian line, which was strongly posted near Caldiero. The assault took place on the 30th October, and was followed by a very desperate action; for the Austrians, confident in the presence of their

favourite commander, fought with the greatest courage. They were, however, defeated; and a column of five thousand men, under General Hellinger, detached for the purpose of attacking the French in the rear, failed in their purpose, and, being themselves surrounded, were obliged to lay down their arms. The victors were joined by General St Cyr, at the head of twenty-five thousand men, who had evacuated the kingdom of Naples, upon a treaty of neutrality entered into with the King, and now came to join their countrymen in Lombardy.

In the midst of his own misfortunes, the Archduke Charles received the fatal intelligence of the capitulation of Ulm, and that the French were advancing in full march towards Vienna. To cover his brother's capital became a matter of more pressing necessity than to attempt to continue the defence of Italy, which circumstances rendered almost hopeless. He commenced his retreat, therefore, on the night of the 1st of November, determining to continue it through the mountain passes of Carinthia, and so on into Hungary. If he had marched by the Tyrol, he would have found Augereau in his front, with Ney and Marmont threatening his flanks, while Massena, before whom he was now retreating, pressed on his rear.

The archduke commenced this dispiriting and distressing movement, over nearly the same ground which he had passed while retreating before Buonaparte himself in 1797. He did not, however, as on that occasion, avail himself of the Tagliamento, or Palma Nova. His purpose was retreat, not

defence; and, though pursued closely by Massena, he halted no longer at these strong posts than was necessary to protect his march, and check the vivacity of the French advance. He effected at length his retreat upon Laybach, where he received tidings from his brother the Archduke John, whose situation on the Tyrol was not more agreeable than his own in Italy; and who, like Charles himself, was desirous to escape into the vicinity of Hungary with what forces remained to him.

The distress of the Archduke John was occasioned by an army of French and Bavarians, commanded by Ney, who had penetrated into the Tyrol by paths deemed impracticable; taken the forts of Schwatz, Neustadt, and Inspruck itself, and placed the archduke's army in the most precarious situation. Adopting a determination worthy of his birth, the Austrian prince resolved at all risks to effect a junction with his brother, and, though hard pressed by the enemy, he accomplished his purpose. Two considerable corps of Austrians, being left in an insulated situation by these movements of the two princes, were obliged to surrender. These were the divisions of Jellachich, in the Vorarlberg, and of the Prince of Rohan, in Lombardy. The whole of the north of Italy, with the Tyrol and all its passes, was left to the undisturbed and unresisted occupation of the French.[1]

The army of the royal brothers had, however, become formidable by their junction, and was daily growing stronger. They were in communication

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 169; Savary, t. ii. p. 107.]

with Hungary, the brave inhabitants of which warlike country were universally rising in arms. They were also joined by volunteers from Croatia, the Tyrol, and all those wild and mountainous countries, which have so long supplied the Austrian army with the finest light troops in the world.

It might seem to counterbalance these advantages, that Massena had also entered into communications with the French army of Germany at Clagenfurt, the capital of Carinthia. But having left great part of his troops in Italy, he had for the time ceased to be formidable to the Austrian princes, who now meditated advancing on the French grand army, which the audacity of its leader had placed in a situation extremely perilous to any other than French troops acting under the eye of their Emperor.

Nothing, it is true, could be more admirably conceived and satisfactorily accomplished than the succession of grand manœuvres, which, distinguishing the opening of the campaign, had produced the great, yet cheaply-purchased success of Ulm, and the capture of Vienna. Nor was the series of combination less wonderful, by which, clearing the Vorarlberg, the Tyrol, and the north of Italy of the enemy, Napoleon had placed almost all the subordinate divisions of his own army at his disposal, ready to assist him in the grand enterprise against the Austro-Russian forces. But he has been considered by military critics as having trusted too great a risk upon the precarious event of battle, when he crossed the Danube, and plunged into Moravia, where a defeat, or even a check, might

have been attended with the most fatal consequences. The position of the Archdukes Charles and John; the organization of the Hungarian insurrection, which proceeded rapidly; the success of the Archduke Ferdinand, in raising a similar general levy in Bohemia, threatened alarming operations in the French rear; while Prussia, with the sword drawn in her hand, and the word *war* upon her lips, watched but the slightest waning of Buonaparte's star, to pronounce the word, and to strike a blow at the same moment.

Napoleon accordingly, though he had dared the risk, was perfectly sensible that as he had distinguished the earlier part of this campaign by some of the most brilliant manœuvres which military history records, it was now incumbent upon him, without delay, to conclude it by a great and decisive victory over a new and formidable enemy. He neglected, therefore, no art by which success could be ensured. In the first place, it was necessary to determine the allies to immediate battle; for, situated in the heart of an enemy's country, with insurrection spreading wide and wider around him, an immediate action was as desirable on his part, as delay would have been advantageous to his opponents.

Some attempts at negotiation were made by the Austrians, to aid which Haugwitz, the Prussian minister, made his appearance in the French camp with the offer of his master's mediation, but with the alternative of declaring war in case it was refused. To temporize with Prussia was of the last consequence, and the French Emperor found a

willing instrument in Haugwitz. "The French and Austrian outposts," said Napoleon, "are engaged; it is a prelude to the battle which I am about to fight—Say nothing of your errand to me at present—I wish to remain in ignorance of it. Return to Vienna, and wait the events of war."[1] Haugwitz, to use Napoleon's own expression, was no novice, and returned to Vienna without waiting for another hint; and doubtless the French Emperor was well pleased to be rid of his presence.[2]

Napoleon next sent Savary[3] to the Russian camp, under pretence of compliment to the Emperor Alexander, but in reality as a spy upon that monarch and his generals. He returned, having discovered, or affected to discover, that the Russian sovereign was surrounded by counsellors, whom their youth and rank rendered confident and presumptuous, and who, he concluded, might be easily misguided into some fatal act of rashness.[4]

[1] [Montholon, t. ii. p. 241.]

[2] ["I asked Napoleon, if Haugwitz had been gained by him? he replied 'No; but he was of opinion that Prussia should never play the first fiddle in the affairs of the continent; that she was only a second-rate power, and ought to act as such.'"—O'Meara, vol. i. p. 227.]

[3] ["Napoleon sent for me at daybreak: he had passed the night over his maps; his candles were burnt down to the sockets: he held a letter in his hand; he was silent for some moments, and then abruptly said to me, 'Be off to Olmutz; deliver this letter to the Emperor of Russia, and tell him that, having heard of his arrival at his army, I have sent you to salute him in my name. If he questions you,' added he, 'you know what answer ought to be given under such circumstances.'"—Savary, t. ii. p. 112.]

[4] ["I saw at Olmutz a great number of young Russians, belonging to the different ministerial departments of their coun-

Buonaparte acted on the hint, and upon the first movement of the Austro-Russian army in advance, withdrew his forces from the position they had occupied. Prince Dolgorucki, aide-de-camp of the Emperor Alexander, was despatched by him to return the compliments which had been brought him. He too was, doubtless, expected to use his powers of observation, but they were not so acute as those of the old officer of police. Buonaparte, as if the interior of his camp displayed scenes which he did not desire Dolgorucki to witness, met the prince at the outposts, which the soldiers were in the act of hastily covering with field-works, like an army which seeks to shelter conscious weakness under intrenchments. Encouraged by what he thought he saw of the difficulties in which the French seemed to be placed, Dolgorucki entered upon politics, and demanded in plain terms the cession of the crown of Italy. To this proposal Buonaparte listened with a patience which seemed to be the effect of his present situation. In short, Dolgorucki carried back to his imperial master the hastily conceived opinion, that the French Emperor was retreating, and felt himself in a precarious posture.[1] On this false ground the Russian council of war determined to act. Their plan was to extend their own left wing, with the purpose of

try, who talked wildly of the ambition of France; and all of whom, in their plans for reducing her to a state of harmlessness, made much the same kind of calculations as the maid with her pail of milk."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 113.]

[1] [Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

turning the right of the French army, and taking them upon the flank and rear.

It was upon the 1st December at noon that the Russians commenced this movement, by which, in confidence of success, they abandoned a chain of heights where they might have received an attack with great advantage, descended into ground more favourable to the enemy, and, finally, placed their left wing at too great a distance from the centre. The French general no sooner witnessed this rash manœuvre, than he exclaimed, "Before to-morrow is over, that army is my own." In the mean time, withdrawing his outposts, and concentrating his forces, he continued to intimate a conscious inferiority, which was far from existing.

The two armies seem to have been very nearly of the same strength. For though the bulletin, to enhance the victory, makes the opposite army amount to 100,000 men, yet there were not actually above 50,000 Russians, and about 25,000 Austrians, in the field of battle.[1] The French army might be about the same force. But they were commanded by Napoleon, and the Russians by Kutousof; a veteran soldier indeed, full of bravery and patriotism, and accustomed to war as it was waged against the Turks; but deficient in general talent, as well as in the alertness of mind necessary to penetrate into and oppose the designs of his adversary, and, as is not unusual, obstinate in proportion to the narrowness of his understanding, and the prejudices of his education.

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 181.]

Mean while, Buonaparte, possessed of his enemy's plan by the demonstrations of the preceding day, passed the night in making his arrangements.[1] He visited the posts in person, and apparently desired to maintain an incognito which was soon discovered. As soon as the person of the Emperor was recognised, the soldiers remembered that next day (2d December) was the anniversary of his coronation. Bunches of lighted hay, placed on the end of poles, made an extempore illumination, while the troops, with loud acclamations, protested they would present him on the following day with a bouquet becoming the occasion; and an old grenadier, approaching his person, swore that the Emperor should only have to combat with his eyes, and that, without his exposing his person, the whole colours and artillery of the Russian army should be brought to him to celebrate the festival of the morrow.[2]

In the proclamation which Napoleon, according to his custom, issued to the army, he promises that he will keep his person out of the reach of fire; thus showing the full confidence, that the assurance

[1] ["The Emperor passed the whole day of the 1st December inspecting his army himself, regiment by regiment. He spoke to the troops, viewed all the parks, all the light batteries, and gave instructions to all the officers and gunners. He returned to dine at his bivouac and sent for all his marshals: he enlarged upon all that they ought to do the next day, and all that it was possible for the enemy to attempt. He knew his ground as well as the environs of Paris. It would require a volume to detail all that emanated from his mind in those twenty-four hours."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 131.]

[2] [Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

of his personal safety would be considered as great an encouragement to the troops, as the usual protestation of sovereigns and leaders, that they will be in the front, and share the dangers of the day.[1] This is, perhaps, the strongest proof possible of the complete and confidential understanding which subsisted between Napoleon and his soldiers. Yet there have not been wanting those, who have thrown the imputation of cowardice on the victor of a hundred battles, and whose reputation was so well established amongst those troops who must be the best judges, that his attention to the safety of his person was requested by them, and granted by him, as a favour to his army.

The Battle of Austerlitz, fought against an enemy of great valour but slender experience, was not of a very complicated character. The Russians, we have seen, were extending their line to surround the French flank. Marshal Davoust, with a division of infantry, and another of dragoons, was placed behind the convent of Raygern, to oppose the

[1] ["*Order of the Day. On the Field, Dec.* 1.—Soldiers! The Russian forces are before you, to avenge the Austrian army at Ulm; they are the same battalions you conquered at Hollabrun, and which you have constantly pursued. The positions we occupy are formidable, and, whilst they march to turn my right, they shall present me their flank.—Soldiers! I shall direct myself all your battalions, I shall keep at a distance from the firing, if, with your accustomed bravery, you carry confusion and disorder into the enemy's ranks; but should victory be for a moment doubtful, you shall behold your Emperor expose himself to the first blow.—This victory will finish our campaign, when we shall return to winter quarters, and be joined by the new armies forming in France: then the peace which I shall sanction will be worthy of my people, of you, and of myself."]

forces destined for this manœuvre, at the moment when they should conceive the point carried. Soult commanded the right wing; Lannes conducted the left, which last rested upon a fortified position called Santon, defended by twenty pieces of cannon. Bernadotte led the centre, where Murat and all the French cavalry were stationed. Ten battalions of the Imperial Guard, with ten of Oudinot's division, were kept in reserve in the rear of the line, under the eye of Napoleon himself, who destined them, with forty field-pieces, to act wherever the fate of battle should render their services most necessary. Such were the preparations for this decisive battle, where three Emperors, each at the head of his own army, strove to decide the destinies of Europe. The sun rose with unclouded brilliancy; it was that sun of Austerlitz which Napoleon, upon so many succeeding occasions, apostrophized, and recalled to the minds of his soldiers. As its first beams rose above the horizon, Buonaparte appeared in front of the army, surrounded by his marshals, to whom he issued his last directions, and they departed at full gallop to their different posts.[1]

The column detached from the left of the Austro-Russian army was engaged in a false manœuvre, and it was ill executed. The intervals between the regiments of which it consisted were suffered

[1] ["In passing along the front of several regiments, the Emperor said, 'Soldiers! we must finish this campaign by a thunderbolt, which shall confound the pride of our enemies;' and, instantly, hats were placed on the points of their bayonets, and cries of 'Vive l'Empereur!' were the signal for the battle."—*Thirtieth Bulletin.*]

to become irregular, and the communications between this attacking column itself and the main body were not maintained with sufficient accuracy. When the Russians thought themselves on the point of turning the right flank of the French, they found themselves suddenly, and at unawares, engaged with Davoust's division, of whose position behind the convent of Raygern, they had not been aware. At the same time, Soult, at the head of the French right wing, rushed forward upon the interval between the Austro-Russian centre and left, caused by the march of the latter upon Raygern, and, completely intersecting their line, severed the left wing entirely from the centre.

The Emperor of Russia perceived the danger, and directed a desperate attempt to be made upon Soult's division by the Russian Guards, for the purpose of restoring the communication with his left. The French infantry were staggered by this charge, and one regiment completely routed. But it was in such a crisis that the genius of Buonaparte triumphed. Bessières had orders to advance with the Imperial Guard, while the Russians were disordered with their own success. The encounter was desperate, and the Russians displayed the utmost valour before they at length gave way to the discipline and steadiness of Buonaparte's veterans. Their artillery and standards were lost, and Prince Constantine, the Emperor's brother, who fought gallantly at their head, was only saved by the speed of his horse.

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

made repeated charges with such success, that the Emperors of Russia and Austria, from the heights of Austerlitz, beheld their centre and left completely defeated. The fate of the right wing could no longer be protracted, and it was disastrous even beyond the usual consequences of defeat.[1] They had been actively pressed during the whole battle by Lannes, but now the troops on their left being routed, they were surrounded on all sides, and, unable to make longer resistance, were forced down into a hollow, where they were exposed to the fire of twenty pieces of cannon. Many attempted to escape across a lake, which was partially frozen; but the ice proving too weak gave way under them, or was broken by the hostile cannonade. This fatality renewed, according to Buonaparte's description, the appearance of the battle with the Turks at Aboukir, where so many thousand men, flying from the battle, perished by drowning. It was with the greatest difficulty, that, rallying the remains of their routed forces around

[1] ["The Russians fled and dispersed: Alexander and the Emperor of Austria witnessed the defeat. Stationed on a height at a little distance from the field of battle, they beheld the guard, which had been expected to decide the victory, cut to pieces by a handful of brave men. Their guns and baggage had fallen into our possession, and Prince Repnin was our prisoner; unfortunately, however, we had a great number of men killed and wounded. I had myself received a sabre wound in the head; in which situation I galloped off to give an account of the affair to the Emperor. My sabre broken, my wound, the blood with which I was covered, the decided advantage we had gained with so small a force over the enemy's chosen troops, inspired Napoleon with the idea of the picture that was painted by Girard."—*Mémoires du* GÉNÉRAL RAPP, p. 62.]

them, and retiring in the best manner they could, the Emperors effected their personal retreat. Only the devoted bravery of the Russians, and the loyalty of the Austrian cavalry, who charged repeatedly to protect the retrograde movement, could have rendered it possible, since the sole passage to the rear lay along a causeway, extending between two lakes. The retreat was, however, accomplished, and the Emperors escaped without sustaining the loss in the pursuit which might have been expected. But in the battle, at least twenty thousand men had remained, killed, wounded, and prisoners; and forty standards, with a great proportion of the hostile artillery, were the trophies of Napoleon, whose army had thus amply redeemed their pledge. It was, however, at a high rate, that they had purchased the promised bouquet. Their own ranks had lost probably five thousand men, though the bulletin diminishes the numbers to two thousand five hundred.[1]

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 180-191; Savary, t. ii. p. 133. Thirtieth Bulletin of the Grand Army. On the field of battle, Napoleon issued the following proclamation:—

"Headquarters, Dec. 2, 10 o'clock at night.

"Soldiers of the Grand Army! Even at this hour, before this great day shall pass away and be lost in the ocean of eternity, your Emperor must address you, and express how much he is satisfied with the conduct of all those who have had the good fortune to combat in this memorable battle. Soldiers! you are the first warriors in the world! The recollection of this exploit and of your deeds, will be eternal! thousands of ages hereafter, so long as the events of the universe continue to be related, will record, that a Russian army, of seventy-six thousand men, hired by the gold of England, was annihilated by you on the plains of Olmutz.—The miserable remains of that army, upon which the

The Austrian Emperor considered his last hope of successful opposition to Napoleon as extinguished by this defeat, and conceived, therefore, that he had nothing remaining save to throw himself upon the discretion of the victor. There were, indeed, some, who accused his councils of pusillanimity. It was said, that the levies of Prince Charles in Hungary, and of Prince Ferdinand in Bohemia, were in great forwardness—that the Emperors had still a considerable army under their own command—and that Prussia, already sufficiently disposed for war, would certainly not permit Austria to be totally overwhelmed. But it ought to be considered, on the other hand, that the new levies, however useful in a partisan war, could not be expected to redeem the loss of such a battle as Austerlitz—that they were watched by French troops, which, though inferior in number, were greatly more formidable in discipline—and that, as for Prussia, it was scarce rational to expect that she would interfere by arms, to save, in the hour of distress, those to whom she had given no assistance, when such would probably have been decisive of the contest, and that in favour of the allies.

The influence of the victory on the Prussian councils was indeed soon made evident; for Count Haugwitz, who had been dismissed to Vienna till

commercial spirit of a despicable nation had placed its expiring hope, are in flight, hastening to make known to the savage inhabitants of the north what the French are capable of performing; they will, likewise, tell them, that, after having destroyed the Austrian army, at Ulm, you told Vienna—'That army is no more!' To Petersburgh you shall also say—'The Emperor Alexander has no longer an army.'"]

the battle should take place, now returned to Buonaparte's headquarters, having changed the original message of defiance of which he was the bearer, into a handsome compliment to Napoleon upon his victory. The answer of Napoleon intimated his full sense of the duplicity of Prussia.—"This," he said, "is a compliment designed for others, but Fortune has transferred the address to me."[1] It was, however, still necessary to conciliate a power, which had a hundred and fifty thousand men in the field; and a private treaty with Haugwitz assigned the Electorate of Hanover to Prussia, in exchange for Anspach, or rather as the price of her neutrality at this important crisis.[2] Thus all hopes of Prussian interference being over, the Emperor Francis must be held justified in yielding to necessity, and endeavouring to secure the best terms which could be yet obtained, by submitting at discretion. His ally, Alexander, refused indeed to be concerned in a negotiation, which in the circumstances could not fail to be humiliating.

A personal interview took place betwixt the Emperor of Austria and Napoleon, to whose camp Francis resorted almost in the guise of a suppliant. The defeated prince is represented as having

[1] [Thirty-Fourth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, t. ii. p. 148.]

[2] ["The battle of Austerlitz took place on the 2d December, and on the 15th, Prussia, by the convention of Vienna, renounced the treaty of Potsdam and the oath of the tomb; she yielded Wesel, Bareuth, and Neuchatel to France; who, in return, consented to Frederic William's taking possession of Hanover, and uniting that country to his dominions."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, t. ii. p. 242.]

thrown the blame of the war upon the English. "They are a set of merchants," he said, "who would set the continent on fire, in order to secure to themselves the commerce of the world." The argument was not very logical, but the good prince in whose mouth it is placed, is not to be condemned for holding at such a moment the language which might please the victor. When Buonaparte welcomed him to his military hut, and said it was the only palace he had inhabited for nearly two months, the Austrian answered with a smile, "You have turned your residence, then, to such good account, that you ought to be content with it."

The Emperor of Austria, having satisfied himself that he would be admitted to terms of greater or less severity, next stipulated for that which Alexander had disdained to request in his own person—the unmolested retreat of the Russians to their own country.—"The Russian army is surrounded," said Napoleon; "not a man can escape me. But I wish to oblige their Emperor, and will stop the march of my columns, if your Majesty promises me that these Russians shall evacuate Germany and the Austrian and Prussian parts of Poland."—"It is the purpose of the Emperor Alexander to do so."[1]

The arrangement was communicated by Savary to the Russian Emperor, who acquiesced in the proposal to return with his army to Russia by regular marches.[2] No other engagement was required

[1] [Thirty-First Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

[2] ["The Emperors seemed to be both in excellent humour;

of Alexander than his word; and the respectful manner in which he is mentioned in the bulletins, indicates Buonaparte's desire to cultivate a good understanding with this powerful and spirited young monarch. On the other hand, Napoleon has not failed to place in the Czar's mouth such compliments to himself as the following:—"Tell your master," said he to Savary, "that he did miracles yesterday—that this bloody day has augmented my respect for him—He is the predestined of Heaven—it will take a hundred years ere my army equals that of France." Savary is then stated to have found Alexander, despite of his reverse of fortune, a man of heart and head. He entered into details of the battle.

"You were inferior to us on the whole," he said, "yet we found you superior on every point of action."

"That," replied Savary, "arises from warlike experience, the fruit of sixteen years of glory. This is the fortieth battle which the Emperor has fought."

"He is a great soldier," said Alexander; "I do not pretend to compare myself with him—this

they laughed, which seemed to us all to be a good *omen*: accordingly in an hour or two the sovereigns parted with a mutual embrace. We followed Napoleon, who rode his horse at a footpace, musing on what he meant to do. He called me, and said, 'Run after the Emperor of Austria: tell him that I have desired you to go and wait at his headquarters for the adhesion of the Emperor of Russia to what has just been concluded between us. When you are in possession of this adhesion, proceed to the corps d'armée of Marshal Davoust, stop his movement, and tell him what has passed.'"—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 140.]

is the first time I have been under fire. But it is enough. I came hither to the assistance of the Emperor of Austria—he has no farther occasion for my services—I return to my capital."

Accordingly, he commenced his march towards Russia, in pursuance of the terms agreed upon. The Russian arms had been unfortunate; but the behaviour of their youthful Emperor, and the marked deference shown towards him by Buonaparte, made a most favourable impression upon Europe at large.[1]

Dec. 6. The Austrian monarch, left to his fate, obtained from Buonaparte an armistice[2]—a small part of the price was imposed in the shape of a military contribution of a hundred millions of francs, to be raised in the territories occupied by the French armies. The cessation of hostilities was to endure while Talleyrand on the one side, and Prince John of Lichtenstein on the other, adjusted the terms of a general pacification. Buonaparte failed not to propitiate the Austrian negotiator by the most

[1] ["I could not help feeling a certain timidity on finding myself in Alexander's presence; he awed me by the majesty and nobleness of his look. Nature had done much for him; and it would have been difficult to find a model so perfect and so graceful; he was then twenty-six years old. He was already somewhat hard of hearing with the left ear, and he turned the right to hear what was said to him. He spoke in broken sentences; he laid great stress upon his finals, so that the discourse was never long. For the rest, he spoke the French language in all its purity, and always used its elegant academic expression. As there was no affectation in his language, it was easy to judge that this was one of the results of an excellent education."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 115.]

[2] [See Annual Register, vol. xlvii. p. 666.]

extravagant praises in his bulletins, and has represented the Emperor of Austria as asking, "Why, possessing men of such distinguished talent, should the affairs of my cabinet be committed to knaves and fools?" Of this question we can only say, that if really asked by Francis, which we doubt, he was himself the only person by whom it could have been answered.

The compliments to the Prince John of Lichtenstein, were intended to propitiate the public in favour of the treaty of peace, negotiated by a man of such talents. Some of his countrymen, on the other hand, accused him of selfish precipitation in the treaty, for the purpose of removing the scene of war from the neighbourhood of his own family estates. But what could the wisdom of the ablest negotiator, or the firmness of the most stubborn patriot have availed, when France was to dictate terms, and Austria to receive them? The treaties of Campo Formio and Luneville, though granted to Austria by Napoleon in the hour of victory, were highly advantageous compared to that of Presburgh, which was signed on the 26th of December, 1805, about a fortnight after the battle of Austerlitz.[1] By this negotiation, Francis ceded to Bavaria the oldest possession of his house, the mountains of Tyrol and of the Vorarlberg, filled with the best, bravest, and most attached of his subjects, and which, by their geographical situation, had hitherto given Austria influence at once

[1] [For a copy of the treaty, see Annual Register, vol. xlvii. p. 668.]

in Germany and Italy. Venice, Austria's most recent possession, and which had not been very honourably obtained, was also yielded up, and added to the kingdom of Italy.[1] She was again reduced to the solitary seaport of Trieste, in the Adriatic.

By the same treaty, the Germanic allies of Buonaparte were to be remunerated. Wirtemberg, as well as Bavaria,[2] received large additions at the expense of Austria and of the other princes of the empire, and Francis consented that both the electors should be promoted to the kingly dignity, in reward of their adherence to the French cause. Other provisions there were, equally inconsistent with the immunities of the Germanic body, for which scarcely a shadow of respect was retained, save by an illusory clause, or species of protest, by

[1] ["After leaving Vienna, Napoleon, on his way to Munich, passed through Passau, where he met General Lauriston, who was returning from Cadiz: he sent him as governor to Venice." —SAVARY, t. ii. p. 155.]

[2] ["The Emperor arrived at Munich, a few hours before New Year's-day, 1806. The Empress had come thither by his order a fortnight before. There was, as may be supposed, great rejoicing at the court of Bavaria: not only was the country saved, but almost doubled in extent. The greatest delight was therefore expressed at seeing us. It was at Munich that we began to perceive something which we had as yet only heard vaguely talked of. A courier was sent by the Tyrol with orders to the Viceroy of Italy to come immediately to Munich: accordingly, five days afterwards, he arrived. No secret was any longer made of his marriage with the Princess Augusta of Bavaria. The viceroy was much beloved, and the greatest pleasure was expressed to see him unite his destiny with that of a princess so virtuous and so lovely. The nuptials were celebrated at Munich; after which Napoleon returned to Paris."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 156.]

which Austria declared, that all the stipulations to which she consented were under reservation of the rights of the empire. By the treaty of Presburgh, Austria is said to have lost upwards of 20,000 square miles of territory, two millions and a half of subjects, and a revenue to the amount of ten millions and a half of florins. And this momentous surrender was made in consequence of one unfortunate campaign, which lasted but six months, and was distinguished by only one general action.

There were two episodes in this war, of little consequence in themselves, but important considered with reference to the alterations they produced in two of the ancient kingdoms of Europe, which they proved the proximate cause of re-modelling according to the new form of government which had been introduced by Buonaparte, and sanctioned by the example of France.

The King of Sweden had been an ardent and enthusiastic member of the Anti-gallican league. He was brave, enterprising, and chivalrous, and ambitious to play the part of his namesake and progenitor, Gustavus Adolphus, or his predecessor, Charles XII.; without, however, considering, that since the time of those princes, and partly in consequence of their wars and extensive undertakings, Sweden had sunk into a secondary rank in the great European family; and without reflecting, that when great enterprises are attempted without adequate means to carry them through, valour becomes Quixotic, and generosity ludicrous. He had engaged to join in a combined effort for the

purpose of freeing Hanover, and the northern parts of Germany, from the French, by means of an army of English, Russians, and Swedes. Had Prussia acceded to the confederacy, this might have been easily accomplished; especially as Saxony, Hesse, and Brunswick, would, under her encouragement, have willingly joined in the war. Nay, even without the accession of Prussia, a diversion in the north, ably conducted and strongly supported, might have at least found Bernadotte sufficient work in Hanover, and prevented him from materially contributing, by his march to the Danube, to the disasters of the Austrian army at Ulm. But, by some of those delays and misunderstandings, which are so apt to disappoint the objects of a coalition, and disconcert enterprises attempted by troops of different nations, the forces designed for the north of Europe did not assemble until the middle of November, and then only in strength sufficient to undertake the siege of the Hanoverian fortress of Hamelen, in which Bernadotte had left a strong garrison. The enterprise, too tardy in its commencement, was soon broken off by the news of the battle of Austerlitz and its consequences, and, being finally abandoned, the unfortunate King of Sweden returned to his own dominions, where his subjects received with unwillingness and terror a prince, who, on many accounts, had incurred the fatal and persevering resentment of Buonaparte. Machinations began presently to be agitated for removing him from the kingdom, as one with whom Napoleon could never be reconciled, and averting

from Sweden, by such sacrifice, the punishment which must otherwise fall on the country, as well as on the King.[1]

While the trifling attempt against Hamelen, joined to other circumstances, was thus preparing the downfall of the ancient dynasty of Sweden, a descent made by the Russians and English on the Neapolitan territories, afforded a good apology to Buonaparte for depriving the King of the Two Sicilies of his dominions, so far as they lay open to the power of France. Governed entirely by the influence of the Queen, the policy of Naples had been of a fickle and insincere character. Repeatedly saved from the greatest hazard of dethronement, the King or his royal consort had never omitted an opportunity to resume arms against France, under the conviction, perhaps, that their ruin would no longer be deferred than whilst political considerations induced the French Emperor to permit their possession of their power. The last interference in their behalf had been at the instance of the Emperor Paul. After this period we have seen that their Italian dominions were occupied by French troops, who held Otranto, and other places in Calabria, as pledges (so they pretended) for the restoration of Malta.

But upon the breaking out of the war of 1805, it was agreed, by a convention entered into at Paris, 21st of September, and ratified by the King of Naples on the 8th of October, that the French

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 196; Las Cases, t. v. p. 168; Montgaillard, t. vi. p. 280.]

should withdraw their forces from the places which they occupied in the Neapolitan territories, and the King should observe a strict neutrality. Neither of the contracting parties was quite sincere. The French troops, which were commanded by St Cyr, were, as we have seen, withdrawn from Naples, for the purpose of reinforcing Massena, in the beginning of the campaign of Austerlitz. Their absence would probably have endured no longer than the necessity which called them away. But the court of Naples was equally insincere; for no sooner had St Cyr left the Neapolitan territories to proceed northward, than the King, animated by the opportunity which his departure afforded, once more raised his forces to the war establishment, and received with open arms an army, consisting of 12,000 Russian troops from Corfu, and 8000 British from Malta, who disembarked in his dominions.[1]

Had this armament occupied Venice at the commencement of the war, they might have materially assisted in the campaign of the Archduke Charles against Massena. The sending them in Novem-

[1] ["Before his departure from Vienna, Napoleon received intelligence of the entry of the Russians, jointly with some English, into Naples. He immediately made dispositions for marching troops thither. He had an old grudge against the Queen of Naples, and on receiving this news, he said, 'Ah! as for her, I am not surprised at it; but wo betide her if I enter Naples; never shall she set foot there again!' He sent from the staff of his own army officers to compose that which was about to assemble on the frontiers of Naples, and ordered Prince Joseph, his brother, whom he had left at Paris, to go and put himself at the head of it."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 152.]

ber to the extremity of the Italian peninsula, only served to seal the fate of Ferdinand the Fourth. On receiving the news of the armistice at Austerlitz, the Russians and the British re-embarked, and not long after their departure a large French army, commanded by Joseph Buonaparte, approached, once more to enforce the doom passed against the royal family of Naples, that they should cease to reign.[1] The King and Queen fled from the storm which they had provoked. Their son, the prince royal, in whose favour they had abdicated, only made use of his temporary authority to surrender Gaeta, Pescara, and Naples itself, with its castles, to the French general. In Calabria, however, whose wild inhabitants were totally disinclined to the French yoke, Count Roger de Damas and the Duke of Calabria attempted to make a stand. But their hasty and undisciplined levies were easily defeated by the French under General Regnier, and, nominally at least, almost the whole Neapolitan kingdom was subjected to the power of Joseph Buonaparte.

One single trait of gallantry illuminated the scene of universal pusillanimity. The Prince of Hesse Philipsthal, who defended the strong for-

[1] [" General St Cyr is advancing by forced marches towards Naples, to punish the treason of the Queen, and to precipitate from the throne this culpable woman, who has violated, in so shameless a manner, all that is held sacred among men. It was endeavoured to intercede for her with the Emperor. He replied, were hostilities to recommence, and the nation to support a thirty years' war, so atrocious an act of perfidy cannot be pardoned.' *The Queen of Naples has ceased* to reign."—*Thirty-seventh Bulletin of the Grand Army*, Dec. 26.]

tress of Gaeta in name of Ferdinand IV., refused to surrender it in terms of the capitulation. "Tell your general," said he, in reply to the French summons, "that Gaeta is not Ulm, nor the Prince of Hesse General Mack!" The place was defended with a gallantry corresponding to these expressions, nor was it surrendered until the 17th of July, 1806, after a long siege, in which the brave governor was wounded.[1] This heroic young prince only appeared on the public scene to be withdrawn from it by an untimely death, which has been ascribed to poison. His valour, however honourable to himself, was of little use to the royal family of Naples, whose deposition was determined on by Buonaparte, in order to place upon the throne one of his own family.

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 237; Annual Register, vol. xlviii. p. 144.]

CHAPTER XXXIII.

*Relative situations of France and England.—Hostilities commenced with Spain, by the Stoppage, by Commodore Moore, of four Spanish Galleons, when three of their Escort were taken, and one blew up.—Napoleon's Plan of Invasion stated and discussed.—John Clerk of Eldin's great System of Breaking the Line, explained—The French Admiral, Villeneuve, forms a junction with the Spanish Fleet under Gravina—Attacked and defeated by Sir Robert Calder—Nelson appointed to the Command in the Mediterranean.—*BATTLE OF TRAFALGAR *fought 21st October,* 1805.*—Death of Nelson.—Behaviour of Napoleon on learning the Intelligence of this signal Defeat.—Villeneuve commits Suicide.—Address of Buonaparte to the Legislative Body.—Statement of M. de Champagny on the Internal Improvements of France.—Elevation of Napoleon's Brothers, Louis and Joseph, to the Thrones of Holland and Naples.—Principality of Lucca conferred on Eliza, the eldest Sister of Buonaparte, and that of Guastalla on Pauline, the youngest.—Other Alliances made by his Family.—Napoleon appoints a new Hereditary Nobility.—Converts from the old Noblesse anxiously sought for and liberally rewarded.—Confederation of the Rhine established, and Napoleon appointed Protector.—The Emperor Francis lays aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, retaining only the Title of Emperor of Austria.—Vacillating and Impolitic Conduct of Prussia.*

THE triumphs of Napoleon had been greater at this period of his reign, than had ever before been

recorded in history as achieved by a single man. Yet even these, like every thing earthly, had their limit. Fate, while she seemed to assign him complete domination over the land, had vested in other hands the empire of the seas; and it frequently happened, that when his victorious eagles were flying their highest pitch upon the continent, some conspicuous naval disaster warned the nations, that there was another element, where France had a rival and a superior.

It is true, that the repeated success of England, resembling almost that of the huntsman over his game, had so much diminished the French navy, and rendered so cautious such seamen as France had remaining, that the former country, unable to get opportunities of assailing the French vessels, was induced to have recourse to strange, and, as it proved, ineffectual means of carrying on hostilities. Such was the attempt at destroying the harbour of Boulogne, by sinking in the roads ships loaded with stones, and another scheme to blow up the French ships, by means of detonating machines to be affixed to them under water. The one, we believe, only furnished the inhabitants of Boulogne with a supply of useful building stone; the other, from the raft on which the machines were conveyed, was much ridiculed under the name of the catamaran expedition.[1]

[1] These implements of destruction were afterwards used against the British cruizers in America, and were judged formidable. But such desperate courage is necessary to attach the machine to the destined vessel, and the fate of the engineer, if discovered, is so certainly fatal, that, like fire-ships, petards, and similar inven-

Buonaparte, mean while, never lost sight of that combination of naval manœuvres, through means of which, by the time that the subjugation of Austria should permit the Grand Army to resume its destination for England, he hoped to assemble in the Channel such a superior fleet, as might waft his troops in safety to the devoted shores of Britain. The unbounded influence which he exercised over the court of Spain, seemed likely to facilitate this difficult enterprise. Yet, as from Spain the French Emperor derived large supplies of treasure, it would have been convenient for him, that, for a time at least, she should retain the mask of neutrality, while, in fact, she was contributing to serve France, and prejudice England, more effectually than if she had been in a state of avowed hostility with the latter power.

The British Government determined to bring this state of things to a decided point, by stopping four galleons, or vessels loaded with treasure, proceeding under an escort from the South Sea, and destined for Cadiz. The purpose of the English was only to detain these ships, as a pledge for the sincerity of the Government of Spain, in observing a more strict neutrality than hitherto. But unhappily the British force, under Commodore Moore, amounted only to four frigates. Spanish honour rendered the admiral unwilling to strike the

tions, liable to the same inconvenience, they do not appear likely to get into general use.—[See, in the *Annual Register*, vol. xlvi. p. 553, Lord Keith's Account of the Failure of the Catamaran Expedition against the French Flotilla outside the pier of Boulogne.]

national flag to an equal strength, and an action ensued, in which three of the Spanish vessels were taken, and one unfortunately blew up; an accident greatly to be regretted. Mr Southey observes, with his usual sound sense and humanity, "Had a stronger squadron been sent, (against the Spaniards,) this deplorable catastrophe might have been saved—a catastrophe which excited not more indignation in Spain, than it did grief in those who were its unwilling instruments, in the British people and in the British government."

This action took place on the 5th of October 1804; and as hostilities were of course immediately commenced betwixt Spain and Britain,[1] Buonaparte, losing the advantages he derived from the neutrality of the former power, had now only to use the naval and military means which she afforded for the advancement of his own purposes. The Court of Spain devoted them to his service, with a passive complaisance of which we shall hereafter see the reward.

Napoleon persisted to the last in asserting, that he saw clearly the means of utterly destroying the English superiority at sea. This he proposed to achieve by evading the blockades of the several ports of France and Spain, which, while weather permitted, were each hermetically sealed by the presence of a British squadron, and by finally assembling in the Channel that overwhelming

[1] [See Declaration of War made by Spain against England, dated Madrid, Dec. 12, 1804, and also Declaration of war with Spain on the part of the King of England, Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 699, and vol. xlvii. p. 608.]

force, which, according to his statement, was to reduce England to a dependency on France, as complete as that of the Isle of Oleron.[1] But men of the greatest talents must necessarily be liable to error, when they apply the principles of a science with which they are well acquainted upon one element, to the operations which are to be carried on by means of another. It is evident that he erred, when calculating his maritime combinations, in not sufficiently considering two most material differences betwixt them, and those which had exalted his glory upon land.

In the first place, as a landsman, Napoleon did not make sufficient allowance for the action of contrary winds and waves; as indeed it was perhaps his fault, even in land operations, where their influence is less essential, to admit too little consequence to the opposition of the elements. He complained, when at St Helena, that he could never get a seaman sufficiently emancipated from the technicality of his profession, to execute or enter into any of his schemes. "If I proposed," he said, "any new idea, I had Gantheaume and all the marine department to contend with—Sir, that is impossible—Sir,—the winds—the calms—the currents, will not permit it; and thus I was stopped short."[2] We believe little dread could have been entertained of the result of naval combinations in which the influence of the winds and waves was not previously and accurately calculated; and that British seamen

[1] [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 264; O'Meara, vol. i. p. 351.]
[2] [Las Cases, t. iii. p. 248.]

would have desired nothing more ardently, than that their enemies should have acted upon a system in which these casualties were neglected, even if that system had been derived from the genius of Napoleon.

But, secondly, there was this great difference betwixt the land and the sea service, to which (the vehemence of his wishes, doubtless, overpowering his judgment) Buonaparte did not give sufficient weight. Upon land, the excellence of the French troops, their discipline, and the enthusiasm arising from uninterrupted success, might be safely reckoned upon as likely to bear down any obstacle which they might unexpectedly meet with, in the execution of the movements which they were commanded to undertake. The situation of the French seamen was diametrically the contrary. Their only chance of safety consisted in their being able to elude a rencontre with a British squadron, even of very inferior force. So much was this the case at the period of which we treat, that Linois, their admiral in the East Indian seas, commanding an eighty-four-gun ship, and at the head of a considerable squadron of ships of war, was baffled and beaten off in the straits of Malacca by a squadron of merchant vessels belonging to the British East India Company, although built, of course, for traffic, and not for war, and, as usual in war time, very imperfectly manned.[1]

Yet, notwithstanding the great and essential

[1] [See Commodore Dance's Account of the Defeat of Admiral Linois' Squadron in the Indian Seas, Annual Register, vol. xlvi. p. 551.]

difference which we have pointed out between the French navy and their land forces, and that the former was even more inferior to that of England than the continental troops in general were to the French soldiers, it is evident that Buonaparte, when talking of ships of the line, was always thinking of battalions. Thus he imagines that the defeat of the Nile might have been prevented, had the headmost vessels of the French line, instead of remaining at anchor, slipped their cables, and borne down to the assistance of those which were first attacked by the British. But in urging this, the leading principle of the manœuvre of breaking the line, had totally escaped the French Emperor. It was the boast of the patriotic sage,[1] who illustrated and recommended this most important system of naval tactics, that it could serve the purpose of a British fleet only. The general principle is briefly this: By breaking through the line, a certain number of ships are separated from the rest, which

[1] The late JOHN CLERK of Eldin; a name never to be mentioned by Britons without respect and veneration, since, until his systematic Essay upon Naval Tactics appeared, the breaking of the line (whatever professional jealousy may allege to the contrary) was never practised on decided and defined principle. His suavity, nay, simplicity of manner, equalled the originality of his genius. This trifling tribute is due from one, who, honoured with his regard from boyhood, has stood by his side, while he was detailing and illustrating the system which taught British seamen to understand and use their own force, at an age so early, that he can remember having been guilty of abstracting from the table some of the little cork models by which Mr Clerk exemplified his manœuvres; unchecked but by his good-humoured raillery, when he missed a supposed line-of-battle ship, and complained that the demonstration was crippled by its absence.

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

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

the remainder must either abandon to their fate by sailing away, or endeavour to save by bearing down, or doubling as it were, upon the assailants, and engaging in a close and general engagement. Now, this last alternative is what Buonaparte recommends,—what he would certainly have practised on land,—and what he did practise, in order to extricate his right wing, at Marengo. But the relative superiority of the English navy is so great, that, while it is maintained, a close engagement with an enemy in the least approaching to equality, is equivalent to a victory; and to recommend a plan of tactics which should render such a battle inevitable, would be, in other words, advising a French admiral to lose his whole fleet, instead of sacrificing those ships which the English manœuvre had cut off, and crowding sail to save such as were yet unengaged.[1]

Under this consciousness of inferiority, the escape of a Spanish or French squadron, when a gale of wind forced, from the port in which they lay, the British blockading vessels, was a matter, the ultimate success of which depended not alone on

[1] ["If it were permitted to a man whose only campaign at sea was that of Egypt in the vessel of Brueys, to speak of naval tactics, I could easily refute all that Sir Walter Scott has here said. I shall limit myself to the relation of the observations made with General Kleber, when, from the neighbouring coast, we witnessed the battle of Aboukir. The greater part of our squadron remained inactive, while the English turned the left; there was not a single spectator who was not irritated at seeing the six vessels on the right of the squadron, commanded by Brueys, keep their line, when, if they had hoisted sail, and fallen back on the left, they would have put the English between two fires and would certainly have gained the victory."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 46.]

the winds and waves, but still more upon the chance of their escaping any part of the hostile navy, with whom battle, except with the most exorbitant superiority on their side, was certain and unavoidable defeat. Their efforts to comply with the wishes of the Emperor of France, were therefore so partially conducted, so insulated, and so ineffectual, that they rather resembled the children's game of hide and seek, than any thing like a system of regular combination. A more hasty and less cautious compliance with Napoleon's earnest wishes to assemble a predominant naval force, would have only occasioned the total destruction of the combined fleets at an earlier period than when it actually took place.

Upon this desultory principle, and seizing the opportunity of the blockading squadron being driven by weather from the vicinity of their harbour, a squadron of ten French vessels escaped from Rochefort on the 11th of January, 1805; and another, under Villeneuve, got out of Toulon on the 18th by a similarly favourable opportunity. The former, after rendering some trifling services in the West Indies, was fortunate enough to regain the port from which they had sailed, with the pride of a party who have sallied from a besieged town, and returned into it without loss. Villeneuve also regained Toulon without disaster, and, encouraged by his success, made a second sortie upon the 18th of March, having on board a large body of troops, designed, it was supposed, for a descent upon Ireland or Scotland. He made, however, towards Cadiz, and formed a junction there with the Spa-

nish fleet under Gravina. They sailed for the West Indies, where the joint squadrons were able to possess themselves of a rock called Diamond, which is scarce to be discovered on the map; and with this trophy, which served at least to show they had been actually out of harbour, they returned with all speed to Europe. As for executing manœuvres, and forming combinations, as Napoleon's plans would lead us to infer was the purpose of their hurried expedition, they attempted none, save of that kind which the hare executes when the hound is at its heels. Nelson, they were aware, was in full pursuit of them, and to have attempted any thing which involved a delay, or gave a chance of his coming up with them, was to court destruction. They were so fortunate as to escape him, though very narrowly, yet did not reach their harbours in safety.

On the 22d July, the combined fleets fell in with Sir Robert Calder, commanding a British squadron. The enemy amounted to twenty sail of the line, three fifty-gun ships, and four frigates, and the British to fifteen sail of the line, and two frigates only. Under this disparity of force, nevertheless, the English admiral defeated the enemy, and took two ships of the line; yet such was the opinion in both countries of the comparative superiority of the British navy, that the French considered their escape as a kind of triumph. Buonaparte alone grumbled against Villeneuve, for not having made use of his advantages,[1] for so it pleased him to term

[1] ["Had Villeneuve manifested more vigour at Cape Finistère, the attack on England might have been rendered practicable.

an engagement in which two ships of the line were lost; whilst the English murmured at the inadequate success of Sir Robert Calder, against an enemy of such superior strength, as if he had performed something less than his duty. A court-martial ratified, to a certain extent,[1] the popular opinion; though it may be doubted whether impartial posterity will concur in the justice of the censure which was passed upon the gallant admiral. At any other period of our naval history, the action of the 22d of July would have been rated as a distinguished victory.

The combined fleets escaped into Vigo, where they refitted; and, venturing to sail from that port, they proceeded to Ferrol,[2] united themselves with

I had made arrangements for his arrival, with considerable art and calculation, and in defiance of the opinions and the routine of the naval officers by whom I was surrounded. Every thing happened as I had foreseen; when the inactivity of Villeneuve ruined all." —Napoleon, *Las Cases*, t. iii. p. 247.]

[1] ["The court are of opinion that such conduct on the part of Admiral Sir Robert Calder was not the result of cowardice or disaffection, but of error in judgment, for which he deserves to be severely reprimanded—and he is hereby severely reprimanded accordingly."—See *Annual Register*, vol. xlvii. p. 436. And for the Defence of Sir Robert Calder, see p. 564 of the same volume.]

[2] ["In 1805, M. Daru was at Boulogne, intendant general of the army. One morning, Napoleon sent for him into his cabinet: Daru there found him transported with rage, striding rapidly up and down the apartment, and breaking a sullen silence only by abrupt and short exclamations—'What a navy!—What an admiral!—What sacrifices thrown away!—My hope is destroyed!—This Villeneuve! instead of being in the Channel, he is gone into Ferrol! It is all over! he will be blockaded. Daru, sit down, listen, and write!' Napoleon had received early in the morning the news of Villeneuve's arrival in a Spanish port; he

the squadron which was lying there, and continued their course for Cadiz, which they entered in safety. This did not consist with the plans of Buonaparte, who would have had the whole naval force united at Brest to be in readiness to cover the descent upon England. "General terror was spread," he said, "throughout that divided nation, and never was England so near to destruction."[1] Of the general terror, few of the British, we believe, remember any thing, and of the imminent danger we were not sensible. Had the combined fleets entered the British Channel, instead of the Mediterranean, they would have found the same admiral, the same seamen, nay, in many instances, the same ships, to which Villeneuve's retreat into Cadiz gave the trouble of going to seek him there.

When the certainty was known that the enemy's fleets were actually in Cadiz, Nelson was put at the head of the British naval force in the Mediterranean,[2] which was reinforced with an alertness and

saw instantly that the conquest of England was abortive, the immense expense of the fleet and the flotilla lost for a long time, perhaps for ever. At that moment, in the transport of rage, which permits not other men to preserve their judgment, he had taken one of those bold resolutions, and traced out one of the most admirable plans of a campaign, that any other conqueror could have conceived at leisure and with coolness, without hesitation, without stopping: he then dictated the whole plan of the campaign of Austerlitz, the departure of the several corps of the army, from Hanover and Holland, even to the confines of the west and south of France."—DUPIN, *Force Naval*, t. i. p. 244.]

[1] [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 263.]

[2] [Nelson had not been a month in England when Captain Blackwood, on his way to the Admiralty with despatches, called on him at Merton, at five in the morning and found him already

secrecy that did the highest honour to the Admiralty. Villeneuve, in the mean time, had, it is believed, his master's express orders to put to sea;[1] and if he had been censured for want of zeal in the action off Cape Finisterre with Calder, he was likely, as a brave man, to determine on running some risk to prove the injustice of his Emperor's reproaches. Cadiz also, being strictly blockaded by the English, the fleets of France and Spain began to be in want of necessaries. But what principally determined the French admiral on putting to sea, was his ignorance of the reinforcements received by the English, which, though they left Nelson's fleet still inferior to his own, yet brought them nearer to an equality than, had he been aware of it, would have rendered their meeting at all desirable to Villeneuve. It was another and especial point of encouragement, that circumstances led him to disbelieve the report that Nelson

dressed. Upon seeing him he exclaimed, "I am sure you bring me news of the French and Spanish fleets! I think I shall have yet to beat them!" It was as he had supposed; they had liberated the squadron from Ferrol, and being now thirty-four sail of the line, got safely into Cadiz. "Depend on it, Blackwood," he repeatedly said, "I shall yet give M. Villeneuve a drubbing!"—SOUTHEY.]

[1] ["Napoleon had, no doubt, ordered the minister of the marine to take from Admiral Villeneuve the command of his fleets; for the latter sent Admiral Rosilly to supersede him. He apprised Villeneuve of this by a courier: whether he added any reproaches I know not; but something of the kind must have passed, since Villeneuve quitted Cadiz without occasion, with the French and Spanish fleet, to attack the English squadron commanded by Nelson."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 112.]

commanded the British fleet.[1] Under the influence of these united motives, and confiding in a plan of tactics which he had formed for resisting the favourite mode of attack practised by the English, the French admiral sailed from Cadiz on the 19th October, 1805, in an evil hour for himself and for his country.

The hostile fleets were not long in meeting, and the wind never impelled along the ocean two more gallant armaments. The advantage of numbers was greatly on the side of Villeneuve. He had thirty-three sail of the line, and seven large frigates; Nelson only twenty-seven line-of-battle ships, and three frigates. The inferiority of the English in number of men and guns was yet more considerable. The combined fleet had four thousand troops on board, many of whom, excellent rifle-men, were placed in the tops. But all odds were compensated by the quality of the British sailors, and the talents of Nelson.

Villeneuve showed no inclination to shun the eventful action. His disposition was singular and ingenious. His fleet formed a double line, each alternate ship being about a cable's length to the windward of her second a-head and a-stern, and

[1] ["Villeneuve had called a council of war on hearing that Nelson had taken the command; and their determination was not to leave Cadiz unless they had reason to believe themselves one-third stronger than the British force. Many circumstances tended to deceive them into such an opinion, and an American contributed unintentionally to mislead them, by declaring that Nelson could not possibly be with the fleet, for he himself had seen him only a few days before in London."—SOUTHEY.]

thus the arrangements represented the chequers of a draught-board, and seemed to guard against the operation of cutting the line, as usually practised by the British. But Nelson had determined to practise the manœuvre in a manner as original as the mode of defence adopted by Villeneuve. His order for sailing was in two lines, and this was also the order for battle. An advanced squadron of eight of the fastest sailing two-deckers, was to cut off three or four of the enemy's line, a-head of their centre; the second in command, Admiral Collingwood, was to break in upon the enemy about the twelfth ship from the rear, and Nelson himself determined to bear down on the centre. The effect of these manœuvres must of course be a close and general action; for the rest Nelson knew he could trust to the determination of his officers and seamen. To his admirals and officers he explained in general, that his object was a close and decisive engagement; and that if, in the confusion and smoke of the battle, signals should not be visible, the captain would never do wrong who laid his ship alongside of the enemy.

With such dispositions on either side, the two gallant fleets met on the memorable 21st of October. Admiral Collingwood, who led the van, went down on the enemy with all his sails set, and, disdaining to furl them in the usual manner, cut the sheets and let his canvass fly loose in the wind, as if he needed it no longer after it had borne him amidst the thickest of the enemy. Nelson run his vessel, the Victory, on board the French Redoutable; the Temeraire, a second British ship, fell on

board the same vessel on the other side; another enemy's ship fell on board of the Temeraire, and the action was fiercely maintained betwixt these four vessels, which lay as close as if they had been moored together in some friendly harbour. While the Victory thus engaged the Redoutable on the starboard, she maintained from her larboard guns an incessant fire on the Bucentaur and the colossal Santa Trinidad, a vessel of four decks. The example of the admiral was universally followed by the British captains; they broke into the enemy's line on every side, engaged two or three ships at the same time, and maintained the battle at the very muzzles of the cannon. The superiority which we have claimed for our countrymen was soon made manifest. Nineteen ships of the line were captured, two were first-rate vessels, none were under seventy-four guns. Four ships of the line were taken, in a subsequent action, by Sir Richard Strachan. Seven out of the vessels which escaped into Cadiz were rendered unserviceable. The whole combined fleet was almost totally destroyed.

It is twenty years and upwards since that glorious day. But the feelings of deep sorrow mingled with those of exultation, with which we first heard the tidings of the battle of Trafalgar, still agitate our bosoms, as we record, that Nelson, the darling of Britain, bought with his life this last and decided triumph over his country's enemies. A Briton himself in every word and thought, the discharge of a sailor's duty, according to his idea, was a debt involving every feat which the most exalted bravery could perform, and every risk which the extremity

of danger could present. The word to which he attached such an unlimited meaning, was often in his mouth; the idea never, we believe, absent from his mind. His last signal intimated that England expected every man to do his *duty*. His first words on entering the action were, "I thank the great Disposer of events for this great opportunity of doing my *duty*;" and with his last departing breath, he was distinctly heard to repeat the same pious and patriotic sentiment, "I thank God I have done my duty."[1] That DUTY was indeed performed, even to the utmost extent of his own comprehensive interpretation of the phrase. The good servant of his country slept not before his task was fulfilled; for, by the victory in which he fell, the naval force of the enemy was altogether destroyed, and the threat of invasion silenced for ever.

It is a remarkable coincidence, that Mack's surrender having taken place on the 20th October, Napoleon was probably entering Ulm in triumph upon the very day, when the united remains of his maritime force, and the means on which, according to his own subsequent account, he relied for the subjugation of England, were flying, striking, and sinking, before the banners of Nelson. What his feelings may have been on learning the news, we

[1] See, for these and other particulars of the battle of Trafalgar, Southey's *Life of Nelson*, a work already repeatedly quoted. It is the history of a hero, in the narrative of which are evinced at once the judgment and fidelity of the historian, with the imagination of the poet. It well deserves to be, what already it is, the text book of the British navy.

have no certain means of ascertaining. The Memoirs of Fouché say, upon the alleged authority of Berthier, that his emotion was extreme, and that his first exclamation was, "I cannot be every where!" implying, certainly, that his own presence would have changed the scene.[1] The same idea occurs in his conversations with Las Cases.[2] It may be greatly doubted, however, whether Napoleon would have desired to have been on board the best ship in the French navy on that memorable occasion; and it seems pretty certain, that his being so could have had no influence whatever on the fate of the day. The unfortunate Villeneuve dared not trust to his master's forgiveness. "He ought," so Buonaparte states it, "to have been victorious, and he was defeated." For this, although the mishap which usually must attend one out of the

[1] ["The disaster of Trafalgar, by the ruin of our navy, completed the security of Great Britain. It was a few days after the capitulation of Ulm, and upon the Vienna road, that Napoleon received the despatch containing the first intelligence of this misfortune. Berthier has since related to me, that while seated at the same table with Napoleon, he read the fatal paper, but not daring to present it to him, he pushed it gradually with his elbows under his eyes. Scarcely had Napoleon glanced through its contents, than he started up, full of rage, exclaiming, 'I cannot be every where!' His agitation was extreme, and Berthier despaired of tranquillizing him."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 293.]

[2] ["It used to be remarked in the saloon of the household, that I was never accessible to any one after I had an audience with the minister of the marine. The reason was, because he never had any but bad news to communicate to me. For my part, I gave up every thing after the disaster of Trafalgar; I could not be every where, and I had enough to occupy my attention with the armies of the continent."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iii. p. 248.]

two commanders who engage in action, Villeneuve felt there was no apology to be accepted, or even offered, and the brave but unfortunate seaman committed suicide.[1] Buonaparte, on all occasions, spoke with disrespect of his memory; nor was it a sign of his judgment in nautical matters, that he preferred to this able, but unfortunate admiral, the gasconading braggart, Latouche Tréville.[2]

[1] ["At Rennes, 26th April, 1806, on his way from England to Paris.—Villeneuve, when taken prisoner and conveyed to England, was so much grieved at his defeat, that he studied anatomy on purpose to destroy himself. For this purpose he bought some anatomical plates of the heart, and compared them with his own body, in order to ascertain the exact situation of that organ. On his arrival in France, I ordered that he should remain at Rennes, and not proceed to Paris. Villeneuve, afraid of being tried by a court-martial, determined to destroy himself, and accordingly took his plates of the heart, and compared them with his breast. Exactly in the shape of the plate, he made a mark with a large pin, then fixed the pin as near as he could judge in the same spot in his own breast, shoved it in to the head, penetrated his heart, and expired. He need not have done it, as he was a brave man, though possessed of no talent."—NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c. vol. i. p. 57.]

[2] This admiral commanded at Toulon in 1804, and having stolen out of harbour with a strong squadron, when the main body of the English fleet was out of sight, had the satisfaction to see three vessels, under Rear-admiral Campbell, retreat before his superior force. This unusual circumstance so elated Monsieur Latouche Tréville, that he converted the affair into a general pursuit of the whole British fleet, and of Nelson himself, who, he pretended, fled before him. Nelson was so much nettled at his effrontery, that he wrote to his brother, "You will have seen Latouche's letter, how he chased me and how I run. I keep it, and if I take him, by God, he shall eat it." Latouche escaped this punishment by dying [19th August, 1804] of the fatigue incurred by walking so often up to the signal-post at Sepet, to watch for the momentary absence of the blockading squadron, which he pretended dared not face him. This man

The unfortunate event of the battle of Trafalgar was not permitted to darken the brilliant picture, which the extraordinary campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz enabled the victor to present to the empire which he governed, and which detailed his successes in the full-blown pride of conquest. "His armies," he said, addressing the Legislative Body, the session of which he opened with great pomp on 2d March, 1806, "had never ceased to conquer, until he commanded them to cease to combat. His enemies were humbled and confounded—the royal house of Naples had ceased to reign *for ever*"—(the term was too comprehensive)—"the entire peninsula of Italy now made a part of the Great Empire—his generosity had permitted the return of the defeated Russians to their own country, and had re-established the throne of Austria, after punishing her by the privation of a part of her dominions." Trafalgar was then touched upon. "A tempest," he said, "had deprived him of some few vessels, after a combat imprudently entered into;"[1] —and thus he glossed over a calamitous and decisive defeat, in which so many of his hopes were shipwrecked.

When a sovereign has not sufficient greatness of mind to acknowledge his losses, we may, without doing him wrong, suspect him of exaggerating

Buonaparte considered as the boast of the French navy.—["Napoleon said, he much regretted Latouche Tréville, whom he regarded as a man of real talent. He was of opinion that that admiral would have given a different impulse to affairs. The attack on India, and the invasion of England, would by him have been at least attempted."—Las Cases, t. iii. p. 247.]

[1] [Moniteur, 3d March, 1806.]

his successes. Those of France, in her external relations, were indeed scarcely capable of being over-estimated. But when M. de Champagny, on the 4th March following, made a relation of the internal improvements of France under the government of Buonaparte, he seems to have assumed the merit of those which only existed upon paper, and of others which were barely commenced, as well as of some that were completed. All was of course ascribed to the inspiring genius of the Emperor, to whose agency France was indebted for all her prosperity. The credit of the good city of Paris was restored, and her revenue doubled —agriculture was encouraged, by the draining of immense morasses—mendicity was abolished. Beneficial results, apparently inconsistent with each other, were produced by his regulations — the expenses of legal proceedings were abridged, and the appointments of the judges were raised. Immense and most expensive improvements, which, in other countries, or rather under other sovereigns, are necessarily reserved for times of peace, were carried on by Napoleon during the most burdensome wars against entire Europe. Forty millions had been expended on public works, of which eight great canals were quoted with peculiar emphasis, as opening all the departments of the empire to the influence of internal navigation. To conclude, the Emperor had established three hundred and seventy schools—had restored the rites of religion—reinforced public credit by supporting the Bank—reconciled jarring factions—diminished the public imposts—and ameliorated the condition of every

existing Frenchman.[1] To judge from the rapturous expressions of M. de Champagny, the Emperor was already the subject of deserved adoration; it only remained to found temples and raise altars.

Much of this statement was unquestionably the exaggeration of flattery, which represented every thing as commenced as soon as it had been resolved upon by the sovereign, every thing finished as soon as it was begun. Other measures there were, which, like the support afforded to the Bank, merely repaired injuries which Napoleon himself had inflicted. The credit of this commercial establishment had been shaken, because, in setting off for the campaign, Napoleon had stripped it of the reserve of specie laid up to answer demands; and it was restored, because his return with victory had enabled him to replace what he had borrowed. Considering that there was no small hazard of his being unable to remedy the evil which he had certainly occasioned,[2] his conduct on the occasion scarcely deserves the name of a national benefit.

Some part of this exaggeration might even de-

[1] [The Exposé also states—"The calendar of the Revolution has been abolished, because its object was found to be unattainable, and it was necessary to sacrifice it to commercial and political convenience, which requires a common system.—Indeed," it adds, "the people of fair Europe are already divided by too many varieties; they ought only to form one great family."]

[2] ["This embarrassment Napoleon had himself caused by carrying off from the vaults of the bank above fifty millions. Placed upon the backs of King Philip's mules, these millions had powerfully contributed to the prodigious success of this unexpected campaign."—Fouché, t. i. p. 295.]

ceive Napoleon. It is one of the great disadvantages of despotism, that the sovereign himself is liable to be imposed upon by false representations of this nature; as it is said the Empress Catherine was flattered by the appearance of distant villages and towns in the desert places of her empire, which were, in fact, no more than painted representations of such objects,[1] upon the plan of those that are exhibited on the stage, or are erected as points of view in some fantastic pleasure gardens. It was a part of Buonaparte's character to seize with ready precision upon general ideas of improvement. Wherever he came, he formed plans of important public works, many of which never existed but in the bulletin. Having issued his general orders, he was apt to hold them as executed. It was impossible to do all himself, or even to overlook with accuracy those to whom the details were committed. There were, therefore, many magnificent schemes commenced, under feelings of the moment, which were left unfinished for want of funds, or perhaps because they only regarded some points of local interest, and there were many adopted that

[1] ["A ridiculous story,"—says the Prince de Ligne, who accompanied the Empress Catherine during her tour through her southern provinces, in 1787, "has been spread, which affirms that villages of pasteboard, and paintings representing distant fleets and arsenals, and bodies of cavalry, have been so disposed as to cheat our eyes during our rapid journey. I believe, however, that some little contrivance is occasionally employed: that, for instance, the Empress, who cannot rove about on foot as we do, is persuaded that some towns, for the building of which she has paid considerable sums, are really finished; whereas there are, in fact, many towns without streets, streets without houses, and houses without roofs, doors, or windows."—*Lettres et Pensées.*]

were forgotten amid the hurry of affairs, or postponed till the moment of peace, which was never to appear during his reign.

But with the same frankness with which history is bound to censure the immeasurable ambition of this extraordinary man, she is bound also to record that his views towards the improvement of his empire were broad, clear-sighted, and public-spirited; and we think it probable, that, had his passion for war been a less predominant point of his character, his care, applied to the objects of peace, would have done as much for France, as Augustus did for Rome. Still it must be added, that, having bereft his country of her freedom, and proposing to transmit the empire, like his own patrimony, to his heirs, the evil which he had done to France was as permanent as his system of government, while the benefits which he had conferred on her, to whatever extent they might have been realized, must have been dependent upon his own life, and the character of his successor.

But as such reflections had not prevented Napoleon from raising the fabric of supreme power, to the summit of which he had ascended, so they did not now prevent him from surrounding and strengthening it with such additional bulwarks as he could find materials for erecting, at the expense of the foes whom he subdued. Sensible of the difficulty, or rather the impossibility, of retaining all power in his own hands, he now bent himself so to modify and organize the governments of the countries adjacent, that they should always be dependent upon France; and to ensure this point, he

determined to vest immediate relations of his own with the supreme authority in those states, which, under the name of allies, were to pay to France the same homage in peace, and render her the same services in war, which ancient Rome exacted from the countries which she had subdued. Germany, Holland, and Italy, were each destined to furnish an appanage to the princes born of the Imperial blood of Napoleon, or connected with it by matrimonial alliances. In return for these benefits, Buonaparte was disposed to subject his brothers to the ordinary monarchical restrictions, which preclude princes nearly connected with the throne, from forming marriages, according to their own private inclinations, and place them in this respect entirely at the devotion of the monarch, and destined to form such political alliances as may best suit his views. They belonged, he said, in the decree creating them, entirely to the country, and must therefore lay aside every sentiment of individual feeling, when the public weal required such a sacrifice.[1]

Two of Napoleon's brothers resisted this species of authority. The services which Lucien had rendered him, upon the 18th Brumaire, although without his prompt assistance that daring adventure might have altogether failed, had not saved him from falling under the Imperial displeasure. It is

[1] ["How does Sir Walter make these different assertions agree? The truth is, Napoleon never wished or pretended to give *appanages*, but to act as he thought right towards France, and this design was as great as it was noble and generous; exaggeration only deforms it."—LOUIS BUONAPARTE, p. 48.]

said that he had disapproved of the destruction of the Republic, and that, in remonstrating against the murder of the Duke d'Enghien, he had dared to tell his brother, that such conduct would cause the people to cast himself and his kindred into the common sewer, as they had done the corpse of Marat.[1] But Lucien's principal offence consisted in his refusing to part with his wife, a beautiful and affectionate woman, for the purpose of forming an alliance more suited to the views of Napoleon.[2] He remained, therefore, long in a private situation,[3] notwithstanding the talent and decision which he had evinced on many occasions during the Revolution, and was only restored to his brother's favour and countenance, when, after his return from Elba, his support became again of importance. Jerome, the youngest brother of the family, incurred also for a time his brother's displeasure, by having formed a matrimonial connexion with an American lady of beauty and accomplishments.[4] Complying

[1] ["One day, after a warm dispute between the two brothers, Lucien, taking out his watch, and flinging it violently on the floor, addressed Napoleon in these remarkable words: 'You will one day be smashed to pieces as I have smashed that watch; and a time will come, when your family and friends will not have a resting-place for their heads.'"—*Mémoires de* RAPP, p. 11.]

[2] [De Bourrienne, t. vi. p. 80.]

[3] [In 1805 he settled at Rome, where the Pope, calling to mind the active part he had taken in the negotiation relative to the Concordat, treated him with marked attention and kindness.]

[4] [Towards the close of 1803, Jerome married Miss Paterson, the daughter of a rich merchant of Baltimore. In the spring of 1805, he embarked in a neutral vessel, and landed at Lisbon, whence he set off, by land, for Paris, directing the ship to pro-

with the commands of Napoleon, he was at a later period restored to his favour, but at present he too was in disgrace. Neither Lucien nor Jerome was therefore mentioned in the species of entail, which, in default of Napoleon's naming his successor, destined the French empire to Joseph and Louis in succession; nor were the former called upon to partake in the splendid provisions, which, after the campaign of Austerlitz, Napoleon was enabled to make for the other members of his family.

Of these establishments, the most princely were the provinces of Holland, which Napoleon now converted into a kingdom, and conferred upon Louis Buonaparte. This transmutation of a republic, whose independence was merely nominal, into a kingdom, which was completely and absolutely subordinate, was effected by little more than an expression of the French Emperor's will that such an alteration should take place. The change was accomplished without attracting much attention; for the Batavian republic was placed so absolutely at Buonaparte's mercy, as to have no power whatever to dispute his pleasure. They had followed the French Revolution through all its phases; and under their present constitution, a Grand Pensionary, who had the sole right of presenting new laws for adoption, and who was accountable

ceed to Amsterdam; from which city he intended his wife should follow him, as soon as he had obtained the requisite permission from his imperial brother. On the arrival, however, of the vessel in the Texel, Madame Jerome, not being permitted to go on shore, landed at Dover, took up her residence during the summer at Camberwell, and in the autumn returned to America.]

to no one for the acts of his administration, corresponded to the First Consul of the French Consular Government. This office-bearer was now to assume the name of king, as his prototype had done that of emperor; but the king was to be chosen from the family of Buonaparte.

On the 18th March, 1806, the secretary of the Dutch Legation at Paris arrived at the Hague bearing a secret commission. The States-General were convoked—the Grand Pensionary was consulted—and, finally, a deputation was sent to Paris, requesting that the Prince Louis Napoleon should be created hereditary King of Holland. Buonaparte's assent was graciously given, and the transaction was concluded.

It is indeed probable, that though the change was in every degree contradictory of their habits and opinions, the Dutch submitted to it as affording a prospect of a desirable relief from the disputes and factions which then divided their government. Louis Buonaparte was of a singularly amiable and gentle disposition. Besides his near relationship to Napoleon, he was married to Hortensia,[1] the daughter of Josephine, step-child of course to the Emperor, and who was supposed to share a great proportion of his favour. The conquered States of

[1] ["The marriage took place on the 4th January, 1802. Louis became a husband—never was there a more gloomy ceremony—never had husband and wife a stronger presentiment of all the horrors of a forced and ill-assorted union! From this he dates the commencement of his unhappiness. It stamped on his whole existence a profound melancholy."—LOUIS BUONAPARTE, *Documens Historiques*, t. i. p. 126.]

Holland, no longer the High and Mighty, as they had been accustomed to style themselves, hoped, in adopting a monarch so nearly and intimately connected with Buonaparte, and received from his hand, that they might be permitted to enjoy the protection of France, and be secured against the subaltern oppression exercised over their commerce and their country. The acceptance of Louis as their King, they imagined, must establish for them a powerful protector in the councils of that Autocrat, at whose disposal they were necessarily placed. Louis Buonaparte was therefore received as King of Holland.[1] How far the prince and his subjects experienced fulfilment of the hopes which both naturally entertained, belongs to another page of this history.

Germany also was doomed to find more than one appanage for the Buonaparte family. The effect of the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz had been almost entirely destructive of the influence which the House of Austria had so long possessed in the southwest districts of Germany. Stripped of her dominions in the Vorarlberg and the Tyrol, as she had formerly been of the larger portion of the Netherlands, she was flung far back from that portion of Germany bordering on the right of the Rhine,

[1] [Louis pleaded the delicacy of his constitution, and the unfavourableness of the climate. "Better to die a king than to live a prince," was Napoleon's reply; and in a day or two after Talleyrand waited on him at St Leu, and read aloud to him and Hortensia, the treaty and constitution. This took place on the 3d of June, 1806; on the 5th Louis was proclaimed King of Holland.—De Bourrienne, t. viii. p. 126.]

where she had formerly exercised so much authority, and often, it must be confessed, with no gentle hand.

Defeated and humbled, the Emperor of Austria was no longer able to offer any opposition to the projects of aggrandizement which Napoleon meditated in those confines of the empire which lay adjacent to the Rhine and to France, of which that river had been declared the boundary; nor indeed to his scheme of entirely new-modelling the empire itself.

Prussia, however, remained a party interested, and too formidable, from her numerous armies and high military reputation, to be despised by Napoleon. He was indeed greatly dissatisfied with her conduct during the campaign, and by no means inclined either to forget or to forgive the menacing attitude which the Court of Berlin had assumed, although finally determined by the course of events to abstain from actual hostility. Yet notwithstanding these causes of irritation, Napoleon still esteemed it more politic to purchase Prussia's acquiescence in his projects by a large sacrifice to her selfish interests, than to add her to the number of his avowed enemies. She was therefore to be largely propitiated at the expense of some other state.

We have already noticed the critical arrival of Haugwitz, the prime-minister of Prussia, at Vienna, and how the declaration of war against France with which he was charged, was exchanged for a friendly congratulation to Napoleon by the event of the battle of Austerlitz. Napoleon was no dupe to the versatility of the Prussian Cabinet; but the

Archduke Ferdinand had rallied a large army in Bohemia— his brother Charles was at the head of a yet larger in Hungary — Alexander, though defeated, refused to enter into any treaty, and retained a menacing attitude, and, victor as he was, Buonaparte could not wish to see the great and highly-esteemed military force of Prussia thrown into the scale against him. He entered, therefore, into a private treaty with Haugwitz, by which Prussia was to cede to France, or rather to place at her disposal, the territories of Anspach and Bareuth, and, by way of indemnification, was to have the countenance of France in occupying Hanover, from which the French troops had been withdrawn to join the Grand Army.

The conduct of the Prussian minister,—for with him, rather than with his court, the fault lay,—was at once mean-spirited and unprincipled. He made his country surrender to France that very territory which the French armies had so recently violated; and he accepted as an indemnification the provinces belonging to the King of Britain, with whom Prussia was so far from having any quarrel, that she had been on the point of making common cause with her against the aggressions of France; and which provinces had been seized by France in violation of the rights of neutrality claimed by the Elector of Hanover, as a member of the Germanic Body. Such gross and complicated violations of national law and justice, have often carried with them their own punishment, nor did they fail to do so in the present instance.

Those states, Anspach and Bareuth, were united to Bavaria; that kingdom was also aggrandized by the Tyrol, at the expense of Austria; and it ceded the Grand Duchy of Berg, which, with other lordships, Napoleon erected into a Grand Duchy, and conferred as an appanage upon Joachim Murat. Originally a soldier of fortune,[1] and an undaunted one, Murat had raised himself to eminence in the Italian campaigns. On the 18th Brumaire, he commanded the party which drove the Council of Five Hundred out of their hall. In reward for this service, he obtained the command of the Consular Guard, and the hand of Marie de l'Annonciade, afterwards called Caroline, sister of Napoleon.[2] Murat was particularly distinguished as a cavalry officer; his handsome person, accomplished horsemanship, and daring bravery at the head of his squadrons, procured him the title of *Le Beau Sabreur*. Out of the field of battle he was but a weak man, liable to be duped by his own vanity, and the flattery of those around him. He affected a theatrical foppery in dress, which rather evinced a fantastic love of finery than good taste; and hence he was sometimes called King Franconi, from the celebrated mountebank of that name.[3] His wife Caroline was an able woman, and well versed in

[1] [Murat's father was the keeper of an humble country inn, and, having once been a steward of the Talleyrands, enjoyed the protection of that ancient and wealthy family.]

[2] [They were married in January, 1800, at the Palace of the Luxembourg.]

[3] [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 351.]

political intrigue.[1] It will presently be found that they arose to higher fortunes than the Grand Duchy of Berg. Mean time, Murat was invested with the hereditary dignity of Grand Admiral of France; for it was the policy of Buonaparte to maintain the attachment of the new princes to the Great Nation, were it but by wearing some string or tassel of his own imperial livery.

The fair territories of Naples and Sicily were conferred upon Joseph,[2] the former in possession, the latter in prospect. He was a good man, who often strove to moderate the fits of violence to which his brother gave way. In society, he was accomplished and amiable, fond of letters, and, though not possessed of any thing approaching his brother's high qualifications, had yet good judgment as well as good inclinations. Had he continued King of Naples, it is probable he might have been as fortunate as Louis, in conciliating the respect of his subjects; but his transference to Spain was fatal to his reputation. In conformity with the policy which we have noticed, the King of Naples was to continue a high feudatory of the empire, under the title of the Vice-Grand Elector.

[1] [M. de Talleyrand said of her, that "she had Cromwell's head on the shoulders of a pretty woman."]

[2] [Ferdinand having embarked for Sicily, Joseph Buonaparte, in February, 1806, made his public entry into Naples, alighting at the palace which the unfortunate monarch had just quitted. He was proclaimed King of Naples and the two Sicilies on the 30th of March. The city was illuminated on the occasion, "amidst every demonstration of joy, even more on the part of the nobles than of the lower orders."—Botta, *Storia d'Italia*, t. iv. p. 264.]

The principality of Lucca had been already conferred on Eliza, the eldest sister of Buonaparte, and was now augmented by the districts of Massa-Carara and Garfagnana. She was a woman of a strong and masculine character, which did not, however, prevent her giving way to the feminine weakness of encouraging admirers, who, it is said, did not sigh in vain.[1]

The public opinion was still less favourable to her younger sister Pauline, who was one of the most beautiful women in France, and perhaps in Europe. Leclerc, her first husband, died in the fatal expedition to St Domingo, and she was afterwards married to the Prince Borghese. Her encouragement of the fine arts was so little limited by the ordinary ideas of decorum, that the celebrated Canova was permitted to model from her person a naked Venus, the most beautiful, it is said, of his works.[2] Scandal went the horrible length of imputing to Pauline an intrigue with her own brother; which we willingly reject as a crime too hideous to be imputed to any one, without the most satisfactory evidence.[3] The gross and guilty

[1] ["She was haughty, nervous, passionate, dissolute, and devoured by the two passions of love and ambition—influenced, as has been said, by the poet Fontanes, in whom she was wrapped up."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 240.]

[2] It is said, that being asked by a lady how she could submit to such an exposure of her person, she conceived that the question only related to physical inconvenience, and answered it by assuring her friend that the apartment was properly aired.

[3] [Fouché, t. ii. p. 33. The most ridiculous reports were also circulated, respecting an improper intercourse between Napoleon and his step-daughter Hortensia:—"Such a connexion," said he, "would have been wholly repugnant to my ideas; and those

enormities practised by the ancient Roman emperors, do not belong to the character of Buonaparte, though such foul aspersions have been cast upon him by those who were willing to represent him as in all respects the counterpart of Tiberius or Caligula. Pauline Borghese received the principality of Guastalla, in the distribution of honours among the family of Napoleon.

At this period, also, Buonaparte began first to display a desire of engrafting his own family upon the ancient dynasties of Europe, with whom he had been so long at war, and the ruin of most of whom had contributed to his elevation. The Elector of Bavaria had to repay the patronage which raised him to the rank of king, and enlarged his territories with the fine country of the Tyrol, by forming an alliance which should mix his ancient blood with that of the family connexions of the fortunate soldier. Eugene Beauharnais, Viceroy of Italy, the son of Josephine by her first husband, and now the adopted son of Napoleon, was wedded to the eldest daughter of the King of Bavaria. Eugene was deservedly favoured by his father-in-law, Napoleon. He was a man of talents, probity, and honour, and displayed great military skill, particularly during the Russian Campaigu of 1812. Stephanie Beauharnais,[1] the niece of Josephine,

who knew any thing of the morality of the Tuileries, must be aware that I need not have been reduced to so unnatural and revolting a choice."—LAS CASES, t. iii. p. 307.]

[1] ["Stephanie Beauharnais lost her mother in childhood. She was left in the care of an English lady, who confided her *protegée*

was married about the same time to the Hereditary Prince of Baden, son to the reigning duke, the neutrality of whose territories had been violated in the seizure of the Duke d'Enghien.

These various kingdoms and principalities, erected in favour of his nearest relations, imposed on the mind a most impressive image of Buonaparte's unlimited authority, who distributed crowns among his kinsfolk as ordinary men give vails to their domestics. But the sound policy of his conduct may be greatly doubted. We have elsewhere stated the obvious objections to the transference of cities and kingdoms from hand to hand, with as little ceremony as the circulation of a commercial bill payable to the holder. Authority is a plant of a slow growth, and to obtain the full veneration which renders it most effectual, must have arisen by degrees in the place which it overshadows and protects. Suddenly transferred to new regions, it is apt to pine and to perish. The theoretical evils of a long-established government are generally mitigated by some practical remedy, or those who suffer by them have grown callous from habit.

to some old nuns in the south of France. During the consulship, I had her placed in the establishment of Madame Campan, at St Germain; all sorts of masters were appointed to superintend her education, and on her introduction into the world, her beauty, wit, accomplishments, and virtues, rendered her an object of universal admiration. I adopted her as my daughter, and gave her in marriage to the hereditary Prince of Baden. This union was, for several years, far from being happy. In course of time, however, they became attached to each other, and from that moment they had only to regret the happiness of which they had deprived themselves during the early years of their marriage."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iii. p. 317.]

The reverse is the case with a newly-established domination, which has no claim to the veneration due to antiquity, and to which the subjects are not attached by the strong though invisible chains of long habit.

Fox, in his own nervous language, has left his protest against the principle adopted at this time in Europe, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another by way of equivalents, and under the pretext of general arrangement. "The wildest schemes," he remarked, "that were ever before broached, would not go so far to shake the foundations of all established government, as this new practice. There must be in every nation a certain attachment of the people to its form of government, without which no government could exist. The system, then, of transferring the subjects of one prince to another, strikes at the foundation of every government, and the existence of every nation."[1]

These observations apply generally to violent alterations upon the European system; but other and more special objections arise to Buonaparte's system of erecting thrones in Holland, in Naples, and all through Europe, for the members of his own family. It was particularly impolitic, as marking too strongly his determination to be satisfied with nothing less than the dominion of the world; for while he governed France in his own person, the disposing of other countries to his brothers and near relations, feudatories of France, and his dependents as well by blood as by allegiance, what

[1] [Speech on the King's Message, relating to Prussia, April 23, 1806; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. vi. p. 891.]

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governed. In devolving the crown of Holland on the son of Louis, after the abdication of Louis, [in July, 1810,] he repeats the same principle as a fundamental condition of its tenure. "Never forget," he said, "that in the situation to which my political system, and the interest of my empire have called you, your *first* duty is towards ME, your *second* towards France. All your other duties, even those towards the people whom I have called you to govern, rank after these."[1]

When Napoleon censures his delegate princes for preferring the interest of the kingdoms which he had assigned them, instead of sacrificing it to him and his government, he degrades them into mere puppets, which might indeed bear regal titles and regal attendance, but, entirely dependent on the will of another, had no choice save to second the views of an ambition, the most insatiable certainly that ever reigned in a human breast.

[1] [On the abdication of Louis, Napoleon sent an aide-de-camp for the minor, to whom he assigned a dwelling in a pavilion in the park of St Cloud with his brother, and a few days after made him the above speech, which he caused to be inserted in the *Moniteur*. "This," says Madame de Staël, "is no libel, it is not the opinion of a faction: it is the man himself, it is Buonaparte in person, who brings against himself a severer accusation than posterity would ever have dared to do. Louis XIV. was accused of having said in private, '*I am the State*;' and enlightened historians have with justice grounded themselves upon this language in condemning his character. But if. when that monarch placed his grandson on the throne of Spain, he had publicly taught him the same doctrine that Buonaparte taught his nephew, perhaps even Bossuet would not have dared to prefer the interests of kings to those of nations."—*Consid. sur la Rév. Franç.* t. ii. p. 379.]

This secret did not remain concealed from the Dutch, from the Neapolitans, or other foreigners, subjected to these pageant monarchs; and as it naturally incensed them against Napoleon's government, so it prevented the authority which he had delegated from obtaining either affection or reverence, and disposed the nations who were subjected to it to take the first opportunity of casting the yoke aside.

The erection of these kindred monarchies was not the only mode by which Napoleon endeavoured to maintain an ascendency in the countries which he had conquered, and which he desired to retain in dependence upon France, though not nominally or directly making parts of the French empire. Buonaparte had already proposed to his council the question whether the creation of Grandees of the Empire, a species of nobility whose titles were to depend, not on their descents, but on their talents and services to the state, was to be considered as a violation of the laws of liberty and equality. He was universally answered in the negative; for having now acquired an hereditary monarch, it seemed a natural, if not an indispensable consequence, that France should have peers of the kingdom, and great officers of the crown. Such an establishment, according to Buonaparte's view, would at once place his dignity on the same footing with those of the other courts of Europe, (an assimilation to which he attached a greater degree of consequence than was consistent with policy,) and by blending the new nobles of the empire with those of the ancient kingly government, would tend to recon-

cile the modern state of things with such relics of the old court as yet existed.

From respect, perhaps, to the republican opinions which had so long predominated, the titles and appanages of these grand feudatories were not chosen within the bounds of France herself, but from provinces which had experienced the sword of the ruler. Fifteen dukedoms, grand fiefs, not of France, but of the French empire, which extended far beyond France itself, were created by the fiat of the Emperor. The income attached to each amounted to the fifteenth part of the revenue of the province, which gave title to the dignitary. The Emperor invested with these endowments those who had best served him in war and in state affairs. Princedoms also were erected, and while marshals and ministers were created dukes, the superior rank of prince was bestowed on Talleyrand, Bernadotte, and Berthier, by the titles of Beneventum, Ponte-Corvo, and Neufchatel.

The transformation of Republican generals and ancient Jacobins into the peerage of a monarchical government, gave a species of incongruity to this splendid masquerade, and more than one of the personages showed not a little awkwardness in supporting their new titles. It is true, the high degree of talent annexed to some of the individuals thus promoted, the dread inspired by others, and the fame in war which many had acquired, might bear them out against the ridicule which was unsparingly heaped upon them in the saloons frequented by the ancient noblesse; but, whatever claims these dignitaries had to the respect of the public, had

been long theirs, and received no accession from their new honours and titles.

In this, and on similar occasions, Napoleon overshot his aim, and diminished to a certain extent his reputation, by seeming to set a value upon honours, titles, and ceremonies, which, if matters of importance to other courts, were certainly not such as *he* ought to have rested his dignity upon. Ceremonial is the natural element of a long-established court, and etiquette and title are the idols which are worshipped there. But Buonaparte reigned by his talents and his sword. Like Mezentius in the Æneid, he ought to have acknowledged no other source of his authority.[1] It was imprudent to appear to attach consequence to points, which even his otherwise almost boundless power could not attain, since his nobility and his court-ceremonial must still retain the rawness of novelty, and could no more possess that value, which, whether real or imaginary, has been generally attached to ancient institutions and long descent, than the Emperor could, by a decree of his complaisant Senate, have given his modern coinage the value which antiquaries attach to ancient medals. It was imprudent to descend to a strife in which he must necessarily be overcome; for where power rests in a great measure on public opinion, it is diminished in proportion to its failure in objects aimed at, whether

[1] Dextra mihi Deus, et telum, quod missile libro,
Nunc adsint —— *Æneidos, Lib. X.*
["Now! now! my spear, and conquering hand, he cry'd,
(Mezentius owns no deity beside!)
Assist my vows."—PITT.]

of greater or less consequence. This half-feudal half-oriental establishment of grand feudatories, with which Buonaparte now began to decorate the structure of his power, may be compared to the heavy Gothic devices with which modern architects sometimes overlay the front of their buildings, where they always encumber what they cannot ornament, and sometimes overload what they are designed to support.[1]

The system of the new noblesse was settled by an Imperial edict of Napoleon himself, which was communicated to the Senate 30th March, 1806, not for the purpose of deliberation or acceptance, but merely that, like the old Parliament of Paris, they might enter it upon their register.

The court of Buonaparte now assumed a character of the strictest etiquette, in which these important trifles, called by a writer on the subject the "Superstitions of Gentlemen Ushers," were treated

[1] ["I had three objects in view in establishing an hereditary national nobility: 1st, to reconcile France to the rest of Europe; 2dly, to reconcile ancient with modern France; 3dly, to banish the remains of the feudal system from Europe, by attaching the idea of nobility to services rendered to the state, and detaching it from every feudal association. The old French nobles, on recovering their country and part of their wealth, had resumed their titles, not legally, but actually; they more than ever regarded themselves as a privileged race; all blending and amalgamation with the leaders of the Revolution was difficult; the creation of new titles wholly annihilated these difficulties; there was not an ancient family that did not readily form alliances with the new dukes. It was not without design that I bestowed the first title I gave on Marshal Lefebvre, who had been a private soldier, and whom every body at Paris remembered a serjeant in the French guards."—NAPOLEON, *Montholon*, t. ii. p. 239.]

as matters of serious import, and sometimes occupied the thoughts of Napoleon himself, and supplied the place of meditated conquests, and the future destruction or erection of kingdoms.

The possessors of ancient titles, tempted by revival of the respect paid to birth and rank, did not fail to mingle with those whose nobility rested on the new creation. The Emperor distinguished these ancient minions of royalty with considerable favour, as, half-blushing for their own apostasy in doing homage to Buonaparte in the palace of the Bourbons, half-sneering at the maladroit and awkward manners of their new associates, they mingled among the men of new descent, and paid homage to the monarch of the day, "because," as one of them expressed himself to Madame de Staël, "one must serve some one or other."[1] Buonaparte encouraged these nobles of the ancient antechambers, whose superior manners seemed to introduce among his courtiers some traits of the former court, so inimitable for grace and for address, and also because he liked to rank among his retainers, so far as he could, the inheritors of those superb names which ornamented the history of France in former ages. But then he desired to make them exclusively his own; nothing less than complete and uncompromising conversion to his government would give satisfaction. A baron of the old noblesse, who had become a counsellor of state, was in 1810 summoned to attend the Emperor at Fontainbleau.

[1] [Considerations sur la Rév. Franç. t. ii. p. 331.]

"What would you do," said the Emperor, "should you learn that the Compte de Lille was this instant at Paris?"

"I would inform against him, and have him arrested," said the candidate for favour; "the law commands it."

"And what would you do if appointed a judge on his trial?" demanded the Emperor again.

"I would condemn him to death," said the unhesitating noble; "the law denounces him."

"With such sentiments you deserve a prefecture," said the Emperor; and the catechumen, whose respect for the law was thus absolute, was made Prefect of Paris.

Such converts were searched for, and, when found, were honoured, and rewarded, and trusted For the power of recompensing his soldiers, statesmen, and adherents, the conquered countries were again the Emperor's resource. National domains were reserved to a large amount throughout those countries, and formed funds, out of which gratifications and annuities were, at Napoleon's sole pleasure, assigned to the generals, officers, and soldiers of the French army; who might in this way be said to have all Europe for their paymaster. Thus, every conquest increased his means of rewarding his soldiers; and that army, which was the most formidable instrument of his ambition, was encouraged and maintained at the expense of those states which had suffered most from his arms.

We have not yet concluded the important changes introduced into Europe by the consequences of the fatal campaign of Austerlitz. The Confederation

of the Rhine,[1] which withdrew from the German empire so large a portion of its princes, and, transferring them from the influence of Austria, placed them directly and avowedly under the protection of France, was an event which tended directly to the dissolution of the Germanic League, which had subsisted since the year 800, when Charlemagne received the Imperial Crown from Pope Leo the Third.

By the new Federation of the Rhine, the courts of Wirtemberg and Bavaria, of Hesse d'Armstadt, with some petty princes of the right bank of the Rhine, formed among themselves an alliance offensive and defensive, and renounced their dependance upon the Germanic Body, of which they declared they no longer recognised the constitution. The reasons assigned for this league had considerable weight. It was urged, that the countries governed by these princes were, in every case of war betwixt France and Austria, exposed to all the evils of invasion, from which the Germanic Body had no longer power to defend them. Therefore, being obliged to seek for more effectual protection from so great an evil, they placed themselves directly under the guardianship of France. Napoleon, on his part, did not hesitate to accept the title of Protector of the Confederation of the Rhine. It is true, that he had engaged to his subjects that he would not extend the limits of his empire beyond that river, which he acknowledged as the natural

[1] [For the "Act of Confederation of the Rhenish League, done at Paris, July 12, 1806," see Annual Register, vol. xlviii. p. 818.]

boundary of France; but this engagement was not held to exclude the sort of seigniorie attached to the new Protectorate, in virtue of which he plunged the German states who composed the Confederacy into every war in which France herself engaged, and at pleasure carried their armies against other German states, their brethren in language and manners, or transferred them to more distant climates, to wage wars in which they had no interest, and to which they had received no provocation. It was also a natural consequence, that a number of inferior members of the empire who had small tenures under the old constitutions, having no means of defence excepting their ancient rights, were abolished in their capacity of imperial feudatories, and reduced from petty sovereigns to the condition of private nobles. This, though certainly unjust in the abstract principle, was not in practice an inconvenient result of the great change introduced.

The military contingents, which the Confederation placed, not perhaps in words, but certainly in fact, at the disposal of their Protector, not less than sixty thousand men, were of a character and in a state of military organization very superior to those which they had formerly furnished to the Germanic Body. These last, much fewer in number, were seldom in a complete state of equipment, and were generally very inferior in discipline. But Napoleon not only exacted, that the contingents furnished under this new federation should be complete in numbers, and perfect in discipline and

appointments, but, imparting to them, and to their officers, a spark of his own military ardour, he inspired them with a spirit of bravery and confidence which they had been far from exhibiting when in the opposite ranks. No troops in his army behaved better than those of the Confederacy of the Rhine. But the strength which the system afforded to Napoleon was only temporary, and depended on the continuance of the power by which it was created. It was too arbitrary, too artificial, and too much opposed both to the interests and national prejudices of the Germans, not to bear within it the seeds of dissolution. When the tide of fortune turned against Buonaparte after the battle of Leipsic, Bavaria hastened to join the allies for the purpose of completing his destruction, and the example was followed by all the other princes of the Rhine. It fared with Napoleon and the German Confederation, as with a necromancer and the demon whom for a certain term he has bound to his service, and who obeys him with fidelity during the currency of the obligation; but when that is expired, is the first to tear his employer to pieces.

Francis of Austria, seeing the empire, of which his house had been so long the head, going to pieces like a parting wreck, had no other resource than to lay aside the Imperial Crown of Germany, and to declare that league dissolved which he now saw no sufficient means of enforcing. He declared the ties dissevered which bound the various princes to him as Emperor, to each other as allies; and

although he reserved the Imperial title, it was only as the Sovereign of Austria, and his other hereditary states.[1]

France became therefore in a great measure the successor to the influence and dignity of the Holy Roman Empire, as that of Germany had been proudly styled for a thousand years; and the Empire of Napoleon gained a still nearer resemblance to that of Charlemagne. At least France succeeded to the Imperial influence exercised by Austria and her empire over all the south-western provinces of that powerful district of Europe. In the eastern districts, Austria, stunned by her misfortunes and her defeats, was passive and unresisting. Prussia, in the north of Germany, was halting between two very opposite set of counsellors; one of which, with too much confidence in the military resources of the country, advised war with France, for which the favourable opportunity had been permitted to escape; while the other recommended, that, like the jackal in the train of the lion, Prussia should continue to avail herself of the spoils which Napoleon might permit her to seize upon, without presuming to place herself in opposition to his will. In either case, the course recommended was sufficiently perilous; but to vacillate, as the Cabinet of Berlin did, betwixt the one and the other, inferred almost certain ruin.

[1] [See the "Act of Resignation of the Office of Emperor of Germany, by Francis, Emperor of Austria, August 6, 1806," Annual Register, vol. xlviii. p. 824.]

While Napoleon thus revelled in augmented strength, and increased honours, Providence put it once more, and for the last time, in his power, to consolidate his immense empire by a general peace, maritime as well as upon the continent.


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CHAPTER XXXIV.

Death of Pitt—He is succeeded by Fox as Prime Minister.—Negotiation with France.—The Earl of Lauderdale sent to Paris as the British Negotiator.—Negotiation broken off, in consequence of the Refusal of England to cede Sicily to France.—Temporizing Policy of Prussia.—An attempt made by her to form a Confederacy in opposition to that of the Rhine, defeated by Napoleon.—General disposition of the Prussians to War.—Legal Murder of Palm, a bookseller—The Emperor Alexander again visits Berlin.—Prussia begins to arm in August 1806, *and, after some Negotiation, takes the field in October, under the Duke of Brunswick.—Impolicy of the Plans of the Campaign.—Details.—Action at Saalfeld.—Battle of Auerstadt, or Jena, on* 14*th October.—Duke of Brunswick mortally wounded.—Consequences of this total Defeat.—Buonaparte takes possession of Berlin on the* 25*th.—Situations of Austria and Prussia, after their several Defeats.—Reflections on the fall of Prussia.*

THE death of William Pitt [23d Jan.] was accelerated by the campaign of Ulm and Austerlitz, as his health had been previously injured by the defeat of Marengo. Great as he was as a statesman, ardent in patriotism, and comprehensive in his political views, it had been too much the habit of that great minister, to trust, for some re-establishment of the balance of power on the continent, to the exertions of

the ancient European governments, whose efforts had gradually become fainter and fainter, and their spirits more and more depressed, when opposed to the power of Buonaparte, whose blows, like the thunderbolt, seemed to inflict inevitable ruin wherever they burst. But, while resting too much hope on coalitions, placing too much confidence in foreign armies, and too little considering, perhaps, what might have been achieved by our own, had sufficient numbers been employed on adequate objects, Pitt maintained with unabated zeal the great principle of resistance to France, unless France should be disposed to show, that, satisfied with the immense power which she possessed, her Emperor was willing to leave to the rest of Europe such precarious independence as his victorious arms had not yet bereft them of.

The British prime minister was succeeded, upon his death, by the statesman to whom, in life, he had waged the most uniform opposition. Charles Fox, now at the head of the British Government, had uniformly professed to believe it possible to effect a solid and lasting peace with France, and, in the ardour of debate, had repeatedly thrown on his great adversary the blame that such had not been accomplished. When he himself became possessed of the supreme power of administration, he was naturally disposed to realize his predictions, if Napoleon should be found disposed to admit a treaty upon any thing like equal terms. In a visit to Paris during the peace of Amiens, Mr Fox had been received with great distinction by Napoleon. The private relations betwixt them were, there-

fore. of an amicable nature, and gave an opening for friendly intercourse.

The time, too, appeared favourable for negotiation; for whatever advantages had been derived by France from her late triumphant campaign on the continent, were, so far as Britain was concerned, neutralized and outbalanced by the destruction of the combined fleets. All possibility of invasion —which appears before this event to have warmly engrossed the imagination of Napoleon—seemed at an end and for ever. The delusion which represented a united navy of fifty sail of the line triumphantly occupying the British Channel, and escorting an overpowering force to the shores of England, was dispelled by the cannon of 21st October. The gay dreams, which painted a victorious army marching to London, reforming the state of England by the destruction of her aristocracy, and reducing her to her natural condition, as Napoleon termed it, of such a dependency on France as the island of Oleron or of Corsica, were gone. After the battle of Trafalgar, all hopes were extinguished, that the fair provinces of England could, in any possible event, have been cut up into new fiefs of the French empire. It was no longer to be dreamed, that *Dotations*, as they were termed, might be formed upon the Royal Exchange for the payment of annuities by hundreds of thousands, and by millions, for rewarding the soldiers of the Great Nation. To work purses for the French officers, that they might be filled with British gold, had of late been a favourite amusement among the fair ladies of France; but it was now evident that

they had laboured in vain. All these hopes and projects were swallowed up in the billows which entombed the wrecks of Trafalgar.

In a word, if Austria had fallen in the contest of 1805, Britain stood more preeminent than ever; and it might have been rationally expected, that the desire of war, on the part of Napoleon, should have ended, when every prospect of bringing that war to the conclusive and triumphant termination which he meditated, had totally disappeared. The views of the British Cabinet, also, we have said, were now amicable, and an incident occurred for opening a negotiation, under circumstances which seemed to warrant the good faith of the English ministers.

A person pretending to be an adherent of the Bourbons, but afterwards pretty well understood to be an agent of the French Government, acting upon the paltry system of espionage which had infected both their internal and exterior relations, obtained an audience of Mr Fox, for the purpose, as he pretended, of communicating to the British minister a proposal for the assassination of Buonaparte. It had happened, that Mr Fox, in conversation with Napoleon, while at Paris, had indignantly repelled a charge of this kind, which the latter brought against some of the English Ministry. "Clear your head of that nonsense," was said to be his answer, with more of English bluntness than of French politeness. Perhaps Buonaparte was desirous of knowing whether his practice would keep pace with his principles, and on this principle had encouraged the spy. Fox, as was to

be expected, not only repelled with abhorrence the idea suggested by this French agent, but caused it to be communicated to the French Emperor;[1] and this gave rise to some friendly communication, and finally to a negotiation for peace. Lord Yarmouth, and afterwards Lord Lauderdale, acted for the British Government; Champagny and General Clarke for the Emperor of France. Napoleon, who, like most foreigners, had but an inaccurate idea of the internal structure of the British constitution, had expected to find a French party in the bosom of England, and was surprised to find that a few miscreants of the lowest rank, whom he had been able to bribe, were the only English who were accessible to foreign influence; and that the party which had opposed the war with France in all its stages, were nevertheless incapable of desiring to see it cease on such terms as were dishonourable to the country.

The French commissioners made several concessions, and even intimated, in verbal conference with Lord Yarmouth, that they would be content to treat upon the principle of *uti possidetis;* that is, of allowing each party to retain such advantages as she had been able to gain by her arms during the war. But when the treaty was farther advanced, the French negotiators resisted this rule, and showed

[1] [See Mr Fox's letter to M. Talleyrand, February 20, 1806; Hansard's Parliamentary Debates, vol. viii. p. 92; Annual Register, vol. xlviii. p. 708. After reading it, Napoleon's first words were, "I recognise here the principles of honour and of virtue, by which Mr Fox has ever been actuated. Thank him on my part."]

themselves disposed to deny that they had ever assented to it.

They were, indeed, willing to resign a long contested point, and consented that the island of Malta, with the Cape of Good Hope, and other possessions in the East and West Indies, should remain under the dominion of Great Britain. But then they exacted the surrender of Sicily and Naples, proposing that Frederick IV. should be indemnified at the expense of Spain by the cession of the Baleario isles. Britain could not implicitly consent to this last proposition, either in policy, or in justice to her unfortunate ally. Naples was indeed occupied by the French, and had received Joseph Buonaparte as her King; but the insular situation of Sicily rendered it easy for Britain to protect that rich island, which was still in the possession of its legitimate monarch. The principle of *uti possidetis* was, therefore, in favour of the English, so far as Sicily was concerned, as it was in that of the French in the case of Naples. The English envoy, for this reason, refused an ultimatum, in which the cession of Sicily was made an indispensable article. Lord Lauderdale, at the same time, demanded his passports, which, however, he did not receive for several days, as if there had been some hopes of renewing the treaty.[1]

Buonaparte was put to considerable inconvenience by the shrewdness and tenacity of the noble

[1] [For copies of the "Papers relative to the Negotiation with France," see Parliamentary Debates, vol. viii. p. 92; Annual Register, vol. xlviii. p. 708.]

negotiator, and had not forgotten them when, in 1815, he found himself on board the Bellerophon, commanded by a relation of the noble earl.[1] It is indeed probable, that had Mr Fox lived, the negotiation might have been renewed. That eminent statesman, then in his last illness, was desirous to accomplish two great objects — peace with France, and the abolition of the slave trade. But although Buonaparte's deference for Fox might have induced him to concede some of the points in dispute, and although the British statesman's desire of peace might have made him relinquish others on the part of England, still, while the two nations retained their relative power and positions, the deep jealousy and mutual animosity which subsisted between them would probably have rendered any peace which could have been made a mere suspension of arms—a hollow and insincere truce, which was almost certain to give way on the slightest occasion. Britain could never have seen with indifference Buonaparte making one stride after another towards universal dominion; and Buonaparte could not long have borne with patience the neighbourhood of our free institutions and our free press; the former of which must have perpetually reminded the French of the liberty they had lost, while the latter was sure to make the Emperor, his government, and his policy, the daily subject of the most severe and unsparing criticism. Even the war with Prussia and Russia, in which Napoleon was soon afterwards engaged,

[1] [Captain Maitland.]

would, in all probability, have renewed the hostilities between France and England, supposing them to have been terminated for a season by a temporary peace. Yet Napoleon always spoke of the death of Fox as one of the fatalities on which his great designs were shipwrecked;[1] which makes it the more surprising that he did not resume intercourse with the administration formed under his auspices, and who might have been supposed to be animated by his principles even after his decease. That he did not do so may be fairly received in evidence to show, that peace, unless on terms which he could dictate, was not desired by him.

As the conduct of Prussia had been fickle and versatile during the campaign of Austerlitz, the displeasure of Napoleon was excited in proportion against her. She had, it is true, wrenched from him an unwilling acquiescence in her views upon Hanover. By the treaty which Haugwitz had signed at Vienna, after the battle of Austerlitz, it was agreed that Prussia should receive the electoral dominions of the King of England, his ally, instead of Anspach, Bareuth, and Neufchatel, which she was to cede to France. The far superior value of Hanover was to be considered as a boon to Prussia, in guerdon of her neutrality. But Napoleon did not forgive the hostile disposition which Prussia had manifested, and it is probable

[1] ["Certainly the death of Fox was one of the fatalities of my career. Had his life been prolonged, affairs would have taken a totally different turn; the cause of the people would have triumphed, and we should have established a new order of things in Europe."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. vii. p. 97.]

he waited with anxiety for the opportunity of inflicting upon her condign chastisement. He continued to maintain a large army in Swabia and Franconia, and, by introducing troops into Westphalia, intimated, not obscurely, an approaching rupture with his ally. Mean time, under the influence of conflicting councils, Prussia proceeded in a course of politics which rendered her odious for her rapacity, and contemptible for the shortsighted views under which she indulged it.

It was no matter of difficulty for the Prussian forces to take possession of Hanover, which, when evacuated by Bernadotte and his army, lay a prey to the first invader, with the exception of the fortress of Hamelen, still occupied by a French garrison. The electorate, the hereditary dominions of the King of Great Britain, with whom Prussia was at profound peace, was accordingly seized upon, and her Cabinet pretended to justify that usurpation by alleging, that Hanover, having been transferred to France by the rights of war, had been ceded to the Prussian Government in exchange for other districts. At the same time, an order of the Prussian monarch shut his ports in the Baltic against the admission of British vessels. These measures, taken together, were looked upon by England as intimating determined and avowed hostility; and Fox described, in the House of Commons, the conduct of Prussia, as a compound of the most hateful rapacity with the most contemptible servility.[1] War was accordingly declared

[1] [Parliamentary Debates, vol. vi. p. 887.]

against her by Great Britain; and her flag being banished from the ocean by the English cruisers, the mouth of the Elbe and the Prussian seaports were declared in a state of blockade, and her trade was subjected to a corresponding degree of distress.

Mean time, it was the fate of Prussia to find, that she held by a very insecure tenure that very electorate, the price of her neutrality at Austerlitz, and which was farther purchased at the expense of war with England. Her ministers, while pressing France to confirm the cession of Hanover, had the mortification to discover that Napoleon, far from regarding the Prussian right in it as indefeasible, was in fact negotiating for a general peace upon the condition, amongst others, that the electorate should be restored to the King of England, its hereditary sovereign. While the disclosure of this double game showed Frederick William upon what insecure footing he held the premium assigned to Prussia by the treaty of Vienna, farther discovery of the projects of France seemed to impel him to change the pacific line of his policy.

Hitherto the victories of Napoleon had had for their chief consequences the depression of Austria, and the diminution of that power which was the natural and ancient rival of the House of Brandenburg. But now, when Austria was thrust back to the eastward, and deprived of her influence in the south-west of Germany, Prussia saw with just alarm that France was assuming that influence herself, and that, unless opposed, she was likely to become as powerful in the north of Germany, as she had rendered herself in the south-western

circles. Above all, Prussia was alarmed at the Confederacy of the Rhine, an association which placed under the direct influence of France, so large a proportion of what had been lately component parts of the Germanic empire. The dissolution of the Germanic empire itself was an event no less surprising and embarrassing; for, besides all the other important points, in which the position of Prussia was altered by the annihilation of that ancient confederacy, she lost thereby the prospect of her own monarch being, upon the decline of Austria, chosen to wear the imperial crown, as the most powerful member of the federation.

One way remained, to balance the new species of power which France had acquired by these innovations on the state of Europe. It was possible, by forming the northern princes of the German empire into a league of the same character with the Confederacy of the Rhine, having Prussia instead of France for its protector, to create such an equilibrium as might render it difficult or dangerous for Buonaparte to use his means, however greatly enlarged, to disturb the peace of the north of Europe. It was, therefore, determined in the Prussian Cabinet to form a league on this principle.

This proposed Northern Confederacy, however, could not well be established without communication with France; and Buonaparte, though offering no direct opposition to the formation of a league, sanctioned by the example of that of the Rhine, started such obstacles to the project in detail, as were likely to render its establishment on an effectual footing impossible. It was said by his minis-

ters, that Napoleon was to take the Hanseatic towns under his own immediate protection; that the wise prince who governed Saxony showed no desire to become a member of the proposed Confederacy; and that France would permit no power to be forced into such a measure. Finally, the Landgrave of Hesse Cassel, who was naturally reckoned upon as an important member of the proposed Northern League, was tampered with to prevail upon him to join the Confederacy of the Rhine, instead of that which was proposed to be formed under the protectorate of Prussia. This prince, afraid to decide which of these powerful nations he should adhere to, remained in a state of neutrality, notwithstanding the offers of France; and, by doing so, incurred the displeasure of Napoleon, from which in the sequel he suffered severely.

By this partial interruption and opposition, Napoleon rendered it impossible for Prussia to make any effectual efforts for combining together those remaining fragments of the German empire, over which her military power and geographical position gave her natural influence. This disappointment, with the sense of having been outwitted by the French Government, excited feelings of chagrin and resentment in the Prussian Cabinet, which corresponded with the sentiments expressed by the nation at large. In the former, the predominant feeling was, despite for disappointed hopes, and a desire of revenge on the sovereign and state by whom they had been over-reached; in the latter, there prevailed a keen and honourable sense that

Prussia had lost her character through the truckling policy of her Administration.

Whatever reluctance the Cabinet of Berlin had shown to enter into hostilities with France, the court and country never appear to have shared that sensation. The former was under the influence of the young, beautiful, and high-spirited Queen, and of Louis of Prussia, a prince who felt with impatience the decaying importance of that kingdom, which the victories of the Great Frederick had raised to such a pitch of glory. These were surrounded by a numerous band of noble youths, impatient for war, as the means of emulating the fame of their fathers; but ignorant how little likely were even the powerful and well-disciplined forces of Frederick, unless directed by his genius, to succeed in opposition to troops not inferior to themselves, and conducted by a leader who had long appeared to chain victory to his chariot wheels. The sentiments of the young Prussian noblesse were sufficiently indicated, by their going to sharpen their sabres on the threshold of La Foret, the ambassador of Napoleon, and the wilder frolic of breaking the windows of the ministers supposed to be in the French interest. The Queen appeared frequently in the uniform of the regiment which bore her name, and sometimes rode at their head, to give enthusiasm to the soldiery. This was soon excited to the highest pitch; and had the military talents of the Prussian generals borne any correspondence to the gallantry of the officers and soldiers, an issue to the campaign might have been

expected far different from that which took place. The manner in which the characters of the Queen, the King, and Prince Louis, were treated in the *Moniteur*, tended still more to exasperate the quarrel; for Napoleon's studious and cautious exclusion from the government paper of such political articles as had not his own previous approbation, rendered him in reason accountable for all which appeared there.

The people of Prussia at large were clamorous for war. They, too, were sensible that the late versatile conduct of their Cabinet had exposed them to the censure, and even the scorn of Europe; and that Buonaparte seeing the crisis ended, in which the firmness of Prussia might have preserved the balance of Europe, retained no longer any respect for those whom he had made his dupes, but treated with total disregard the remonstrances, which, before the advantages obtained at Ulm and Austerlitz, he must have listened to with respect and deference.

Another circumstance of a very exasperating character took place at this time. One Palm, a bookseller at Nuremberg, had exposed to sale a pamphlet,[1] containing remarks on the conduct of Napoleon, in which the Emperor and his policy were treated with considerable severity. The bookseller was seized upon for this offence by the

[1] [The pamphlet was intitled, "L'Allemagne dans son profond Abaissement," and was attributed to the pen of M. Gentz. Palm was offered his pardon, upon condition that he gave up the author of the work; which he refused to do.]

French gendarmes, and transferred to Braunau, where he was brought before a military commission, tried for a libel on the Emperor of France, found guilty, and shot to death [Aug. 26] in terms of his sentence. The murder of this poor man, for such it literally was, whether immediately flowing from Buonaparte's mandate,[1] or the effects of the furious zeal of some of his officers, excited deep and general indignation.[2]

The constitution of many of the states in Germany is despotic; but, nevertheless, the number of independent principalities, and the privileges of the free towns, have always ensured to the nation at large the blessings of a free press, which, much addicted as they are to literature, the Germans value as it deserves. The cruel effort now made to fetter this unshackled expression of opinion, was, of course, most unfavourable to his authority by whom it had been commanded. The thousand presses of Germany continued on every possible opportunity to dwell on the fate of Palm; and, at the distance of six or seven years from his death, it might be reckoned among the leading causes which ultimately determined the popular opinion against

[1] ["All that I recollect about Palm is, that he was arrested by order of Davoust, I believe, tried, condemned, and shot, for having, while the country was in possession of the French, and under military occupation, not only excited rebellion amongst the inhabitants, and urged them to rise and massacre the soldiers, but also attempted to instigate the soldiers themselves to refuse obedience to their orders, and to mutiny against their generals. I believe that he met with a fair trial."—NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c. vol. i. p. 432.]

[2] [A subscription was set on foot in Germany, and also in England, for his widow and three children.]

Napoleon. It had not less effect at the time when the crime was committed; and the eyes of all Germany were turned upon Prussia, as the only member of the late Holy Roman League, by whom the progress of the public enemy of the liberties of Europe could be arrested in its course.

Amidst the general ferment of the public mind, Alexander once more appeared in person at the court of Berlin, and, more successful than on the former occasion, prevailed on the King of Prussia at length to unsheath the sword. The support of the powerful hosts of Russia was promised; and, defeated on the fatal field of Austerlitz in his attempt to preserve the south-east of Germany from French influence, Alexander now stood forth to assist Prussia as the Champion of the North. An attempt had indeed been made through means of D'Oubril, a Russian envoy at Paris, to obtain a general peace for Europe, in concurrence with that which Lord Lauderdale was endeavouring to negotiate on the part of Britain; but the treaty entirely miscarried.

While Prussia thus declared herself the enemy of France, it seemed to follow, as a matter of course, that she should become once more the friend of Britain; and, indeed, that power lost no time in manifesting an amicable disposition on her part, by recalling the order which blockaded the Prussian ports, and annihilated her commerce. But the Cabinet of Berlin evinced, in the moment when about to commence hostilities, the same selfish insincerity which had dictated all their previous conduct. While sufficiently desirous of obtaining

British money to maintain the approaching war, they showed great reluctance to part with Hanover, an acquisition made in a manner so unworthy; and the Prussian minister, Lucchesini, did not hesitate to tell the British ambassador, Lord Morpeth, that the fate of the electorate would depend upon the event of arms.

Little good could be augured from the interposition of a power, who, pretending to arm in behalf of the rights of nations, refused to part with an acquisition which she herself had made, contrary to all the rules of justice and good faith. Still less was a favourable event to be hoped for, when the management of the war was intrusted to the same incapable or faithless ministers, who had allowed every opportunity to escape of asserting the rights of Prussia, when, perhaps, her assuming a firm attitude might have prevented the necessity of war altogether. But the resolution which had been delayed, when so many favourable occasions were suffered to escape unemployed, was at length adopted with an imprudent precipitation, which left Prussia neither time to adopt the wisest warlike measures, nor to look out for those statesmen and generals by whom such measures could have been most effectually executed.

About the middle of August, Prussia began to arm. Perhaps there are few examples of a war declared with the almost unanimous consent of a great and warlike people, which was brought to an earlier and more unhappy termination. On the 1st of October, Knobelsdorff, the Prussian envoy, was called upon by Talleyrand to explain the cause of

the martial attitude assumed by his state. In reply, a paper was delivered, containing three propositions, or rather demands. First, That the French troops which had entered the German territory, should instantly recross the Rhine. Secondly, That France should desist from presenting obstacles to the formation of a league in the northern part of Germany, to comprehend all the states, without exception, which had not been included in the Confederation of the Rhine. Thirdly, That negotiations should be immediately commenced, for the purpose of detaching the fortress of Wesel from the French empire, and for the restitution of three abbeys,[1] which Murat had chosen to seize upon as a part of his Duchy of Berg. With this manifesto[2] was delivered a long explanatory letter, containing severe remarks on the system of encroachment which France had acted upon. Such a text and commentary, considering their peremptory tone, and the pride and power of him to whom they were addressed in such unqualified terms, must have been understood to amount to a declaration of war. And yet, although Prussia, in common with all Europe, had just reason to complain of the encroachments of France, and her rapid strides to universal empire, it would appear that the two first articles in the King's declaration, were subjects rather of negotiation than grounds of an absolute declaration of war; and that the fortress of Wesel, and the three abbeys, were scarce of

[1] [Essen, Werden, and Elte.]

[2] [See Annual Register, vol. xlviii., p. 800.]

importance enough to plunge the whole empire into blood for the sake of them.

Prussia, indeed, was less actually aggrieved than she was mortified and offended. She saw she had been outwitted by Buonaparte in the negotiation of Vienna; that he was juggling with her in the matter of Hanover; that she was in danger of beholding Saxony and Hesse withdrawn from her protection, to be placed under that of France; and under a general sense of these injuries, though rather apprehended than really sustained, she hurried to the field. If negotiations could have been protracted till the advance of the Russian armies, it might have given a different face to the war; but in the warlike ardour which possessed the Prussians, they were desirous to secure the advantages which, in military affairs, belong to the assailants, without weighing the circumstances which, in their situation, rendered such precipitation fatal.

Besides, such advantages were not easily to be obtained over Buonaparte, who was not a man to be amused by words when the moment of action arrived. Four days before the delivery of the Prussian note to his minister, Buonaparte had left Paris, and was personally in the field collecting his own immense forces, and urging the contribution of those contingents which the Confederate Princes of the Rhine were bound to supply. His answer to the hostile note of the King of Prussia was addressed, not to that monarch, but to his own soldiers. "They have dared to demand," he said, "that we should retreat at the first sight of their army. Fools! could they not reflect how impossi-

ble they found it to destroy Paris, a task incomparably more easy than to tarnish the honour of the Great Nation ! Let the Prussian army expect the same fate which they encountered fourteen years ago, since experience has not taught them, that while it is easy to acquire additional dominions and increase of power, by the friendship of France, her enmity, on the contrary, which will only be provoked by those who are totally destitute of sense and reason, is more terrible than the tempests of the ocean."

The King of Prussia had again placed at the head of his armies the Duke of Brunswick. In his youth, this general had gained renown under his uncle Prince Ferdinand. But it had been lost in the retreat from Champagne in 1792, where he had suffered himself to be out-manœuvred by Dumouriez and his army of conscripts. He was seventy-two years old, and is said to have added the obstinacy of age to others of the infirmities which naturally attend it. He was not communicative, nor accessible to any of the other generals, excepting Mollendorf; and this generated a disunion of councils in the Prussian camp, and the personal dislike of the army to him by whom it was commanded.

The plan of the campaign, formed by this ill-fated prince, seems to have been singularly injudicious, and the more so, as it is censurable on exactly the same grounds as that of Austria in the late war. Prussia could not expect to have the advantage of numbers in the contest. It was, therefore, her obvious policy to procrastinate and lengthen

out negotiation, until she could have the advantage of the Russian forces. Instead of this, it was determined to rush forward towards Franconia, and oppose the Prussian army alone to the whole force of France, commanded by their renowned Emperor.

The motive, too, was similar to that which had determined Austria to advance as far as the banks of the Iller. Saxony was in the present campaign, as Bavaria in the former, desirous of remaining neuter; and the hasty advance of the Prussian armies was designed to compel the Elector Augustus to embrace their cause. It succeeded accordingly; and the sovereign of Saxony united his forces, though reluctantly, with the left wing of the Prussians, under Prince Hohenloe. The conduct of the Prussians towards the Saxons bore the same ominous resemblance to that of the Austrians to the Bavarians. Their troops behaved in the country of Saxony more as if they were in the land of a tributary than an ally, and while the assistance of the good and peaceable prince was sternly exacted, no efforts were made to conciliate his good-will, or soothe the pride of his subjects. In their behaviour to the Saxons in general, the Prussians showed too much of the haughty spirit that goes before a fall.

The united force of the Prussian army, with its auxiliaries, amounted to one hundred and fifty thousand men,[1] confident in their own courage, in the rigid discipline which continued to distinguish

[1] [Jomini, t. ii., p. 276.]

their service, and in the animating recollections of the victorious career of the Great Frederick. There were many generals and soldiers in their ranks who had served under him; but, amongst that troop of veterans, Blucher alone was destined to do distinguished honour to the school.

Notwithstanding these practical errors, the address of the Prussian King to his army was in better taste than the vaunting proclamation of Buonaparte, and concluded with a passage, which, though its accomplishment was long delayed, nevertheless proved at last prophetic:—"We go," said Frederick William, "to encounter an enemy, who has vanquished numerous armies, humiliated monarchs, destroyed constitutions, and deprived more than one state of its independence, and even of its very name. He has threatened a similar fate to Prussia, and proposes to reduce us to the dominion of a strange people, who would suppress the very name of Germans. The fate of armies, and of nations, is in the hands of the Almighty; but constant victory, and durable prosperity, are never granted, save to the cause of justice."

While Buonaparte assembled in Franconia an army considerably superior in number to that of the Prussians, the latter occupied the country in the vicinity of the river Saale, and seemed, in doing so, to renounce all the advantage of making the attack on the enemy ere he had collected his forces Yet, to make such an attack was, and must have been, the principal motive of their hasty and precipitate advance; especially after they had secured its primary object, the accession of Saxony to the

campaign. The position which the Duke of Brunswick occupied was indeed very strong as a defensive one, but the means of supporting so large an army were not easily to be obtained in such a barren country as that about Weimar; and their magazines and depots of provisions were injudiciously placed, not close in the rear of the army, but at Naumburg, and other places, upon their extreme left, and where they were exposed to the risk of being separated from them. It might be partly owing to the difficulty of obtaining forage and subsistence, that the Prussian army was extended upon a line by far too much prolonged to admit of mutual support. Indeed, they may be considered rather as disposed in cantonments than as occupying a military position; and as they remained strictly on the defensive, an opportunity was gratuitously afforded to Buonaparte to attack their divisions in detail, of which he did not fail to avail himself with his usual talent. The headquarters of the Prussians, where were the King and Duke of Brunswick, were at Weimar; their left, under Prince Hohenloe, were at Schleitz; and their right extended as far as Muhlhausen, leaving thus a space of ninety miles betwixt the extreme flanks of their line.

Buonaparte, in the mean time, commenced the campaign, according to his custom, by a series of partial actions fought on different points, in which his usual combinations obtained his usual success, the whole tending to straiten the Prussians in their position, to interrupt their communications, separate them from their supplies, and compel them to fight

a decisive battle from necessity, not choice, in which dispirited troops, under baffled and outwitted generals, were to encounter with soldiers who had already obtained a foretaste of victory, and who fought under the most renowned commanders, the combined efforts of the whole being directed by the master spirit of the age.

Upon the 8th October, Buonaparte gave vent to his resentment in a bulletin, in which he complained of having received a letter of twenty pages, signed by the King of Prussia, being, as he alleged, a sort of wretched pamphlet, such as England engaged hireling authors to compose at the rate of five hundred pounds sterling a-year. "I am sorry," he said, "for my brother, who does not understand the French language, and has certainly never read that rhapsody." The same publication contained much in ridicule of the Queen and Prince Louis.[1] It bears evident marks of Napoleon's own composition, which was as singular, though not so felicitous, as his mode of fighting; but it was of little use to censure either the style or the reasoning of

[1] ["'Marshal,' said the Emperor, on the 7th, to Berthier, 'they give us a rendezvous of honour for the 8th. They say a handsome queen is there, who desires to see battles; let us be polite, and march without delay for Saxony!' The Emperor was correctly informed; for the Queen of Prussia is with the army, equipped like an Amazon, wearing the uniform of her regiment of dragoons, and writing twenty letters a-day to all parts of the kingdom, to excite the inhabitants against the French. It appears like the conduct of the frenzied Armida, setting fire to her own palace. Next to her Majesty, Prince Louis of Prussia, a brave young man, incited by the war faction, vainly hopes to gain honours and renown in the vicissitudes of war."—*First Bulletin of the Grand Army.*]

the lord of so many legions. His arms soon made the impression which he desired upon the position of the enemy.

The French advanced, in three divisions, upon the dislocated and extended disposition of the large but ill-arranged Prussian army. It was a primary and irretrievable fault of the Duke of Brunswick, that his magazines, and reserves of artillery and ammunition, were placed at Naumburg, instead of being close in the rear of his army, and under the protection of his main body. This ill-timed separation rendered it easy for the French to interpose betwixt the Prussians and their supplies, providing they were able to clear the course of the Saale.

With this view the French right wing, commanded by Soult and Ney, marched upon Hof. The centre was under Bernadotte and Davoust, with the guard commanded by Murat. They moved on Saalburg and Schleitz. The left wing was led by Augereau against Coburg and Saalfield. It was the object of this grand combined movement to overwhelm the Prussian right wing, which was extended farther than prudence permitted; and, having beaten this part of the army, to turn their whole position, and possess themselves of their magazines. After some previous skirmishes, a serious action took place at Saalfield, where Prince Louis of Prussia commanded the advanced guard of the Prussian left wing.

In the ardour and inexperience of youth, the brave prince, instead of being contented with defending the bridge on the Saale, quitted that advantageous position, to advance with unequal forces

against Lannes, who was marching upon him from Graffenthal. If bravery could have atoned for imprudence, the battle of Saalfield would not have been lost. Prince Louis showed the utmost gallantry in leading his men when they advanced, and in rallying them when they fled. He was killed fighting hand to hand with a French subaltern, who required him to surrender, and, receiving a sabre-wound for reply, plunged his sword into the prince's body. Several of his staff fell around him.[1]

The victory of Saalfield opened the course of the Saale to the French, who instantly advanced on Naumburg. Buonaparte was at Gera, within half a day's journey from the latter city, whence he sent a letter to the King of Prussia, couched in the language of a victor, (for victorious he already felt himself by his numbers and position,) and seasoned with the irony of a successful foe. He regretted his good brother had been made to sign the wretched pamphlet which had borne his name, but which he protested he did not impute to him as his composition. Had Prussia asked any practicable favour of him, he said he would have granted it; but she had asked his dishonour, and ought to have known there could be but one answer. In consideration of

[1] ["Prince Louis urged and hastened hostilities, and feared to let the opportunity escape. He was, besides, a man of great courage and talent; all accounts agreed on that point. Napoleon, who did not dislike such petulant eagerness, was conversing with us one evening respecting the generals of the enemy's army; some one present happened to mention Prince Louis; 'As for him,' said he, 'I foretell that he will be killed this campaign.' Who could have thought that the prediction would so soon have been fulfilled."—*Mémoires de* RAPP, p. 66.]

their former friendship, Napoleon stated himself to be ready to restore peace to Prussia and her monarch; and, advising his good brother to dismiss such counsellors as recommended the present war and that of 1792, he bade him heartily farewell.[1]

Buonaparte neither expected nor received any answer to this missive, which was written under the exulting sensations experienced by the angler, when he feels the fish is hooked, and about to become his secure prey. Naumburg and its magazines were consigned to the flames, which first announced to the Prussians that the French army had gotten completely into their rear, had destroyed their magazines, and, being now interposed betwixt them and Saxony, left them no alternative save that of battle, which was to be waged at the greatest disadvantage with an alert enemy, to whom their supineness had already given the choice of time and place for it. There was also this ominous consideration, that, in case of disaster, the Prussians had neither principle, nor order, nor line of retreat. The enemy were betwixt them and Magdeburg, which ought to have been their rallying point; and the army of the Great Frederick was, it must be owned, brought to combat with as little reflection or military science, as a herd of school-boys might have displayed in a mutiny.

Too late determined to make some exertion to clear their communications to the rear, the Duke of Brunswick, with the King of Prussia in person,

[1] [See Fifteenth Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

marched with great part of their army to the recovery of Naumburg. Here Davoust, who had taken the place, remained at the head of a division of six-and-thirty-thousand men, with whom he was to oppose nearly double the number. The march of the Duke of Brunswick was so slow, as to lose the advantage of this superiority. He paused on the evening of the thirteenth on the heights of Auerstadt, and gave Davoust time to reinforce the troops with which he occupied the strong defile of Koesen. The next morning, Davoust, with strong reinforcements, but still unequal in numbers to the Prussians, marched towards the enemy, whose columns were already in motion. The vanguard of both armies met, without previously knowing that they were so closely approaching each other, so thick lay the mist upon the ground.

The village of Hassen-Hausen, near which the opposite armies were first made aware of each other's proximity, became instantly the scene of a severe conflict, and was taken and retaken repeatedly. The Prussian cavalry, being superior in numbers to that of the French, and long famous for its appointments and discipline, attacked repeatedly, and was as often resisted by the French squares of infantry, whom they found it impossible to throw into disorder, or break upon any point. The French, having thus repelled the Prussian horse, carried, at the point of the bayonet, some woods and the village of Spilberg, and remained in undisturbed possession of that of Hassen-Hausen. The Prussians had by this time maintained the battle from eight in the morning till eleven, and being now engaged

on all points, with the exception of two divisions of the reserve, had suffered great loss. The Generalissimo, Duke of Brunswick, wounded in the face by a grape-shot, was carried off; so was General Schmettau, and other officers of distinction. The want of an experienced chief began to be felt; when, to increase the difficulties of their situation, the King of Prussia received intelligence, that General Mollendorf, who commanded his right wing, stationed near Jena, was in the act of being defeated by Buonaparte in person. The King took the generous but perhaps desperate resolution, of trying, whether in one general charge he could not redeem the fortune of the day, by defeating that part of the French with which he was personally engaged. He ordered the attack to be made along all the line, and with all the forces which he had in the field; and his commands were obeyed with gallantry enough to vindicate the honour of the troops, but not to lead to success. They were beaten off, and the French resumed the offensive in their turn.

Still the Prussian monarch, who seems now to have taken the command upon himself, endeavouring to supply the want of professional experience by courage, brought up his last reserves, and encouraged his broken troops rather to make a final stand for victory, than to retreat in face of a conquering army. This effort also proved in vain. The Prussian line was attacked every where at once; centre and wings were broken through by the French at the bayonet's point; and the retreat, after so many fruitless efforts, in which no division had been left

unengaged, was of the most disorderly character. But the confusion was increased tenfold, when, as the defeated troops reached Weimar, they fell in with the right wing of their own army, fugitives like themselves, and who were attempting to retreat in the same direction. The disorder of two routed armies meeting in opposing currents, soon became inextricable. The roads were choked up with artillery and baggage waggons; the retreat became a hurried flight; and the King himself, who had shown the utmost courage during the battle of Auerstadt, was at length, for personal safety, compelled to leave the high-roads, and escape across the fields, escorted by a small body of cavalry.

While the left of the Prussian army were in the act of combating Davoust at Auerstadt, their right, as we have hinted, were with equally bad fortune engaged at Jena. This second action, though the least important of the two, has always given the name to the double battle; because it was at Jena that Napoleon was engaged in person.

The French Emperor had arrived at this town, which is situated upon the Saale, on the 13th of October, and had lost no time in issuing those orders to his mareschals, which produced the demonstrations of Davoust, and the victory of Auerstadt. His attention was not less turned to the position he himself occupied, and in which he had the prospect of fighting Mollendorf, and the right of the Prussians, on the next morning. With his usual activity, he formed or enlarged, in the course of the night, the roads by which he proposed to bring up

his artillery on the succeeding day, and by hewing the solid rock, made a path practicable for guns to the plateau, or elevated plain in the front of Jena, where his centre was established.[1] The Prussian army lay before them, extended on a line of six leagues, while that of Napoleon, extremely concentrated, showed a very narrow front, but was well secured both in the flanks and in the rear Buonaparte, according to his custom, slept in the bivouac, surrounded by his guards.[2] In the morning he harangued his soldiers, and recommended to

[1] [" Before the Emperor lay down, he descended the hill of Jena on foot, to be certain that no ammunition-waggon had been left at the bottom. He there found the whole of Marshal Lannes's artillery sticking in a ravine, which, in the obscurity of the night had been mistaken for a road. The Emperor was excessively angry, but showed his displeasure only by a cold silence. Without wasting time in reproaches, he set to work himself to do the duty of an artillery officer. He collected the men, made them get their park-tools, and light the lanterns; one of which he held for the convenience of those whose labours he directed. Never shall I forget the expression of the countenances of the men on seeing the Emperor lighting them with a lantern, nor the heavy blows with which they struck the rocks." —Savary, t. ii. p. 180.]

[2] [" The night before the battle of Jena, the Emperor said, he had run the greatest risk. He might then have disappeared without his fate being clearly known. He had approached the bivouacs of the enemy, in the dark, to reconnoitre them; he had only a few officers with him. The opinion which was then entertained of the Prussian army kept every one on the alert: it was thought that the Prussians were particularly given to nocturnal attacks. As the Emperor returned, he was fired at by the first sentinel of his camp; this was a signal for the whole line; he had no resource but to throw himself flat on his face, until the mistake was discovered. But his principal apprehension was, that the Prussian line, which was near him, would act in the same manner."—Las Cases, t. i. p. 143.]

them to stand firm against the charges of the Prussian cavalry, which had been represented as very redoubtable. As, before Ulm, he had promised his soldiers a repetition of the battle of Marengo, so now he pointed out to his men that the Prussians, separated from their magazines, and cut off from their country, were in the situation of Mack at Ulm. He told them, that the enemy no longer fought for honour and victory, but for the chance of opening a way to retreat; and he added, that the corps which should permit them to escape would lose their honour. The French replied with loud shouts, and demanded instantly to advance to the combat. The Emperor ordered the columns destined for the attack to descend into the plain. His centre consisted of the Imperial Guard, and two divisions of Lannes. Augereau commanded the right, which rested on a village and a forest; and Soult's division, with a part of Ney's, were upon the left.

Oct. 14.

General Mollendorf advanced on his side, and both armies, as at Auerstadt, were hid from each other by the mist, until suddenly the atmosphere cleared, and showed them to each other within the distance of half cannon-shot. The conflict instantly commenced. It began on the French right, where the Prussians attacked with the purpose of driving Augereau from the village on which he rested his extreme flank. Lannes was sent to support him, by whose succour he was enabled to stand his ground. The battle then became general; and the Prussians showed themselves such masters of discipline, that it was long impossible to gain any advan-

tage over men, who advanced, retired, or moved to either flank, with the regularity of machines. Soult at length, by the most desperate efforts, dispossessed the Prussians opposed to him of the woods from which they had annoyed the French left; and at the same conjuncture the division of Ney, and a large reserve of cavalry, appeared upon the field of battle. Napoleon, thus strengthened, advanced the centre, consisting in a great measure of the Imperial Guard, who, being fresh and in the highest spirits, compelled the Prussian army to give way. Their retreat was at first orderly; but it was a part of Buonaparte's tactics to pour attack after attack upon a worsted enemy, as the billows of a tempestuous ocean follow each other in succession, till the last waves totally disperse the fragments of the bulwark which the first have breached. Murat at the head of the dragoons and the cavalry of reserve, charged, as one who would merit, as far as bravery could merit, the splendid destinies which seemed now opening to him. The Prussian infantry were unable to support the shock, nor could their cavalry protect them. The rout became general.[1] Great

[1] ["The Emperor, at the point where he stood, saw the flight of the Prussians, and our cavalry taking them by thousands. Night was approaching; and here, as at Austerlitz, he rode round the field of battle. He often alighted from his horse to give a little brandy to the wounded; and several times I observed him putting his hand into the breast of a soldier to ascertain whether his heart beat, because, in consequence of having seen some slight appearance of colour in his cheeks, he supposed he might not be dead. In this manner I saw him two or three times discover men who were still alive. On these occasions, he gave way to a joy which it is impossible to describe."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 184.]

part of the artillery was taken, and the broken troops retreated in disorder upon Weimar, where, as we have already stated, their confusion became inextricable, by their encountering the other tide of fugitives from their own left, which was directed upon Weimar also. All leading and following seemed now lost in this army, so lately confiding in its numbers and discipline. There was scarcely a general left to issue orders, scarcely a soldier disposed to obey them; and it seems to have been more by a sort of instinct, than any resolved purpose, that several broken regiments were directed, or directed themselves, upon Magdeburg, where Prince Hohenloe endeavoured to rally them.

The French accounts state that 20,000 Prussians were killed and taken in the course of this fatal day; that three hundred guns fell into their power, with twenty generals, or lieutenant-generals, and standards and colours to the number of sixty.[1]

The mismanagement of the Prussian generals in these calamitous battles, and in all the manœuvres which preceded them, amounted to infatuation. The troops also, according to Buonaparte's evidence, scarcely maintained their high character, oppressed probably by a sense of the disadvantages under which they combated. But it is unnecessary to dwell on the various causes of a defeat, when the vanquished seem neither to have formed one combined and general plan of attack in the action, nor maintained communication with each other while it

[1] [Fifth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Jomini, t. ii. p. 281; Savary, t. ii. p. 181.]

endured, nor agreed upon any scheme of retreat when the day was lost. The Duke of Brunswick, too, and General Schmettau, being mortally wounded early in the battle, the several divisions of the Prussian army fought individually, without receiving any general orders, and consequently without regular plan or combined manœuvres. The consequences of the defeat were more universally calamitous than could have been anticipated, even when we consider, that, no mode of retreat having been fixed on, or general rallying place appointed, the broken army resembled a covey of heathfowl, which the sportsman marks down and destroys in detail and at his leisure.

Next day after the action, a large body of the Prussians, who, under the command of Mollendorf had retired to Erfurt, were compelled to surrender to the victors, and the marshal, with the Prince of Orange Fulda, became prisoners. Other relics of this most unhappy defeat met with the same fate. General Kalkreuth, at the head of a considerable division of troops, was overtaken and routed in an attempt to cross the Hartz mountains. Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg commanded an untouched body of sixteen thousand men, whom the Prussian general-in-chief had suffered to remain at Memmingen, without an attempt to bring them into the field. Instead of retiring when he heard all was lost, the prince was rash enough to advance towards Halle, as if to put the only unbroken division of the Prussian army in the way of the far superior and victorious hosts of France. He was accordingly attacked and defeated by Bernadotte.

The chief point of rallying, however, was Magdeburg, under the walls of which strong city Prince Hohenloe, though wounded, contrived to assemble an army amounting to fifty thousand men, but wanting every thing, and in the last degree of confusion. But Magdeburg was no place of rest for them. The same improvidence, which had marked every step of the campaign, had exhausted that city of the immense magazines which it contained, and taken them for the supply of the Duke of Brunswick's army. The wrecks of the field of Jena were exposed to famine as well as the sword. It only remained for Prince Hohenloe to make the best escape he could to the Oder, and, considering the disastrous circumstances in which he was placed, he seems to have displayed both courage and skill in his proceedings. After various partial actions, however, in all of which he lost men, he finally found himself, with the advanced-guard and centre of his army, on the heights of Prenzlow, without provisions, forage, or ammunition. Surrender became unavoidable; and at Prenzlow and Passewalk, nearly twenty thousand Prussians laid down their arms.

The rear of Prince Hohenloe's army did not immediately share this calamity. They were at Boitzenburg when the surrender took place, and amounted to about ten thousand men, the relics of the battle in which Prince Eugene of Wirtemberg had engaged near Weimar, and were under the command of a general whose name hereafter was destined to sound like a war trumpet—the celebrated Blucher.

In the extremity of his country's distresses, this distinguished soldier showed the same indomitable spirit, the same activity in execution and daringness of resolve, which afterwards led to such glorious results. He was about to leave Boitzenburg on the 29th, in consequence of his orders from Prince Hohenloe, when he learned that general's disaster at Prenzlow. He instantly changed the direction of his retreat, and, by a rapid march towards Strelitz, contrived to unite his forces with about ten thousand men, gleanings of Jena and Auerstadt, which, under the Dukes of Weimar and of Brunswick Oels, had taken their route in that direction. Thus reinforced, Blucher adopted the plan of passing the Elbe at Lauenburg, and reinforcing the Prussian garrisons in Lower Saxony. With this view he fought several sharp actions, and made many rapid marches. But the odds were too great to be balanced by courage and activity. The division of Soult which had crossed the Elbe, cut him off from Lauenburg, that of Murat interposed between him and Stralsund, while Bernadotte pressed upon his rear. Blucher had no resource but to throw himself and his diminished and dispirited army into Lubeck. The pursuers came soon up, and found him like a stag at bay. A battle was fought on the 6th of November, in the streets of Lubeck, with extreme fury on both sides, in which the Prussians were overpowered by numbers, and lost many slain, besides four thousand prisoners. Blucher fought his way out of the town, and reached Schwerta. But he had now

retreated as far as he could, without violating the neutrality of the Danish territory, which would only have raised up new enemies to his unfortunate master.

On the 7th November, therefore, he gave up his good sword, to be resumed under happier auspices, and surrendered with the few thousand men which remained under his command.[1] But the courage which he had manifested, like the lights of St Elmo amid the gloom of the tempest, showed that there was at least one pupil of the Great Frederick worthy of his master, and afforded hopes, on which Prussia long dwelt in silence, till the moment of action arrived.

The total destruction, for such it might almost be termed, of the Prussian army, was scarcely so wonderful, as the facility with which the fortresses which defend that country, some of them ranking among the foremost in Europe, were surrendered by their commandants, without shame, and without resistance, to the victorious enemy. Strong towns, and fortified places, on which the engineer had exhausted his science, provided too with large garrisons, and ample supplies, opened their gates at the sound of a French trumpet, or the explosion of

[1] [" So jealous was Blucher of any tarnish being attached to his character, in consequence of this surrender, that the capitulation was at one time on the point of being broken off, because Bernadotte would not consent that the reasons which compelled him to surrender, viz. a want of powder and other necessaries, should be stated, as Blucher insisted, among the articles drawn up between them."—See GENTZ, *Journal des Quatorze Jours de la Monarchie Prussienne.*]

a few bombs. Spandau, Stettin, Custrin, Hamelen, were each qualified to have arrested the march of invaders for months, yet were all surrendered on little more than a summons. In Magdeburg was a garrison of twenty-two thousand men, two thousand of them being artillerymen; and nevertheless this celebrated city capitulated with Mareschal Ney at the first flight of shells. Hamelen was garrisoned by six thousand troops, amply supplied with provisions, and every means of maintaining a siege. The place was surrendered to a force scarcely one-third in proportion to that of the garrison. These incidents were too gross to be imputed to folly and cowardice alone. The French themselves wondered at their conquests, yet had a shrewd guess at the manner in which they were rendered so easy. When the recreant governor of Magdeburg was insulted by the students of Halle for treachery as well as cowardice, the French garrison of the place sympathized, as soldiers, with the youthful enthusiasm of the scholars, and afforded the sordid old coward but little protection against their indignation. From a similar generous impulse, Schoels, the commandant of Hamelen, was nearly destroyed by the troops under his orders. In surrendering the place, he had endeavoured to stipulate, that, in case the Prussian provinces should pass by the fortune of war to some other power, the officers should retain their pay and rank. The soldiers were so much incensed at this stipulation, which carried desertion in its front, and a proposal to shape a private fortune to himself amid

the ruin of his country, that Schoels only saved himself by delivering up the place to the French before the time stipulated in the articles of capitulation.

It is believed that, on several of these occasions, the French constructed a golden key to open these iron fortresses, without being themselves at the expense of the precious metal which composed it. Every large garrison has of course a military chest, with treasure for the regular payment of the soldiery; and it is said, that more than one commandant was unable to resist the proffer, that, in case of an immediate surrender, this deposit should not be enquired into by the captors, but left at the disposal of the governor, whose accommodating disposition had saved them the time and trouble of a siege.[1]

While the French army made this uninterrupted progress, the new King of Holland, Louis Buonaparte, with an army partly composed of Dutch and

[1] ["The war with Prussia—a war which had been hatching since the battle of Austerlitz—was less caused by the counsels of the cabinet, than by the compilers of secret memoirs. They began by representing the Prussian monarchy as ready to fall at the least puff, like a house built with cards. I can affirm, that for the last three months, this war was prepared like a *coup de théâtre*; all the chances and vicissitudes had been calculated, and weighed, with the greatest exactness. I considered it ill becoming the dignity of crowned heads, to see a cabinet so ill regulated. The Prussian monarchy, whose safeguard it should have been, depended upon the cunning of some intriguers, and the energy of a few subsidized persons, who were the very puppets of our will. Jena! history will one day develope thy secret causes."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 304.]

partly of Frenchmen, possessed himself with equal ease of Westphalia, great part of Hanover, Emden, and East Friesland.[1]

To complete the picture of general disorder which Prussia now exhibited, it is only necessary to add, that the unfortunate King, whose personal qualities deserved a better fate, had been obliged, after the battle, to fly into East Prussia, where he finally sought refuge in the city of Koningsberg. L'Estocq, a faithful and able general, was still able to assemble out of the wreck of the Prussian army a few thousand men, for the protection of his sovereign. Buonaparte took possession of Berlin on the 25th October, eleven days after the battle of Jena. The mode in which he improved his good fortune, we reserve for future consideration.

Oct. 25.

The fall of Prussia was so sudden and so total, as to excite the general astonishment of Europe. Its prince was compared to the rash and inexperienced gambler, who risks his whole fortune on one desperate cast, and rises from the table totally ruined. That power had, for three quarters of a century, ranked among the most important of Europe; but never had she exhibited such a formidable position as almost immediately before her disaster, when, holding in her own hand the balance of Europe, she might, before the day of Austerlitz, have inclined the scale to which side she would. And now she lay at the feet of the antagonist whom she had rashly and in ill time defied, not fallen merely, but totally prostrate, without the

[1] [Documens sur la Hollande, t. i. p. 282.]

means of making a single effort to arise. It was remembered that Austria, when her armies were defeated, and her capital taken, had still found resources in the courage of her subjects, and that the insurrections of Hungary and Bohemia had assumed, even after Buonaparte's most eminent successes, a character so formidable, as to aid in procuring peace for the defeated Emperor on moderate terms. Austria, therefore, was like a fortress repeatedly besieged, and as often breached and damaged, but which continued to be tenable, though diminished in strength, and deprived of important outworks. But Prussia seemed like the same fortress swallowed up by an earthquake, which leaves nothing either to inhabit or defend, and where the fearful agency of the destroyer reduces the strongest bastions and bulwarks to crumbled masses of ruins and rubbish.

The cause of this great distinction between two countries which have so often contended against each other for political power, and for influence in Germany, may be easily traced.

The empire of Austria combines in itself several large kingdoms, the undisturbed and undisputed dominions of a common sovereign, to whose sway they have been long accustomed, and towards whom they nourish the same sentiments of loyalty which their fathers entertained to the ancient princes of the same house. Austria's natural authority therefore rested, and now rests, on this broad and solid base, the general and rooted attachment of the people to their prince, and their identification of his interests with their own.

Prussia had also her native provinces, in which her authority was hereditary, and where the affection, loyalty, and patriotism of the inhabitants were natural qualities, which fathers transmitted to their sons. But a large part of her dominions consist of late acquisitions, obtained at different times by the arms or policy of the great Frederick; and thus her territories, made up of a number of small and distant states, want geographical breadth, while their disproportioned length stretches, according to Voltaire's well-known simile, like a pair of garters across the map of Europe. It follows as a natural consequence, that a long time must intervene betwixt the formation of such a kingdom, and the amalgamation of its component parts, differing in laws, manners, and usages, into one compact and solid monarchy, having respect and affection to their king, as the common head, and regard to each other as members of the same community. It will require generations to pass away, ere a kingdom, so artificially composed, can be cemented into unity and strength; and the tendency to remain disunited, is greatly increased by the disadvantages of its geographical situation.

These considerations alone might explain, why, after the fatal battle of Jena, the inhabitants of the various provinces of Prussia contributed no important personal assistance to repel the invader; and why, although almost all trained to arms, and accustomed to serve a certain time in the line, they did not display any readiness to exert themselves against the common enemy. They felt that they belonged to Prussia only by the right of the

strongest, and therefore were indifferent when the same right seemed about to transfer their allegiance elsewhere. They saw the approaching ruin of the Prussian power, not as children view the danger of a father, which they are bound to prevent at the hazard of their lives, but as servants view that of a master, which concerns them no otherwise than as leading to a change of their employers.

There were other reasons, tending to paralyse any effort at popular resistance, which affected the hereditary states of Prussia, as well as her new acquisitions. The power of Prussia had appeared to depend almost entirely upon her standing army, established by Frederick, and modelled according to his rules. When, therefore, this army was at once annihilated, no hope of safety was entertained by those who had so long regarded it as invincible. The Prussian peasant, who would gladly have joined the ranks of his country while they continued to keep the field, knew, or thought he knew, too much of the art of war, to have any hope in the efforts which might be made in a desultory guerilla warfare; which, however, the courage, devotion, and pertinacity of an invaded people have rendered the most formidable means of opposition even to a victorious army.

The ruin of Prussia, to whatever causes it was to be attributed, seemed, in the eyes of astonished Europe, not only universal, but irremediable. The King, driven to the extremity of his dominions, could only be considered as a fugitive, whose precarious chance of restoration to the crown depended on the doubtful success of his ally of Russia, who

now, as after the capture of Vienna, had upon his hands, strong as those hands were, not the task of aiding an ally, who was in the act of resistance to the common enemy, but the far more difficult one of raising from the ground a prince who was totally powerless and prostrate. The French crossed the Oder—Glogau and Breslau were invested. Their defence was respectable; but it seemed not the less certain that their fall involved almost the last hopes of Prussia, and that a name raised so high by the reign of one wise monarch, was like to be blotted from the map of Europe by the events of a single day.

Men looked upon this astonishing calamity with various sentiments, according as they considered it with relation to the Prussian administration alone, or as connected with the character of the King and kingdom, and the general interests of Europe. In the former point of view, the mind could not avoid acknowledging, with a feeling of embittered satisfaction, that the crooked and selfish policy of Prussia's recent conduct,—as shortsighted as it was grasping and unconscientious,—had met in this present hour of disaster with no more than merited chastisement. The indifference with which the Prussian Cabinet had viewed the distresses of the House of Austria, which their firm interposition might probably have prevented—the total want of conscience and decency with which they accepted Hanover from France, at the moment when they meditated war with the power at whose hand they received it—the shameless rapacity with which they proposed to detain the electorate from its

legal owner, at the very time when they were negotiating an alliance with Britain,—intimated that contempt of the ordinary principles of justice, which, while it renders a nation undeserving of success, is frequently a direct obstacle to their attaining it. Their whole procedure was founded on the principles of a felon, who is willing to betray his accomplice, providing he is allowed to retain his own share of the common booty. It was no wonder, men said, that a government setting such an example to its subjects, of greediness and breach of faith in its public transactions, should find among them, in the hour of need, many who were capable of preferring their own private interests to that of their country. And if the conduct of this wretched administration was regarded in a political instead of a moral point of view, the disasters of the kingdom might be considered as the consequence of their incapacity, as well as the just remuneration of their profligacy. The hurried and presumptuous declaration of war, after every favourable opportunity had been suffered to escape, and indeed the whole conduct of the campaign, showed a degree of folly not far short of actual imbecility, and which must have arisen either from gross treachery, or something like infatuation. So far, therefore, as the ministers of Prussia were concerned, they reaped only the reward due to their political want of morality, and their practical want of judgment.

Very different, indeed, were the feelings with which the battle of Jena and its consequences were regarded, when men considered that great calamity in reference not to the evil counsellors by whom it

was prepared, but to the prince and nation who were to pay the penalty. "We are human," and, according to the sentiment of the poet, on the extinction of the state of Venice,[1] "must mourn, even when the shadow of that which has once been great passes away." But the apparent destruction of Prussia was not like the departure of the aged man, whose life is come to the natural close, or the fall of a ruined tower, whose mouldering arches can no longer support the incumbent weight. These are viewed with awe indeed, and with sympathy, but they do not excite astonishment or horror. The seeming fate of the Prussian monarchy resembled the agonizing death of him who expires in the flower of manhood. The fall of the House of Brandenburg was as if a castle, with all its trophied turrets strong and entire, should be at once hurled to the earth by a superhuman power. Men, alike stunned with the extent and suddenness of the catastrophe, were moved with sympathy for those instantly involved in the ruin, and struck with terror at the demolition of a bulwark, by the destruction of which all found their own safety endangered. The excellent and patriotic character of Frederick William, on whose rectitude and honour even the misconduct of his ministers had not brought any stain; the distress of his interesting, high-spirited, and beautiful consort; the general sufferings of a brave and proud people, accustomed to assume and

[1] "Men are we, and must grieve even when the shade
Of that which once was great is passed away"
WORDSWORTH.

deserve the name of Protectors of the Protestant Faith and of the Liberties of Germany, and whose energies, corresponding with the talents of their leader, had enabled them in former times to withstand the combined force of France, Austria, and Russia,—excited deep and general sympathy.

Still wider did that sympathy extend, and more thrilling became its impulse, when it was remembered that in Prussia fell the last state of Germany, who could treat with Napoleon in the style of an equal; and that to the exorbitant power which France already possessed in the south of Europe, was now to be added an authority in the north almost equally arbitrary and equally extensive. The prospect was a gloomy one; and they who felt neither for the fallen authority of a prince, nor the destroyed independence of a kingdom, trembled at the prospect likely to be entailed on their own country by a ruin, which seemed as remediless as it was extensive and astounding.

"But yet the end was NOT."——

Providence, which disappoints presumptuous hopes by the event, is often mercifully pleased to give aid when human aid seems hopeless. Whatever may be thought of the doctrine of an intermediate state of sufferance and purification in an after stage of existence, it is evident from history, that in this world, kingdoms, as well as individuals, are often subjected to misfortunes arising from their own errors, and which prove in the event conducive to future regeneration. Prussia was exposed to a

long and painful discipline in the severe school of adversity, by which she profited in such a degree as enabled her to regain her high rank in the republic of Europe, with more honour perhaps to her prince and people, than if she had never been thrust from her lofty station. Her government, it may be hoped, have learned to respect the rights of other nations, from the sufferings which followed the destruction of their own—her people have been taught to understand the difference between the dominion of strangers and the value of independence. Indeed, the Prussians showed in the event, by every species of sacrifice, how fully they had become aware, that the blessing of freedom from foreign control is not to be secured by the efforts of a regular army only, but must be attained and rendered permanent by the general resolution of the nation, from highest to lowest, to dedicate their united exertions to the achievement of the public liberty at every risk, and by every act of self-devotion. Their improvement under the stern lessons which calamity taught them, we shall record in a brighter page. For the time, the cloud of misfortune sunk hopelessly dark over Prussia, of which not merely the renown, but the very national existence, seemed in danger of being extinguished for ever.

CHAPTER XXXV.

Ungenerous conduct of Buonaparte to the Duke of Brunswick.—The approach of the French troops to Brunswick compels the dying Prince to cause himself to be carried to Altona, where he expires.—Oath of revenge taken by his Son.—At Potsdam and Berlin, the proceedings of Napoleon are equally cruel and vindictive.—His clemency towards the Prince of Hatzfeld.—His Treatment of the Lesser Powers.—Jerome Buonaparte.—Seizure of Hamburgh.—Berlin Decrees against British Commerce.—Napoleon rejects all application from the continental commercial towns to relax or repeal them.—Commerce, nevertheless, flourishes in spite of them.—Second anticipation called for of the Conscription for 1807.—*The King of Prussia applies for an Armistice, which is clogged with such harsh terms, that he refuses them.*

THE will of Napoleon seemed now the only law, from which the conquered country that so late stood forth as the rival of France, was to expect her destiny; and circumstances indicated, that, with more than the fortune of Cæsar or Alexander, the Conqueror would not emulate their generosity or clemency.

The treatment of the ill-fated Duke of Brunswick did little honour to the victor. After receiving a mortal wound on the field of battle, he was

transported from thence to Altona. Upon his way to his native dominions, in the government of which his conduct had been always patriotic and praiseworthy, he wrote to Napoleon, representing that, although he had fought against him as a general in the Prussian service, he nevertheless, as a Prince of the Empire, recommended his hereditary principality to the moderation and clemency of the victor. This attempt to separate his two characters, or to appeal to the immunities of a league which Napoleon had dissolved, although natural in the duke's forlorn situation, formed a plea not likely to be attended to by the conqueror. But, on other and broader grounds, Buonaparte, if not influenced by personal animosity against the duke, or desirous to degrade, in his person, the father-in-law of the heir of the British crown, might have found reasons for treating the defeated general with the respect due to his rank and his misfortunes. The Duke of Brunswick was one of the oldest soldiers in Europe, and his unquestioned bravery ought to have recommended him to his junior in arms. He was a reigning prince, and Buonaparte's own aspirations towards confirmation of aristocratical rank should have led him to treat the vanquished with decency. Above all, the duke was defenceless, wounded, dying; a situation to command the sympathy of every military man, who knows on what casual circumstances the fate of battle depends. The answer of Napoleon was, nevertheless, harsh and insulting in the last degree. He reproached the departing general with his celebrated proclamation against France in 1792, with the result of his unhappy

campaign in that country, with the recent summons by which the French had been required to retreat beyond the Rhine. He charged him as having been the instigator of a war which his counsels ought to have prevented. He announced the right which he had acquired, to leave not one stone standing upon another in the town of Brunswick; and summed up his ungenerous reply by intimating, that though he might treat the subjects of the duke like a generous victor, it was his purpose to deprive the dying prince and his family of their hereditary sovereignty.[1]

As if to fulfil these menaces, the French troops approached the city of Brunswick; and the wounded veteran, dreading the further resentment of his ungenerous victor, was compelled to cause himself to be removed to the neutral town of Altona, where he expired.[2] An application from his son, requesting permission to lay his father's body in the tomb of his ancestors, was rejected with the same sternness which had characterised Buonaparte's answer to the attempt of the duke, when living, to

[1] [Sixteenth Bulletin of the Grand Army, dated 12th Oct.]

[2] ["The Duke of Brunswick's entry into Altona presented a new and striking proof of the instability of fortune. A sovereign prince was beheld, enjoying, right or wrong, a great military reputation, but very lately powerful and tranquil in his own capital, now beaten and mortally wounded, borne into Altona on a miserable litter, carried by ten men, without officers, without domestics, escorted by a crowd of boys and ragamuffins, who pressed about him from curiosity, deposited in a bad inn, and so worn out with fatigue, that the morrow after his arrival, the report of his death was generally credited. His wife joined him on the 1st November; he refused all visits, and died on the 10th."—Bourrienne, t. vii. p. 159.]

soften his enmity. The successor of the duke vowed, it is believed, to requite these insults with mortal hatred,—did much to express it during his life,— and bequeathed to his followers the legacy of revenge,[1] which the Black Brunswickers had the means of amply discharging upon the 18th of June, 1815.

Some have imputed this illiberal conduct of Buonaparte to an ebullition of spleen against the object of his personal dislike; others have supposed that his resentment was, in whole or in part, affected in order to ground upon it his resolution of confiscating the state of Brunswick, and uniting it with the kingdom of Westphalia, which, as we shall presently see, he proposed to erect as an appanage for his brother Jerome. Whether arising from a burst of temperament, or a cold calculation of interested selfishness, his conduct was equally unworthy of a monarch and a soldier.

At Potsdam and at Berlin, Napoleon showed himself equally as the sworn and implacable enemy, rather than as the generous conqueror. At Potsdam he seized on the sword, belt, and hat of the Great Frederick, and at Berlin he appropriated and removed to Paris the monument of Victory,

1 ["Within a window'd niche of that high hall
Sate Brunswick's fated chieftain: he did hear
That sound the first amidst the festival,
And caught its tone with Death's prophetic ear;
And when they smiled because he deem'd it near,
His heart more truly knew that peal too well,
Which stretch'd his Father on a bloody bier,
And roused the Vengeance blood alone could quell.
He rush'd into the field and, foremost fighting, fell."
Childe Harold.]

erected by the same monarch, in consequence of the defeat of the French at Rosbach.[1] The finest paintings and works of art in Prussia were seized upon for the benefit of the French National Museum.

The language of the victor corresponded with his actions. His bulletins and proclamations abounded with the same bitter sarcasms against the King, the Queen, and those whom he called the war faction of Prussia. Ascribing the war to the unrepressed audacity of the young nobility, he said, in one of those proclamations, he would permit no more rioting in Berlin, no more breaking of windows; and, in addressing the Count Neale, he threatened, in plain terms, to reduce the nobles of Prussia to beg their bread.[2] These, and similar expressions of irritated spleen, used in the hour of conquest, level the character of the great victor with that of the vulgar Englishman in the farce, who cannot be satisfied with beating his enemy, but must scold him also. Napoleon's constant study

[1] ["The sword of the Great Frederick was easily found at Potsdam, together with the scarf which he wore during the Seven Years' War; also the insignia of the Black Eagle. The Emperor took these trophies with transport, saying, 'I would rather have these than twenty millions: I shall send them to my old soldiers—I shall present them to the governor of the Invalids: in that hotel they shall remain.'"—*Nineteenth Bulletin.*]

[2] ["The good people of Berlin have been the sacrifice of the war; while those who excited it have left them and are become fugitives; I shall reduce those noble courtiers to such extremities that they shall be compelled to beg their bread." To Prince Hatzfeld, the Emperor said, "Do not appear in my presence; I have no need of your services; retire to your estates."—*Twenty-first Bulletin.*]

of the poetry ascribed to Ossian, might have taught him that wrath should fly on eagles' wings from a conquered foe. The soldiers, and even the officers, caught the example of their Emperor, and conceived they met his wishes by behaving more imperiously in quarters, and producing more distress to their hosts, than had been their custom in the Austrian campaigns. Great aggressions, perhaps, were rarely perpetrated, and would have been punished, as contrary to military discipline; but a grinding, constant, and unremitting system of vexation and requisition, was bitterly felt by the Prussians at the time, and afterwards sternly revenged.

It is but justice, however, to record an act of clemency of Napoleon amid these severities. He had intercepted a letter containing some private intelligence respecting the motions of the French, sent by Prince Hatzfeld, late the Prussian governor of Berlin, to Prince Hohenloe, then still at the head of an army. Napoleon appointed a military commission for the trial of Hatzfeld; and his doom, for continuing to serve his native prince after his capital had been occupied by the enemy, would have been not less certain than severe. His wife, however, threw herself at Napoleon's feet, who put into her hands the fatal document which contained evidence of what was called her husband's guilt, with permission to throw it into the fire.[1] The

[1] ["I remained at the door of the Emperor's cabinet to prevent any person from being announced before the princess. Duroc soon came out and immediately introduced her. She knew not why her husband had been arrested; and, in the simplicity of her nature, demanded justice for the wrong which she

French Emperor is entitled to credit for the degree of mercy he showed on this occasion; but it must be granted at the same time, that to have proceeded to sentence and execution upon such a charge, would have been an act of great severity,

supposed was done to him. When she had finished, the Emperor handed to her the letter written by her husband; when she had run it over, she seemed motionless, and looked as if she had lost sensation. She stared with haggard eyes at the Emperor; but articulated not a word. He said to her, 'Well, madam, is this a calumny—an unjust charge?' The princess, more dead than alive, was going to answer only with her tears, when the Emperor took the letter from her, and said, 'Madam, were it not for this letter there would be no proof against your husband.' —'That is very true,' she replied, 'but I cannot deny that it is his writing.'—'Well,' said the Emperor, 'there is nothing to be done but to burn it;' and he threw the letter into the fire." —SAVARY, t. ii., p. 206.

The following is Napoleon's own account of what passed, in a letter to Josephine, dated 6th November, nine o'clock evening: —"I received thy letter; in which thou seemest angry with me for speaking ill of women." In the letter here referred to, Josephine had expressed her regret at the disrespectful terms in which the Queen of Prussia was spoken of in the Bulletins of the Grand Army. "It is true I utterly abominate intriguing females. I am accustomed to those who are amiable, gentle, and conciliating; and such I love. If they have spoiled me it is not my fault, but thine. But at least thou wilt see I have been very good to one, who showed herself a feeling, amiable woman—Madame Hatzfeld. When I showed her her husband's letter, she replied to me, weeping bitterly, with heartfelt sensibility and *naïveté: Alas! it is but too surely his writing.* When she read it, her accent went to my soul—her situation distressed me. I said, *Well, then, madame, throw that letter into the fire; I shall then no longer possess the means of punishing your husband.* She burnt the letter, and was happy. Her husband is restored to tranquillity: Two hours later, and he would have been a lost man. Thus thou seest, that I esteem women that are good, and ingenuous, and amiable: but this is because such alone resemble thee."—*Lettres de Napoleon à Josephine*, t. i. p. 195.]

if not of actual atrocity. If, as has been alleged, the correspondence of Prince Hatzfeld was dated before, not after the capitulation of Berlin, his death would have been an unqualified murder.[1]

The victor, who had all at his disposal, was now to express his pleasure concerning those satellites of Prussia, which, till her fall, had looked up to her as their natural protector and ally. Of these, Saxony and Hesse-Cassel were the principal; and, in his proceedings towards them, Buonaparte regarded the train of his own policy much more than the merits which the two electors might have respectively pleaded towards France.

Saxony had joined her arms to those of Prussia —forced, as she said, by the arguments which a powerful neighbour can always apply to a weaker —still she *had* joined her, and fought on her side at the battle of Jena. The apology of compulsion was admitted by Buonaparte; the Saxon troops were dismissed upon their parole, and their prince raised to the rank of a King, shortly afterwards admitted as a member of the Confederacy of the Rhine, and treated by Buonaparte with much personal consideration. The Dukes of Saxe-Weimar and Saxe-Gotha also were permitted to retain their dominions, on acknowledging a similar vassalage to the French empire.

The Landgrave, or Elector, of Hesse-Cassel, might have expected a still more favourable acceptance in the eyes of the victor; for he had refused to join Prussia, and, in spite of threats and

[1] ["The letter was forwarded from the post-office a few days *after* our arrival at Berlin."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 205.]

persuasions, had observed neutrality during the brief contest. But Napoleon remembered, to the prejudice of the landgrave, that he had resisted all previous temptations to enter into the Confederation of the Rhine. He imputed his neutrality to fear, not choice. He alleged, that it had not been strictly observed; and, treating the inaction of Hesse, whose inclinations were with Prussia, as a greater crime than the actual hostilities of Saxony, whose will was with France, he declared, according to his usual form of dethronement, that the House of Hesse-Cassel had ceased to reign. The doom was executed even before it was pronounced. Louis Buonaparte, with Marshal Mortier, had possessed himself of Hesse-Cassel by the 1st of November.[1] The army of the landgrave made no resistance—a part of them passed under the banners of France, the rest were disbanded.

The real cause of seizing the territories of an unoffending prince, who was totally helpless, unless in so far as right or justice could afford him protection, was Buonaparte's previous resolution, already hinted at, to incorporate Hesse-Cassel with

[1] ["This is not correct. I had put myself at this period at the head of my own troops and some French regiments then in Holland, because the Emperor required the King of Holland to form a combined army at Wesel, under the title of the Army of the North. Endeavouring as much as possible to reconcile my very different duties, I marched towards Cassel, at the orders of Marshal Mortier, who was advancing upon Mayence with a small number of troops. When I approached Cassel, Marshal Mortier had entered the evening before. I immediately halted the body of the army before I entered the town, and leaving the French troops under the command of Marshal Mortier, I took the route to Holland with the Dutch."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 50.]

the adjacent territories, for the purpose of forming a kingdom to be conferred on his youngest brother Jerome. This young person bore a gay and dissipated character; and, though such men may at times make considerable sacrifices for the indulgence of transient passion, they are seldom capable of retaining for a length of time a steady affection for an object, however amiable. Jerome Buonaparte, as before stated, had married an American young lady, distinguished for her beauty and her talents, and had thus lost the countenance of Napoleon, who maintained the principle, that, segregated as his kindred were from the nation at large, by their connexion with him, his rank, and his fortunes, they were not entitled to enter into alliances according to the dictates of their own feelings, but were bound to form such as were most suitable to his policy. Jerome was tempted by ambition finally to acquiesce in this reasoning, and sacrificed the connexion which his heart had chosen, to become the tool of his brother's ever-extending schemes of ambition. The reward was the kingdom of Westphalia, to which was united Hesse-Cassel, with the various provinces which Prussia had possessed in Franconia, Westphalia Proper, and Lower Saxony; as also the territories of the unfortunate Duke of Brunswick. Security could be scarcely supposed to attend upon a sovereignty, where the materials were acquired by public rapine, and the crown purchased by domestic infidelity.

About the middle of November, Mortier formally re-occupied Hanover in the name of the Emperor, and, marching upon Hamburgh, took

possession of that ancient free town, so long the emporium of commerce for the north of Europe. Here, as formerly at Leipsic, the strictest search was made for British commodities and property, which were declared the lawful subject of confiscation. The *Moniteur* trumpeted forth, that these rigorous measures were accompanied with losses to British commerce which would shake the credit of the nation. This was not true. The citizens of Hamburgh had long foreseen that their neutrality would be no protection, and, in spite of the fraudful assurances of the French envoy, designed to lull them into security, the merchants had availed themselves of the last two years to dispose of their stock, call in their capital, and wind up their trade; so that the rapacity of the French was in a great measure disappointed. The strict search after British property, and the confiscation which was denounced against it at Hamburgh and elsewhere, were no isolated acts of plunder and spoliation, but made parts of one great system for destroying the commerce of England, which was shortly after laid before the world by the celebrated decrees of Berlin.[1]

It was frequently remarked of Buonaparte, that

[1] ["On the 19th November, Hamburgh was taken possession of in the Emperor's name. The demands which Marshal Mortier was necessitated to make were hard. But my representations suspended for a time the order given by Napoleon to seize the Bank. I cannot do otherwise than render a tribute to the uprightness of the marshal's conduct, who forwarded my representations to the Emperor at Berlin, announcing that he has delayed acting till the arrival of fresh orders. The Emperor read and approved my views."—Bourrienne, t. vii. p. 179.]

he studied a sort of theatrical effect in the mode of issuing his decrees and proclamations, the subject matter of which formed often a strange contrast with the date; the latter, perhaps, being at the capital of some subdued monarch, while the matter promulgated respected some minute regulation affecting the municipality of Paris. But there was no such discrepancy in the date and substance of the Berlin decrees against British enterprise. It was when Buonaparte had destroyed the natural bulwark which protected the independence of the north of Germany, and had necessarily obtained a corresponding power on the shores of the Baltic, that he seriously undertook to promulgate his sweeping plan of destroying the commerce of his Island foe.[1]

When slight inconveniences, according to Buonaparte's expression, put an end to his hopes of invading Britain, or when, as at other times he more candidly admitted, the defeat at Trafalgar induced him "to throw helve after hatchet," and

[1] ["The delirium caused by the wonderful results of the Prussian campaign completed the intoxication of France. She prided herself upon having been saluted with the name of the Great Nation by her Emperor, who had triumphed over the genius and the work of Frederick. Napoleon believed himself the Son of Destiny, called to break every sceptre. Peace, and even a truce with England, was no longer thought of. The idea of destroying the power of England, the sole obstacle to universal monarchy, now became his fixed resolve. It was with this view he established the continental system, the first decree concerning which was dated from Berlin. Napoleon persuaded himself, that by depriving England of all the outlets for its manufactures, he should reduce it to poverty, and that it must then submit to its fate. He not only thought of subjecting it, but also of effecting its destruction."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 305.]

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

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resign all hope of attaining any success by means of his navy, he became desirous of sapping and undermining the bulwark, which he found it impossible to storm; and, by directing his efforts to the destruction of British commerce, he trusted gradually to impair the foundations of her national wealth and prosperity. He erred, perhaps, in thinking that, even if his object could have been fully attained, the full consequences would have followed which his animosity anticipated. Great Britain's prosperity mainly rests on her commerce, but her existence as a nation is not absolutely dependent upon it; as those foreigners are apt to imagine, who have only seen the numerous vessels with which she covers the ocean and fills foreign ports, but have never witnessed the extent of her agricultural and domestic resources. But, entertaining the belief which Napoleon did, in regard to the indispensable connexion betwixt British commerce and British power, the policy of his war upon the former cannot be denied. It was that of the Abyssynian hunter, who, dreading to front the elephant in his fury, draws his sabre along the animal's heel-joint, and waits until the exertions of the powerful brute burst the injured sinews, and he sinks prostrate under his own weight.

The celebrated Decrees of Berlin appeared on the 21st November, 1806, interdicting all commerce betwixt Great Britain and the continent; which interdiction was declared a fundamental law of the French empire, until the English should consent to certain alterations in the mode of conducting hostilities by sea, which should render her

naval superiority less useful to herself, and less detrimental to the enemy. This measure was justified upon the following grounds:—That England had either introduced new customs into her maritime code, or revived those of a barbarous age—that she seized on merchant vessels, and made their crews prisoners, just as if they had been found on board ships of war—declared harbours blockaded which were not so in reality—and extended the evils of war to the peaceful and unarmed citizen.

This induction to the celebrated project, afterwards called the Continental System of the Emperor, was false in the original proposition, and sophistical in those by which it was supported. It was positively false that Great Britain had introduced into her maritime law, either by new enactment, or by the revival of obsolete and barbarous customs, any alteration by which the rights of neutrals were infringed, or the unarmed citizen prejudiced, more than necessarily arose out of the usual customs of war. The law respecting the blockade of ports, and the capture of vessels at sea, was the same on which every nation had acted for three centuries past, France herself not excepted. It is true, that the maritime code seemed at this period to be peculiarly that of England, because no nation save herself had the means of enforcing them; but she did not in this respect possess any greater advantage by sea than Napoleon enjoyed by land.

The reasoning of the Emperor Napoleon upon the inequality and injustice of the maritime mode of exercising war, compared with the law of hos-

tilities by land, was not more accurate than his allegation, that Britain had innovated upon the former for the purpose of introducing new, or reviving old severities. This will appear plain from the following considerations:—

At an early period of society, the practice of war was doubtless the same by land or sea; and the savage slaughtered or enslaved his enemy whether he found him in his hut or in his canoe. But when centuries of civilisation began to mitigate the horrors of barbarous warfare, the restrictive rules introduced into naval hostilities were different from those adopted in the case of wars by land, as the difference of the services obviously dictated. A land army has a precise object, which it can always attain if victorious. If a general conquer a town, he can garrison it; he can levy contributions; nay, he may declare that he will appropriate it to himself in right of sovereignty. He can afford to spare the property of private individuals, when he is at liberty to seize, if he is so minded, upon all their public rights, and new-mould them at his pleasure. The seaman, on the other hand, seizes on the merchant vessel and its cargo, by the same right of superior force, in virtue of which the victor by land has seized upon castles, provinces, and on the very haven, it may be, which the vessel belongs to. If the maritime conqueror had no right to do this, he would gain nothing by his superiority except blows, when he met with vessels of force, and would be cut off from any share of the spoils of war. which form the reward of victory. The innocent and unarmed citizen, perhaps the neutral

stranger, suffers in both cases; but a state of war is of course a state of violence, and its evils, unhappily, cannot be limited to those who are actually engaged in hostilities. If the spirit of philanthropy affected in the peroration to Buonaparte's decrees had been real, he might have attained his pretended purpose of softening the woes of war, by proposing some relaxation of the rights of a conqueror by land, in exchange for restrictions to be introduced into the practice of hostilities by sea. Instead of doing so, he, under the pretext of exercising the right of reprisals, introduced the following Decrees, unheard of hitherto among belligerent powers, and tending greatly to augment the general distress, which must, under all circumstances, attend a state of war.

I. The British isles were declared in a state of blockade. II. All commerce and correspondence with England was forbidden. All English letters were to be seized in the post-houses. III. Every Englishman, of whatever rank or quality, found in France, or the countries allied with her, was declared a prisoner of war. IV. All merchandise, or property of any kind, belonging to English subjects, was declared lawful prize. V. All articles of English manufacture, and articles produced in her colonies, were in like manner declared contraband and lawful prize. VI. Half of the produce of the above confiscations was to be employed in the relief of those merchants whose vessels had been captured by the English cruizers. VII. All vessels coming from England, or the English colonies, were to be refused admission into any harbour.

Four additional articles provided the mode of promulgating and enforcing the decree, and directed that it should be communicated to the allies of France.

This was the first link of a long chain of arbitrary decrees and ordinances, by which Napoleon, aiming at the destruction of British finance, interrupted the whole commerce of Europe, and destroyed for a season, and as far as lay in his power, that connexion between distant nations which unites them to each other by the most natural and advantageous means, the supply of the wants of the one country by the superfluous produce of the other. The extent of public inconvenience and distress, which was occasioned by the sudden suppression of commercial communication with England, may be judged of by reflecting, how many of the most ordinary articles of consumption are brought from foreign countries,—in how many instances the use of these articles have brought them into the list of necessaries,—and how, before an ordinary mechanic or peasant sits down to breakfast, distant climes must be taxed to raise the coffee and sugar which he consumes.[1]

[1] ["It is difficult, at this day, to conceive how Europe could, for a single hour, endure that fiscal tyranny which exacted the most exorbitant prices for articles, become indispensable necessaries of life, both to rich and poor, through habits of three centuries. It is so far from being the truth that such system had for its only and exclusive aim to prevent England from disposing of her merchandise, that licenses were sold at a high rate to those who had influence sufficient to procure them; and gold alone gave that influence. The quantity and the quality of articles exported from France were exaggerated with incredible impudence. It became necessary, indeed, to purchase such articles,

The painful embarrassment of those deprived of their habitual comforts, was yet exceeded by the clamour and despair of the whole commercial world on the continent, who were thus, under pretext of relieving them from the vexation of the English cruisers, threatened with a total abrogation of their profession. Hamburgh, Bourdeaux, Nantes, and other continental towns, solicited, by petitions and deputations, some relaxation of decrees which inferred their general ruin. They pleaded the prospect of universal bankruptcy, which this prohibitory system must occasion. "Let it be so," answered the Emperor; "the more insolvency on the continent, the greater will be the distress of the merchants in London. The fewer traders in Hamburgh, the less will be the temptation to carry on commerce with England. Britain must be humbled, were it at the expense of throwing civilisation back for centuries, and returning to the original mode of trading by barter."

But, great as was Buonaparte's power, he had overrated it in supposing, that, by a mere expression of his will, he could put an end to an intercourse, in the existence of which the whole world possessed an interest. The attempt to annihilate commerce, resembled that of a child who tries to stop with his hand the stream of an artificial foun-

in submission to the will of the Emperor; but they were bought only to be thrown into the sea. And yet none was found who had the conscience to tell the Emperor that England sold to the continent, but that she bought almost nothing from thence."—Bourrienne, t. vii. p. 231.]

tain, which escapes in a hundred partial jets from under his palm and between his fingers. The Genius of Commerce, like a second Proteus, assumed every variety of shape, in order to elude the imperial interdiction, and all manner of evasions was practised for that purpose. False papers, false certificates, false bills of lading, were devised, and these frauds were overlooked in the seaports, by the very agents of the police, and customhouse officers, to whom the execution of the decrees was committed. Douaniers, magistrates, generals, and prefects, nay, some of the kindred princes of the House of Napoleon, were well pleased to listen to the small still voice of their interest, rather than to his authoritative commands; and the British commerce, though charged with heavy expenses, continued to flourish in spite of the Continental System.[1]

[1] [" The accusation thus brought might also fall upon me; and although I consider myself beyond the reach of such calumnies, I must declare, in answer to the frequent insinuations made during and even since the reign of my brother, that such an accusation is as untrue as it is inconceivable. I declare I was in no manner a partisan of the Continental System; first, because it injured Holland more than it did England, and it was the interest of Holland which concerned me most deeply; and in the second place, because this system, though true in theory, was false in its application. I compare it to a sieve; a single hole is sufficient to render it incapable of containing any thing. The Continental System being acted upon in most countries, must have produced more beneficial results in those points where it was not maintained; and thus it was with respect to the advantages it conferred upon English commerce, mentioned by Sir Walter Scott. It was this which gave France the means of benefiting her merchants, to the injury of those of other countries, who had not the power to open and shut their ports at will. It will consequently be supposed that I could only lend myself partially, without zeal or pleasure, to the Continental System, since it was

The new, and still more violent measures, which Napoleon had recourse to for enforcing his prohibitions, will require our notice hereafter. Mean time, it is enough to say, that such acts of increasing severity had the natural consequence of rendering his person and power more and more unpopular; so that, while he was sacrificing the interests and the comforts of the nations under his authority to his hope of destroying England, he was, in fact, digging a mine under his own feet, which exploded to his destruction long before the security of England was materially affected.

Napoleon had foreseen, that, in order to enforce the decrees by which, without possession of any naval power, he proposed to annihilate the naval supremacy of England, it would be necessary to augment to a great extent the immense superiority of land forces which France already possessed. It was necessary, he was aware, that to enable him to maintain the prohibitions which he had imposed upon general commerce, as well as to prosecute the struggle in which he was about to be engaged with Russia, a large draught should be made on the population of France. He had, accordingly, by a requisition addressed to the Senate, dated from Bamberg, 7th of October, required a second

both against my own opinion and against the interest of the country, and I was convinced of its inefficacy against England; but at the same time I may declare, since all this is now a mere matter of history, that I did not hesitate to obey all that was required, with respect to the pretended blockade of England; but I repeat, that it was against my own opinion, and consequently without zeal and without pleasure." — Louis Buonaparte, p. 53.]

anticipation of the conscription of 1807, amounting to a levy of eighty thousand men.

The measure was supported in the Senate by the oratory of Regnault de St Jean d'Angely, an ancient Republican. This friend of freedom saw nothing inconsistent in advocating a measure, which the absolute monarch recommended as the necessary step to a general peace. The conscripts who had first marched had secured victory; those who were now to be put in motion were to realize the prospect of peace, the principal object of their brethren's success. The obsequious Senate readily admitted these arguments, as they would have done any which had been urged in support of a request which they dared not deny. The sole purpose of Regnault's eloquence, was to express in decent amplification the simple phrase, "Napoleon so wills it."

A deputation of the Senate,[1] carrying to Napoleon in person their warm acquiescence in the proposed measure, received in guerdon the honourable task of conveying to Paris the spoils of Potsdam and Berlin, with three hundred and forty-six stand

[1] ["This deputation thought fit to make representations to the Emperor, on the danger which he might incur by advancing beyond the Oder, and to express to him a wish to see his conquests brought to a termination. This observation offended the Emperor, and he replied to the deputation, that he would make peace as soon as he could, but in such a way as to make it once for all; and that he could not refrain from showing his dissatisfaction at their want of consideration, in exhibiting the shameful spectacle of disunion between the chief of the state and the first constituted body of the nation, at the very time when they knew that the Russians were advancing to join the Prussians."—Savary t. ii. p. 210.]

of colours, the trophies of the war against Prussia —with the task of announcing the celebrated Decrees, by which the general commerce of Europe and of France itself was annihilated, to secure it from the aggressions of the British naval force. The military trophies were received—the Decrees were recorded; and no one dared undertake the delicate task of balancing the victories of the Emperor against the advantage which his dominions were likely to derive from them.

In the mean while, the unfortunate Frederick William, whose possession of his late flourishing kingdom was reduced to such territories as Prussia held beyond the Vistula, and a few fortresses on the Oder, which still held out, sent an embassy to Berlin, for the purpose of learning upon what terms he might be yet admitted to treat for peace with the victor, who had hold of his capital and the greater part of his dominions. The Marquis Lucchesini was employed on this mission, a subtle Italian, who, being employed in negotiations at Paris, had been accustomed to treat with France on a footing of equality. But these times were passed since the battle of Jena; and the only terms to which Prussia could be now admitted, were to be so dearly purchased, that even a mere temporary armistice was to cost the surrender of Graudentz, Dantzick, Colberg,—in short, all the fortresses yet remaining to Prussia, and still in a state of defence. As this would have been placing himself entirely at the mercy of Buonaparte, and in as bad circumstances as he could be reduced to even by the most unsuccessful military operations, the King refused to

acquiesce in such severe terms, and determined to repose his fate in the chance of war, and in the support of the auxiliary army of Russia, which was now hastily advancing to his assistance.

CHAPTER XXXVI.

Retrospect of the Partition of Poland.—Napoleon receives addresses from Poland, which he evades.—He advances into Poland, Bennigsen retreating before him.—Character of the Russian Soldiery.—The Cossacks.—Engagement at Pultusk, on 26th November, terminating to the disadvantage of the French.—Bennigsen continues his retreat—The French go into winter quarters.—Bennigsen appointed Commander-in-chief in the place of Kaminskoy, who shows symptoms of insanity. He resumes offensive operations.—Battle of Eylau, 8th February, 1807. Claimed as a victory by both parties.—The loss on both sides amounts to 50,000 men killed, the greater part Frenchmen.—Bennigsen retreats upon Konigsberg.—Napoleon offers favourable terms for an Armistice to the King of Prussia, who refuses to treat, save for a general Peace.—Napoleon falls back to the line of the Vistula.—Dantzick is besieged, and surrenders.—Russian army is poorly recruited—the French powerfully.—Actions during the Summer.—Battle of Heilsberg, and retreat of the Russians.—Battle of Friedland, 14th June.—An Armistice takes place on the 23d.

NAPOLEON was politically justified in the harsh terms which he was desirous to impose on Prussia, by having now brought his victorious armies to the neighbourhood of Poland, in which he had a good right to conceive himself sure to find numerous followers and a friendly reception.

The partition of this fine kingdom by its powerful neighbours, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, was the first open and audacious transgression of the law of nations, which disgraced the annals of civilized Europe. It was executed by a combination of three of the most powerful states of Europe against one too unhappy in the nature of its constitution, and too much divided by factions, to offer any effectual resistance. The kingdom subjected to this aggression had appealed in vain to the code of nations for protection against an outrage, to which, after a desultory and uncombined, and therefore a vain defence, she saw herself under the necessity of submitting. The Poles retained, too, a secret sense of their fruitless attempt to recover freedom in 1791, and an animated recollection of the violence by which it had been suppressed by the Russian arms. They waited with hope and exultation the approach of the French armies; and candour must allow, that, unlawfully subjected as they had been to a foreign yoke, they had a right to avail themselves of the assistance, not only of Napoleon, but of Mahomet, or of Satan himself, had he proposed to aid them in regaining the independence of which they had been oppressively and unjustly deprived.[1]

This feeling was general among the middling classes of the Polish aristocracy, who recollected

[1] ["We have here a critique upon the policy of Napoleon towards Poland, which I shall not stop to examine. It is but too easy to criticise the actions of statesmen, when time, in its rapid course, has unveiled the causes and effects of events: when the game is finished, the spectators have no longer any credit in discovering what the players ought to have done."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 53.]

with mortified pride the diminution of their independent privileges, the abrogation of their Diets, and the suppression of the *Liberum Veto*, by which a private gentleman might render null the decision of a whole assembly, unless unanimity should be attained, by putting the dissentient to death upon the spot.[1] But the higher order of nobility, grati-

[1] Most readers must be so far acquainted with the ancient form of Polish Diets as to know, that their resolutions were not legally valid if there was one dissenting voice, and that in many cases the most violent means were resorted to, to obtain unanimity. The following instance was related to our informer, a person of high rank:—On some occasion, a provincial Diet was convened for the purpose of passing a resolution which was generally acceptable, but to which it was apprehended one noble of the district would oppose his veto. To escape this interruption, it was generally resolved to meet exactly at the hour of summons, to proceed to business upon the instant, and thus to elude the anticipated attempt of the individual to defeat the purpose of their meeting. They accordingly met at the hour, with most accurate precision, and shut and bolted the doors of their place of meeting. But the dissentient arrived a few minutes afterwards, and entrance being refused, under the excuse that the Diet was already constituted, he climbed upon the roof of the hall, and, it being summer time, when no fires were lighted, descended through the vent into the stove by which, in winter, the apartment was heated. Here he lay perdu, until the vote was called, when, just as it was about to be recorded as unanimous in favour of the proposed measure, he thrust his head out of the stove, like a turtle protruding his neck from his shell, and pronounced the fatal *veto*. Unfortunately for himself, instead of instantly withdrawing his head, he looked around for an instant with exultation, to remark and enjoy the confusion which his sudden appearance and interruption had excited in the assembly. One of the nobles who stood by unsheathed his sabre, and severed at one blow the head of the dissentient from his body. Our noble informer, expressing some doubt of a story so extraordinary, was referred for its confirmation to Prince Sobieski, afterwards King of Poland, who not only bore testimony to the strange scene, as what he had himself witnessed, but declared

fied by the rank they held, and the pleasures they enjoyed at the courts of Berlin, Vienna, and especially at Petersburgh, preferred in general the peaceful enjoyment of their immense estates to the privileges of a stormy independence, which raised the most insignificant of the numerous aristocracy to a rank and importance nearly resembling their own. They might, too, with some justice, distrust the views of Napoleon, though recommended by the most specious promises. The dominion of Russia in particular, from similarity of manners, and the particular attention paid to their persons and interests, was not so unpopular among the higher branches of the aristocracy as might have been expected, from the unjust and arbitrary mode in which she had combined to appropriate so large a part of their once independent kingdom. These did not, therefore, so generally embrace the side of France as the minor nobles or gentry had done. As for the ordinary mass of the population, being almost all in the estate of serfage, or villanage, which had been general over Europe during the prevalence of the feudal system, they followed their respective lords, without pretending to entertain any opinion of their own.

While Russia was marching her armies hastily forward, not only to support, or rather raise up

that the head of the Dietin rolled over on his own foot almost as soon as he heard the word *veto* uttered. Such a constitution required much amelioration; but that formed no apology for the neighbouring states, who dismembered and appropriated to themselves an independent kingdom, with the faults or advantages of whose government they had not the slightest title to interfere.

once more, her unfortunate ally the King of Prussia, but to suppress any ebullition of popular spirit in Poland, Buonaparte received addresses from that country, which endeavoured to prevail on him to aid them in their views of regaining their independence. Their application was of a nature to embarrass him considerably. To have declared himself the patron of Polish independence, might have, indeed, brought large forces to his standard, —might have consummated the disasters of Prussia, and greatly embarrassed even Russia herself; and so far policy recommended to Napoleon to encourage their hopes of her restored independence. But Austria had been a large sharer in the various partitions of Poland, and Austria, humbled as she had been, was still a powerful state, whose enmity might have proved formidable, if, by bereaving her of her Polish dominions, or encouraging her subjects to rebel, Buonaparte had provoked her to hostilities, at the time when he himself and the best part of his forces were engaged in the North of Europe. The same attempt would have given a very different character to the war, which Russia at present waged only in the capacity of the auxiliary of Prussia. The safety and integrity of the Russian empire, south of the Volga, depends almost entirely upon the preservation of those territories which she has acquired in Poland; and, if she had engaged in the war as a principal, Buonaparte was scarcely yet prepared to enter upon a contest with the immense power of that empire, which must be waged upon the very frontier of the enemy, and as near to their

resources as he was distant from his own. It might have been difficult, also, to have stated any consistent grounds, why he, who had carved out so many new sovereignties in Europe with the point of the sword, should reprobate the principle of the partition of Poland. Influenced by these motives, the modern setter-up and puller-down of kings abstained from re-establishing the only monarchy in Europe, which he might have new-modelled to his mind, in the character not of a conqueror, but a liberator.

While Napoleon declined making any precise declaration, or binding himself by any express stipulations to the Polish delegates, the language he used to them was cautiously worded, so as to keep up their zeal and animate their exertions. Dombrowski,[1] a Polish exile in the French army, was employed to raise men for Napoleon's service, and the enthusiasm of those who entered, as well as the expectations of the kingdom at large, were excited by such oracular passages as the following, which appeared in the thirty-sixth bulletin:—"Is the throne of Poland to be re-established, and will that great nation regain her existence and independence? Will she be recalled to life, as if summoned to arise from the tomb?—God only, the

[1] ["Napoleon had sent to Italy for the Polish general, Dombrowski, who joined us at Potsdam. This was an indication of his intentions, though as yet he had not allowed a word on the subject to transpire in Poland. It was not until after the final refusal of the King of Prussia to negotiate, that he appealed to the patriotism of the Poles to augment his force. With a view to this object, the mere presence of Dombrowski was of great advantage."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 212.]

great disposer of events, can be the arbiter of this great political problem." [1]

The continuance of war was now to be determined upon; a war to be waged with circumstances of more than usual horror, as it involved the sufferings of a winter campaign in the northern latitudes. The French, having completely conquered the Prussian estates to the east of the Oder, had formed the sieges of Great Glogau, of Breslau, and of Graudentz, and were at the same time pushing westward to occupy Poland. The Russian general, Bennigsen, had on his side pressed forward for the purpose of assisting the Prussians, and had occupied Warsaw. But finding that their unfortunate allies had scarcely the remnant of an army in the field, the Russian general retreated after

[1] [This bulletin was dated, Imperial Headquarters at Posen, December 1. On the next day, Napoleon issued the following proclamation to the army:—"Soldiers! a year ago, at the same hour, you were on the memorable field of Austerlitz. The sacred cohorts of Russia fled, defeated, before you; or, surrounded, laid down their arms at the feet of their conquerors. To the moderation, and, perhaps, blamable generosity, which overlooked the third coalition, the formation of a fourth may be ascribed. But the ally on whose military skill their principal hope rested, is already no more. His principal towns, his fortresses, his forage, and ammunition, magazines, 280 standards, 700 pieces of cannon, are in our power. Neither the Oder, nor Warta, the Deserts of Poland, nor the rude season of winter, have been capable of arresting, for a moment, our progress. You have braved all dangers, surmounted them all, and every enemy has fled on your approach. In vain did the Russians wish to defend the capital of ancient and illustrious Poland. The French eagles hover over the Vistula. The unfortunate, but brave Poles, on contemplating you, fancy they behold the celebrated legions of their great Sobieski returning from a military expedition."]

some skirmishes, and recrossed the Vistula, while the capital of Poland, thus evacuated, was entered on the 28th November by Murat, at the head of the French vanguard.

About the 25th, Napoleon, leaving Berlin, had established himself at Posen, a centrical town of Poland, which country began to manifest an agitation, partly the consequence of French intrigues, partly arising from the animating prospect of restored independence. The Poles resumed in many instances their ancient national dress and manners, and sent deputies to urge the decision of Buonaparte in their favour. The language in which they entreated his interposition, resembled that of Oriental idolatry. "The Polish nation," said Count Radyiminiski, the Palatine of Gnesna, "presents itself before your Majesty, groaning still under the yoke of German nations, and salutes with the purest joy the regenerator of their dear country, the legislator of the universe. Full of submission to your will, they adore you, and repose on you with confidence all their hopes, as upon him who has the power of raising empires and destroying them, and of humbling the proud." The address of the President of the Judicial Council-Chamber of the Regency of Poland, was not less energetic. "Already," he said, "we see our dear country saved; for in your person we adore the most just and the most profound Solon. We commit our fate and our hopes into your hands, and we implore the mighty protection of the most august Cæsar."

Not even these Eastern hyperboles could extort

any thing from Buonaparte more distinctly indicative of his intentions, than the obscure hints we have already mentioned.

In the mean while, Warsaw was put into a state of defence, and the auxiliary forces of Saxony and the new confederates of the Rhine were brought up by forced marches, while strong reinforcements from France repaired the losses of the early part of the campaign.

The French army at length advanced in full force, and crossed successively the rivers Vistula and Bug, forcing a passage wherever it was disputed. But it was not the object of Bennigsen to give battle to forces superior to his own, and he therefore retreated behind the Wkra, and was joined by the large bodies of troops commanded by Generals Buxhowden and Kaminskoy. The latter took the general command. He was a contemporary of Suwarrow, and esteemed an excellent officer, but more skilled in the theory than the practice of war. "Kaminskoy," said Suwarrow, "knows war, but war does not know him—I do not know war, but war knows me." It appears also, that during this campaign Kaminskoy was afflicted with mental alienation.

On the 23d December, Napoleon arrived in person upon the Wkra, and ordered the advance of his army in three divisions. Kaminskoy, when he saw the passage of this river forced, determined to retreat behind the Niemen, and sent orders to his lieutenants accordingly. Bennigsen, therefore, fell back upon Pultusk, and Prince Galitzin upon Golymin, both pursued by large divisions of the

French army. The Russian Generals Buxhowden and D'Anrep also retreated in different directions, and apparently without maintaining a sufficiently accurate communication either with Bennigsen, or with Galitzin. In their retrograde movements the Russians sustained some loss, which the bulletins magnified to such an extent, as to represent their army as entirely disorganized, their columns wandering at hazard in unimaginable disorder, and their safety only caused by the shortness of the days, the difficulties of a country covered with woods and intersected with ravines, and a thaw which had filled the roads with mud to the depth of five feet. It was, therefore, predicted, that although the enemy might possibly escape from the position in which he had placed himself, it must necessarily be effected at the certain loss of his artillery, his carriages, and his baggage.[1]

These were exaggerations calculated for the meridian of Paris. Napoleon was himself sensible, that he was approaching a conflict of a different kind from that which he had maintained with Austria, and more lately against Prussia. The common soldier in both those services was too much levelled into a mere moving piece of machinery, the hundred-thousandth part of the great machine called an army, to have any confidence in himself, or zeal beyond the mere discharge of the task intrusted to him according to the word of command. These troops, however highly disciplined, wanted that powerful and individual feeling, which

[1] [Forty-fifth, forty-sixth, and forty-seventh Bulletins of the Grand Army.]

in armies possessing a strong national character, (by which the Russians are peculiarly distinguished,) induces the soldier to resist to the last moment, even when resistance can only assure him of revenge. They were still the same Russians, of whom Frederick the Great said, " that he could kill, but could not defeat them;"—they were also strong of constitution, and inured to the iron climate in which Frenchmen were now making war for the first time;—they were accustomed from their earliest life to spare nourishment and hardship;—in a word, they formed then, as they do now, the sole instance in Europe of an army, the privates of which are semi-barbarians, with the passions, courage, love of war, and devotion to their country, which is found in the earlier periods of society, while the education received by their superior officers places them on a level with those of any other nation. That of the inferior regimental officers is too much neglected; but they are naturally brave, kind to the common soldier, and united among themselves like a family of brothers,—attributes which go far to compensate the want of information. Among the higher officers, are some of the best informed men in Europe.

The Russian army was at this period deficient in its military staff, and thence imperfect in the execution of combined movements; and their generals were better accustomed to lead an army in the day of actual battle, than to prepare for victory by a skilful combination of previous manœuvres. But this disadvantage was balanced by their zealous and unhesitating devotion to their Emperor

and their country. There scarcely existed a Russian, even of the lowest rank, within the influence of bribery; and an officer, like the Prussian commandant of Hamelen, who began to speculate upon retaining his rank in another service, when surrendering the charge intrusted to him by his sovereign, would have been accounted in Russia a prodigy of unexampled villany. In the mode of disciplining their forces, the Russians proceeded on the system most approved in Europe. Their infantry was confessedly excellent, composed of men in the prime of life, and carefully selected as best qualified for military service. Their artillery was of the first description, so far as the men, guns, carriages, and appointments were concerned; but the rank of General of Artillery had not the predominant weight in the Russian army, which ought to be possessed by those particularly dedicated to the direction of that arm, by which, according to Napoleon, modern battles must be usually decided. The direction of their guns was too often intrusted to general officers of the line. The service of cavalry is less natural to the Russians than that of the infantry, but their horse regiments are nevertheless excellently trained, and have uniformly behaved well.

But the Cossacks are a species of force belonging to Russia exclusively; and although subsequent events have probably rendered every reader in some degree acquainted with their national character, they make too conspicuous a figure in the history of Napoleon, to be passed over without a brief description here.

The natives on the banks of the Don and the Volga hold their lands by military service, and enjoy certain immunities and prescriptions, in consequence of which each individual is obliged to serve four years in the Russian armies. They are trained from early childhood to the use of the lance and sword, and familiarized to the management of a horse peculiar to the country—far from handsome in appearance, but tractable, hardy, swift, and sure-footed, beyond any breed perhaps in the world. At home, and with his family and children, the Cossack is kind, gentle, generous, and simple; but when in arms, and in a foreign country, he resumes the predatory, and sometimes the ferocious habits of his ancestors, the roving Scythians. As the Cossacks receive no pay, plunder is generally their object; and as prisoners were esteemed a useless encumbrance, they granted no quarter, until Alexander promised a ducat for every Frenchman whom they brought in alive. In the actual field of battle, their mode of attack is singular. Instead of acting in line, a body of Cossacks about to charge, disperse at the word of command, very much in the manner of a fan suddenly flung open, and joining in a loud yell, or *hourra*, rush, each acting individually, upon the object of attack, whether infantry, cavalry, or artillery, to all of which they have been, in this wild way of fighting, formidable assailants. But it is as light cavalry that the Cossacks are perhaps unrivalled. They and their horses have been known to march one hundred miles in twenty-four hours without halting. They plunge into woods, swim rivers, thread passes, cross deep morasses, and

penetrate through deserts of snow, without undergoing material loss, or suffering from fatigue. No Russian army, with a large body of Cossacks in front, can be liable to surprise; nor, on the other hand, can an enemy surrounded by them ever be confident against it. In covering the retreat of their own army, their velocity, activity, and courage, render pursuit by the enemy's cavalry peculiarly dangerous; and in pursuing a flying enemy, these qualities are still more redoubtable. In the campaign of 1806-7, the Cossacks took the field in great numbers, under their celebrated Hettman, or Attaman, Platow, who, himself a Cossack, knew their peculiar capacity for warfare, and raised their fame to a pitch which it had not attained in former European wars.

The Russians had also in their service Tartar tribes, who in irregularity resembled the Cossacks, but were not to be compared with them in discipline or courage, being, in truth, little better than hordes of roving savages.

It remains only to be mentioned, that at this time the Russian commissariat was very indifferent, and, above all, deficient in funds. The funds of the Imperial treasury were exhausted, and an aid, amounting only to eighty thousand pounds, was obtained from England with difficulty. In consequence of these circumstances, the Russians were repeatedly, during the campaign, obliged to fight at disadvantage for want of provisions.—We return to the progress of the war.

On the 25th of December, the Russian army of Bennigsen, closely concentrated, occupied a posi-

tion behind Pultusk; their left, commanded by Count Ostermann, resting upon the town, which is situated on the river Narew. A corps occupied the bridge, to prevent any attack from that point. The right, under Barclay de Tolly, was strongly posted in a wood, and the centre was under the orders of General Zachen. A considerable plain extended between the town of Pultusk and the wood, which formed the right of the Russian position. They had stationed a powerful advanced guard, had occupied the plain with their cavalry, and established a strong reserve in their rear. On the 26th, the Russian position was attacked by the French divisions of Lannes and Davoust, together with the French guards. After skirmishing some time in the centre, without making the desired impression, the battle appeared doubtful, when, suddenly assembling a great strength on their own left, the French made a decisive effort to overwhelm the Russians, by turning their right wing. The attack prevailed to a certain extent. The accumulated and superior weight of fire determined Barclay de Tolly to retreat on his reserves, which he did without confusion, while the French seized upon the wood, and took several Russian guns. But Bennigsen, in spite of Kaminskoy's order to retreat, was determined to abide the brunt of battle, and to avail himself of the rugged intrepidity of the troops which he commanded. Ordering Barclay de Tolly to continue his retreat, and thus throwing back his right wing, he enticed the French, confident in victory, to pursue their success, until the Russian cavalry, which had covered the manœuvre,

suddenly withdrawing, they found themselves under a murderous and well-directed fire from one hundred and twenty guns, which, extending along the Russian front, played on the French advancing columns with the utmost success. The Russian line at the same time advanced in turn, and pushing the enemy before them, recovered the ground from which they had been driven. The approach of night ended the combat, which had been both obstinate and bloody. The French lost near eight thousand men, killed and wounded, including General Lannes and five other general officers among the latter. The Russian loss amounted to five thousand. The French retreated after nightfall with such rapidity, that on the next day the Cossacks could not find a rear-guard in the vicinity of Pultusk.[1]

The action of Pultusk raised the reputation of Bennigsen, and the character as well as the spirits of the Russian army; but its moral effect on the soldiers was its only important consequence. Had Bennigsen been joined during the action by the division of Buxhowden or D'Anrep, of whom the former was only eight miles distant, the check might have been converted into a victory, highly influential on the issue of the campaign. But either the orders of Kaminskoy, or some misunderstanding, prevented either of these corps from advancing to support the efforts of Bennigsen. It became impossible for him, therefore, notwithstanding the advantages he had obtained, to retain

[1] [Forty-seventh Bulletin of the Grand Army; Jomini, t. ii. pp. 334, 343; Savary, t. ii. p. 15.]

his position at Pultusk, where he must have been surrounded. He accordingly fell back upon Ostrolenka, where he was joined by Prince Galitzin, who had been engaged in action at Golymin upon the day of the battle of Pultusk; had, like Bennigsen, driven back the enemy, and like him had retreated for the purpose of concentrating his forces with those of the grand army. The French evinced a feeling of the unusual and obstinate nature of the contest in which they had been engaged at Pultusk and Golymin. Instead of pressing their operations, they retreated into winter quarters; Napoleon withdrawing his guard as far as Warsaw,[1] while the other divisions were cantoned in the towns to the eastward, but without attempting to realize the prophecies of the bulletins concerning the approaching fate of the Russian army.

The conduct of Kaminskoy began now to evince decided tokens of insanity. He was withdrawn from the supreme command, which, with the general approbation of the soldiers, was conferred upon Bennigsen. This general was not equal in military genius to Suwarrow, but he seems to have

[1] ["The Emperor established himself at Warsaw on the 1st January, 1807. He calculated on remaining there until the return of spring. Our halt was delightful. With the exception of theatres, the city presented all the gaieties of Paris. Twice a-week the Emperor gave a concert; after which a court was held, which led again to numerous meetings in private parties. On these occasions, the personal beauty and graceful manners of the Polish ladies were conspicuous. While time passed away thus agreeably, duty was not neglected. The Emperor made every exertion to revictual and provide for his army."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 17.]

been well fitted to command a Russian army. He was active, hardy, and enterprising, and showed none of that peculiarly fatal hesitation, by which officers of other nations opposed to the French generals, and to Buonaparte in particular, seem often to have been affected, as with a sort of moral palsy, which disabled them for the combat at the very moment when it seemed about to commence. On the contrary, Bennigsen, finding himself in a supreme command of ninety thousand men, was resolved not to wait for Buonaparte's onset, but determined to anticipate his motions; wisely concluding, that the desire of desisting from active operations, which the French Emperor had evinced by cantoning his troops in winter quarters, ought to be a signal to the Russians again to take the field.

The situation of the King of Prussia tended to confirm that determination. This unfortunate monarch—well surely did Frederick William then deserve that epithet—was cooped up in the town of Konigsberg, only covered by a small army of a few thousand men, and threatened by the gradual approach of the divisions of Ney and Bernadotte; so that the King's personal safety appeared to be in considerable danger. Graudentz, the key of the Vistula, continued indeed to hold out, but the Prussian garrison was reduced to distress, and the hour of surrender seemed to be approaching. To relieve this important fortress, therefore, and at the same time protect Konigsberg, were motives added to the other reasons which determined Ben-

nigsen to resume offensive operations. A severe and doubtful skirmish was fought near Mohrungen,[1] in which the French sustained considerable loss. The Cossacks spread abroad over the country, making numerous prisoners; and the scheme of the Russian general succeeded so well, as to enable the faithful L'Estocq to relieve Graudentz with reinforcements and provisions.

By these daring operations, Buonaparte saw himself forced into a winter campaign, and issued general orders for drawing out his forces, with the purpose of concentrating them at Willenberg, in the rear of the Russians, (then stationed at Mohrungen,) and betwixt them and their own country. He proposed, in short, to force his enemies eastward towards the Vistula, as at Jena he had compelled the Prussians to fight with their rear turned to the Rhine. Bernadotte had orders to engage the attention of Bennigsen upon the right, and detain him in his present situation, or rather, if possible, induce him to advance eastward towards Thorn, so as to facilitate the operation he meditated.

The Russian general learned Buonaparte's intention from an intercepted despatch,[2] and changed

[1] [Fifty-fifth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, t. ii. p. 25; Jomini, t. ii. p. 353.]

[2] ["As ill-luck would have it, the officer despatched to Bernadotte was a young man of no experience, who proceeded straight towards the place of his destination, without making any enquiries as to what might be on the road. The consequence was, he fell into the hands of some Cossacks, who carried him and his despatch to the Russian general-in-chief. This trifling accident was attended with serious consequences. But for the capture of

his purpose of advancing on Ney and Bernadotte. Marches and counter-marches took place, through a country at all times difficult, and now covered with snow. The experience and dexterity of the French secured some advantages; but these were fully counterbalanced by the daily annoyance and loss which they in turn sustained from Platow and his Cossacks. In cases where the French retreated, the Scythian lances were always on their rear; and when the Russians retired in turn, and were pursued by the French, with the same venturous spirit which they had displayed against others, the latter seldom failed to suffer for their presumption. There was found in the spearmen of the Don and Wolga a natural and instinctive turn for military stratagem, ambuscade, and sudden assault, which compelled the French light troops to adopt a caution, very different from their usual habits of audacity.

Bennigsen was aware that it was the interest of Russia to protract the campaign in this manner. He was near his reinforcements, the French were distant from theirs; every loss, therefore, told more in proportion on the enemy, than on his army. On the other hand, the Russian army, impatient of protracted hostilities, became clamorous for battle; for the hardships of their situation were such as to give them every desire to bring the war to a crisis. We have noticed the defects of the Russian Commissariat. They were especially ma-

this officer, the Russian army must inevitably have been destroyed, and peace would have been immediately concluded." —SAVARY, t. ii. p. 30.]

nifest during those campaigns, when the leader was obliged more than once, merely from want of provisions, to peril the fate of the war upon a general battle, which prudence would have induced him to avoid. In those northern latitudes, and in the month of February, the troops had no resource but to prowl about, and dig for the hoards of provision concealed by the peasants. This labour, added to their military duty, left them scarcely time to lie down; and when they did so, they had no bed but the snow, no shelter but the wintry heaven, and no covering but their rags.[1] The distresses of the army were so extreme, that it induced General Bennigsen, against his judgment, to give battle at all risks, and for this purpose to concentrate his forces at Preuss-Eylau, which was pitched on as the field on which he proposed to await Buonaparte.

In marching through Landsberg to occupy the selected ground, the Russian rear-guard was exposed to a serious attack by the French, and was only saved from great loss by the gallantry of Prince Bagration, who redeemed, by sheer dint of fighting, the loss sustained by want of conduct in defiling through the streets of a narrow village, while pursued by an enterprising enemy. The Russian army lost 3000 men. On the 7th February, the same gallant prince, with the Russian rear-guard, gained such decided advantages over the French van as nearly balanced the loss at Landsberg, and gave time for the whole army to march through

[1] Sir Robert Wilson's Sketches of the Campaigns in Poland, in 1806, and 1807, p. 94.

the town of Preuss-Eylau, and to take up a position behind it. It had been intended to maintain the town itself, and a body of troops had been left for that purpose; but in the confusion attending the movement of so large an army, the orders issued had been misunderstood, and the division designed for this service evacuated the place so soon as the rear-guard had passed through it.

A Russian division was hastily ordered to re-occupy Preuss-Eylau. They found the French already in possession, and, although they dislodged them, were themselves driven out in turn by another division of French, to whom Buonaparte had promised the plunder of the town. A third division of Russians was ordered to advance; for Bennigsen was desirous to protract the contest for the town until the arrival of his heavy artillery, which joined him by a different route. When it came up, he would have discontinued the struggle for possession of Preuss-Eylau, but it was impossible to control the ardour of the Russian columns, who persevered in advancing with drums beating, rushed into the town, and surprising the French in the act of sacking it, put many of them to the bayonet, even in the acts of license which they were practising. Preuss-Eylau, however, proved no place of shelter. It was protected by no works of any kind; and the French, advancing under cover of the hillocks and broken ground which skirt the village, threw their fire upon the streets, by which the Russians sustained some loss. General Barclay de Tolly was wounded, and his

forces again evacuated the town, which was once more and finally occupied by the French. Night fell, and the combat ceased, to be renewed with treble fury on the next day.

The position of the two armies may be easily described. That of Russia occupied a space of uneven ground, about two miles in length and a mile in depth, with the village of Serpallen on their left; in the front of their army lay the town of Preuss-Eylau, situated in a hollow, and in possession of the French. It was watched by a Russian division; which, to protect the Russian centre from being broken by an attack from that quarter, was strongly reinforced, though by doing so the right wing was considerably weakened. This was thought of the less consequence, that L'Estocq, with his division of Prussians, was hourly expected to join the Russians on that point. The French occupied Eylau with their left, while their centre and right lay parallel to the Russians, upon a chain of heights which commanded in a great measure the ground possessed by the enemy. They also expected to be reinforced by the division of Ney, which had not come up, and which was destined to form on the extreme left.

The space betwixt the hostile armies was open and flat, and intersected with frozen lakes. They might trace each other's position by the pale glimmer of the watch-lights upon the snow. The difference of numerical force was considerably to the advantage of the French. Sir Robert Wilson rates them at 90,000 men, opposed to 60,000 only;

but the disproportion is probably considerably overrated.[1]

The eventful action commenced with daybreak on the 8th of February. Two strong columns of the French advanced, with the purpose of turning the right, and storming the centre, of the Russians, at one and the same time. But they were driven back in great disorder by the heavy and sustained fire of the Russian artillery. An attack on the Russian left was equally unsuccessful. The Russian infantry stood like stone ramparts—they repulsed the enemy—their cavalry came to their support, pursued the retiring assailants, and took standards and eagles. About mid-day, a heavy storm of snow began to fall, which the wind drove right in the face of the Russians, and which added to the obscurity caused by the smoke of the burning village of Serpallen, that rolled along the line.

Under cover of the darkness, six columns of the French advanced with artillery and cavalry, and were close on the Russian position ere they were opposed. Bennigsen, at the head of his staff, brought up the reserves in person, who, uniting with the first line, bore the French back at the point of the bayonet. Their columns, partly broken, were driven again to their own position, where they rallied with difficulty. A French regiment of cuirassiers, which, during this part of the action, had gained an interval in the Russian army, were charged by the Cossacks, and found their defensive

[1] [Jomini, t. ii. p. 359, states the Russian army to have been 60,000 strong.]

armour no protection against the lance. They were all slain except eighteen.[1]

At the moment when victory appeared to declare for the Russians, it was on the point of being wrested from them. Davoust's division had been manœuvring since the beginning of the action to turn the left, and gain the rear, of the Russian line. They now made their appearance on the field of battle with such sudden effect, that Serpallen was lost, the Russian left wing, and a part of their centre, were thrown into disorder, and forced to retire and change their front, so as to form almost at right angles with the right, and that part of the centre which retained their original position.

At this crisis, and while the French were gaining ground on the rear of the Russians, L'Estocq, so long expected, appeared in his turn suddenly on the field, and, passing the left of the French, and the right of the Russians, pushed down in three columns to redeem the battle on the Russian centre and rear. The Prussians, under that loyal and gallant leader, regained in this bloody field their ancient military reputation. They never fired till within a few paces of the enemy, and then used the bayonet with readiness and courage. They redeemed the ground which the Russians had lost, and drove back in their turn the troops of Davoust and Bernadotte, who had been lately victorious.

[1] ["When the French cuirassiers made their desperate charge on the Russian centre, and passed through an interval, the Cossacks bore down on them, speared them, unhorsed them, and in a few moments 530 Cossacks reappeared on the field, equipped with the spoil of the slain."—Sir R. Wilson, p. 27.]

Ney, in the mean while, appeared on the field, and occupied Schloditten, a village on the road to Konigsberg. As this endangered the communication of the Russians with that town, it was thought necessary to carry it by storm; a gallant resolution, which was successfully executed.[1] This was the last act of the bloody day. It was ten o'clock at night, and the combat was ended.[2]

Fifty thousand men perished in this dreadful battle—the best contested in which Buonaparte had yet engaged, and by far the most unsuccessful. He retired to the heights from which he had advanced in the morning, without having gained one point for which he had struggled, and after having suffered a loss considerably greater than that which he had inflicted on the enemy. But the condition of the Russian army was also extremely calamitous. Their generals held a council of war upon the field of battle, and without dismounting from their horses. The general sentiment which pre-

[1] [Fifty-eighth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, t. ii. p. 30; Jomini, t. ii. p. 357.]

[2] ["One day, during dinner, the conversation turned on various deeds of arms. The grand marshal said, that what had most struck him in the life of Napoleon happened at Eylau, when, attended only by some officers of his staff, a column of four or five thousand Russians came almost in contact with him. The Emperor was on foot; Berthier instantly ordered up the horses: the Emperor gave him a reproachful look; then sent orders to a battalion of his guard to advance, which was a good way behind, and standing still. As the Russians advanced, he repeated several times, 'What audacity! what audacity!' At the sight of the grenadiers of the guard, the Russians stopped short. It was high time for them to do so, as Bertrand said. The Emperor had never stirred; all who surrounded him had been much alarmed."—Las Cases, t. i. p. 143.]

vailed among them was, a desire to renew the battle on the next day, at all hazards. Tolstoy undertook to move forward on the French lines—L'Estocq urged the same counsel. They offered to pledge their lives, that, would Bennigsen advance, Napoleon must necessarily retire; and they urged the moral effect which would be produced, not on their army only, but on Germany and on Europe, by such an admission of weakness on the part of him who had never advanced but to victory. But Bennigsen conceived that the circumstances of his army did not permit him to encounter the hazard of being cut off from Konigsberg, and endangering the person of the King of Prussia; or that of risking a second general action, with an army diminished by at least 20,000 killed and wounded, short of ammunition, and totally deprived of provisions. The Russians accordingly commenced their retreat on Konigsberg that very night. The division of Count Ostreman did not move till the next morning, when it traversed the field in front of Preuss-Eylau, without the slightest interruption from the French, who still occupied the town.[1]

The battle of Preuss-Elyau was claimed as a victory by both parties, though it was very far from being decided in favour of either. Bennigsen had it to boast, that he had repelled the attacks of Buonaparte along the whole of his line, and that the fighting terminated unfavourably to the French. He could also exhibit the unusual spectacle of

[1] [Sir Robert Wilson's Sketch of the Campaigns in Poland, p. 29.]

twelve imperial eagles of France, taken in one action. For many days after the battle, also, the Cossacks continued to scour the country, and bring into Konigsberg great numbers of French prisoners. On the other hand, the subsequent retreat of the Russians was interpreted by the French into an acknowledgment of weakness; and they appealed to their own possession of the field of battle, with the dead and wounded, as the usual testimonials of victory.

But there were two remarkable circumstances by which Napoleon virtually acknowledged that he had received an unusual check. On the 13th February, four days after the battle, a message was despatched to the King of Prussia by Buonaparte, proposing an armistice, on grounds far more favourable to the Prince than those Frederick William might have been disposed to accept, or which Buonaparte would have been inclined to grant, after the battle of Jena. It was even intimated, that in case of agreeing to make a separate peace, the Prussian King might obtain from the French Emperor the restoration of his whole dominions. True to his ally the Emperor of Russia, Frederick William, even in the extremity of his distress, refused to accede to any save a general peace. The proposal of an armistice was also peremptorily refused, and the ground on which it was offered was construed to indicate Buonaparte's conscious weakness.

Another decisive proof of the loss which Napoleon had sustained in the battle of Preuss-Eylau, was his inactivity after the battle. For eight days he remained without making any movement, excepting by means of his cavalry, which were generally

worsted, and on the 19th February he evacuated the place, and prepared himself to retreat upon the Vistula, instead of driving the Russians, as he had threatened, behind the Pregel. Various actions took place, during his retreat, with different fortunes, but the Russian Cossacks and light troops succeeded in making numbers of prisoners, and collecting much spoil.

The operations of Napoleon, when he had again retired to the line of the Vistula, intimated caution, and the sense of a difficult task before him. He appeared to feel, that the advance into Poland had been premature, while Dantzic remained in the hands of the Prussians, from whence the most alarming operations might take place in his rear, should he again advance to the Vistula without subduing it. The siege of Dantzic was therefore to be formed without delay. The place was defended by General Kalkreuth to the last extremity. After many unsuccessful attempts to relieve it, Dantzic finally surrendered in the end of May 1807, after trenches had been opened before it for fifty-two days.[1] If the season of the year had admitted, a British expedition to Dantzic might, if ably conducted, have operated in the rear of the Emperor Napoleon the relief of Prussia, and perhaps effected the liberation of Europe.

The utmost care was also taken to supply the loss which Napoleon's armies had sustained in

[1] [Seventy-seventh Bulletin of the Grand Army; Jomini, t. ii. p. 396; Savary, t. ii. p. 48. Dantzic surrendered on the 24th of May, and, four days after, Napoleon conferred on Marshal Lefebvre the title of Duke of Dantzic.]

these hard-fought campaigns. He raised the siege of Colberg, drew the greater part of his forces out of Silesia, ordered a new levy in Switzerland, urged the march of bodies of troops from Italy, and, to complete his means, demanded a new conscription of the year 1808, which was instantly complied with by the Senate as a matter of course. At length, as summer approached, the surrender of Dantzic enabled him to unite the besieging division, twenty-five thousand strong, to his main army, and to prepare to resume offensive operations. A large levy of Poles was made at the same time; and they, with other light troops of the French, were employed in making strong reconnoissances, with various fortune, but never without the exchange of hard blows. It became evident to all Europe, that whatever might be the end of this bloody conflict, the French Emperor was contending with a general and troops, against whom it was impossible to gain those overpowering and irresistible advantages, which characterised his campaigns in Italy and Germany. The bulletins, it is true, announced new successes from day to day; but as the geographical advance upon the Polish territory was by no means in proportion to the advantages claimed, it was plain that Napoleon was as often engaged in parrying as in pushing, in repairing losses as in improving victories. The Russian generals composed plans with skill, and executed them with activity and spirit, for cutting off separate divisions, and disturbing the French communications.

The Russian army had received reinforcements; but they were deficient in numerical amount, and

only made up their strength, at the utmost, to their original computation of 90,000 men. This proved unpardonable negligence in the Russian Government, considering the ease with which men can there be levied to any extent by the mere will of the Emperor, and the vital importance of the war which they were now waging. It is said, however, that the poverty of the Russian Administration was the cause of this failure to recruit their forces; and that the British being applied to, to negotiate a loan of six millions, and advance one million to account, had declined the transaction, and thereby given great offence to the Emperor Alexander.

Napoleon, so much more remote from his own territories, had already, by exertions unparalleled in the history of Europe, assembled two hundred and eighty thousand men between the Vistula and Memel, including the garrison of Dantzic. With such unequal forces the war recommenced.

The Russians were the assailants, making a combined movement on Ney's division, which was stationed at Gutstadt, and in the vicinity. They pursued him as far as Deppen, where there was some fighting; but upon the 8th of June, Napoleon advanced in person to extricate his marshal, and Bennigsen was obliged to retreat in his turn. He was hardly pressed on the rear by the Grand Army of France. But even in this moment of peril, Platow, with his Cossacks, made a charge, or, in their phrase, a hourra, upon the French, with such success, that they not only dispersed the skirmishers of the French vanguard, and the advanced troops destined to support them, but com-

pelled the infantry to form squares, endangered the personal safety of Napoleon, and occupied the attention of the whole French cavalry, who bore down on them at full speed. Musketry and artillery were all turned on them at once, but to little or no purpose; for, having once gained the purpose of checking the advance, which was all they aimed at, the cloud of Cossacks dispersed over the field, like mist before the sun, and united behind the battalions whom their demonstration had protected.

By this means Platow and his followers had got before the retreating division of the Russian army under Bagration, which they were expected to support, and had reached first a bridge over the Aller. The Cossacks were alarmed by the immense display of force demonstrated against them, and showed a disposition to throw themselves confusedly on the bridge, which must certainly have been attended with the most disastrous consequences to the rear-guard, who would thus have been impeded in their retreat by the very troops appointed to support them. The courage and devotion of Platow prevented that great misfortune. He threw himself from his horse. "Let the Cossack that is base enough," he exclaimed, "desert his Hettman!" The children of the wilderness halted around him, and he disposed them in perfect order to protect the retreat of Bagration and the rear-guard, and afterwards achieved his own retreat with trifling loss.[1]

[1] [Sir Robert Wilson's Campaigns in Poland, p. 30.]

The Russian army fell back upon Heilsberg, and there concentrating their forces made a most desperate stand. A very hard-fought action [10th June] here took place. The Russians, overpowered by superior numbers, and forced from the level ground, continued to defend with fury their position on the heights, which the French made equally strenuous efforts to carry by assault. The combat was repeatedly renewed, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery, but without the fiery valour of the assailants making any effectual impression on the iron ranks of the Russians.[1] The battle continued, till the approach of midnight, upon terms of equality; and when the morning dawned, the space of ground between the position of the Russians and that of the French, was not merely strewed, but literally sheeted over, with the bodies of the dead and wounded.[2] The Russians retired unmolested after the battle of Heilsberg, and, crossing the river Aller, placed that barrier betwixt them and the army of Buonaparte, which, though it had suffered great losses, had, in consequence of the superiority of numbers, been less affected by them than the Russian forces. In the condition of Bennigsen's army, it was his obvious policy to protract the war, especially as reinforcements, to the number of thirty thousand men, were approaching

[1] [Seventy-eighth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Jomini, t ii. p. 408; Savary, t. ii. p. 52.]

[2] ["Next day, June 11, the Russians stopped all day in front of Heilsberg: both parties removed their wounded; and we had as many as though we had fought a great battle. The Emperor was very dissatisfied."—Savary, t. ii. p. 53.]

the frontier from the interior of the empire. It was probably with this view that he kept his army on the right bank of the Aller, with the exception of a few bodies of cavalry, for the sake of observation and intelligence.

On the 13th, the Russian army reached Friedland, a considerable town on the west side of the Aller, communicating with the eastern, or right bank of the river, by a long wooden bridge. It was the object of Napoleon to induce the Russian general to pass by this narrow bridge to the left bank, and then to decoy him into a general action, in a position where the difficulty of defiling through the town, and over the bridge, must render retreat almost impossible. For this purpose he showed such a proportion only of his forces, as induced General Bennigsen to believe that the French troops on the western side of the Aller consisted only of Oudinot's division, which had been severely handled in the battle of Heilsberg, and which he now hoped altogether to destroy. Under this deception he ordered a Russian division to pass the bridge, defile through the town, and march to the assault. The French took care to offer no such resistance as should intimate their real strength. Bennigsen was thus led to reinforce this division with another—the battle thickened, and the Russian general at length transported all his army, one division excepted, to the left bank of the Aller, by means of the wooden bridge and three pontoons, and arrayed them in front of the town of Friedland, to overpower, as he supposed, the crippled

division of the French, to which alone he believed himself opposed.[1]

But no sooner had he taken this irretrievable step than the mask was dropped. The French skirmishers advanced in force; heavy columns of infantry began to show themselves; batteries of cannon were got into position; and all circumstances concurred, with the report of prisoners, to assure Bennigsen, that he, with his enfeebled forces, was in presence of the grand French army. His position, a sort of plain, surrounded by woods and broken ground, was difficult to defend; with the town and a large river in his rear, it was dangerous to attempt a retreat, and to advance was prevented by the inequality of his force. Bennigsen now became anxious to maintain his communication with Wehlau, a town on the Pregel, which was the original point of retreat, and where he hoped to join with the Prussians under General L'Estocq. If the enemy should seize the bridge at Allerberg, some miles lower down the Aller than Friedland, this plan would become impossible, and he found himself therefore obliged to diminish his forces, by detaching six thousand men to defend

[1] ["The Emperor ordered me to advance alone, along the wood on our right, to seek a point whence the bridge of Friedland was visible; and after observing whether the Russians were crossing over to our bank or recrossing to the right, I returned to inform him, that the Russians instead of retiring, were all crossing to our bank of the river, and that their masses were sensibly augmenting. 'Well,' said the Emperor, 'I am ready now. I have an hour's advantage of them, and will give them battle since they wish it: this is the anniversary of Marengo, and to-day fortune is with me.'"—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 56.]

that point. With the remainder of his force he resolved to maintain his present position till night.

The French advanced to the attack about ten o'clock. The broken and wooded country which they occupied, enabled them to maintain and renew their efforts at pleasure, while the Russians, in their exposed situation, could not make the slightest movement without being observed. Yet they fought with such obstinate valour, that at noon the French seemed sickening of the contest, and about to retire. But this was only a feint, to repose such of their forces as had been engaged, and to bring up reinforcements. The cannonade continued till about half past four, when Buonaparte brought up his full force in person, for the purpose of one of those desperate and generally irresistible efforts to which he was wont to trust the decision of a doubtful day. Columns of enormous power, and extensive depth, appeared partially visible among the interstices of the wooded country, and seen from the town of Friedland, the hapless Russian army looked as if surrounded by a deep semicircle of glittering steel. The attack upon all the line, with cavalry, infantry, and artillery, was general and simultaneous, the French advancing with shouts of assured victory; while the Russians, weakened by the loss of at least twelve thousand killed and wounded, were obliged to attempt that most dispiriting and dangerous of movements—a retreat through encumbered defiles, in front of a superior enemy. The principal attack was on the left wing, where the Russian position was at length forced. The troops which composed

it streamed into the town, and crowded the bridge and pontoons; the enemy thundered on their rear, and without the valour of Alexander's Imperial Guard, the Russians would have been utterly destroyed. These brave soldiers charged with the bayonet the corps of Ney, who led the French vanguard, disordered his column, and, though they were overpowered by numbers, prevented the total ruin of the left wing.

Mean while, the bridge and pontoons were set on fire, to prevent the French, who had forced their way into the town, from taking possession of them. The smoke rolling over the combatants, increased the horror and confusion of the scene; yet a considerable part of the Russian infantry escaped through a ford close by the town, which was discovered in the moment of defeat. The Russian centre and right, who remained on the west bank of the Aller, effected a retreat by a circuitous route, leaving on the right the town of Friedland, with its burning bridges, no longer practicable for friend or foe, and passing the Aller by a ford considerably farther down the river. This also was found out in the very moment of extremity,—was deep and dangerous, took the infantry up to the breast, and destroyed what ammunition was left in the tumbrils.

Thus were the Russians once more united on the right bank of the Aller, and enabled to prosecute their march towards Wehlau. Amid the calamities of defeat, they had saved all their cannon except seventeen, and preserved their baggage. Indeed, the stubborn character of their defence

seems to have paralysed the energies of the victor, who, after carrying the Russian position, showed little of that activity in improving his success, which usually characterised him upon such occasions. He pushed no troops over the Aller in pursuit of the retreating enemy, but suffered Bennigsen to rally his broken troops without interruption. Neither, when in possession of Friedland, did he detach any force down the left bank, to act upon the flank of the Russian centre and right, and cut them off from the river. In short, the battle of Friedland, according to the expression of a French general, was a battle gained, but a victory lost.[1]

Yet the most important consequences resulted from the action, though the French success had been but partially improved. Konigsberg,[2] which had been so long the refuge of the King of Prussia, was evacuated by his forces, as it became plain his Russian auxiliaries could no longer maintain the war in Poland.[3] Bennigsen retreated to Tilsit, towards the Russian frontiers. But the moral con-

[1] [Seventy-ninth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, t. ii. p. 56; Jomini, t. ii. p. 411.]

[2] [Eightieth Bulletin of the Grand Army.]

[3] [Three days after the battle the unfortunate Queen of Prussia, wrote thus to her father, the elector of Baden:—"By the unfortunate battle of Friedland, Konigsberg fell into the hands of the French. We are closely pressed by the enemy, and if the danger should become in any degree more imminent, I shall be compelled to leave Memel with my children. I shall go to Riga, should the aspect of affairs become more alarming. God will give me the power to survive the moment when I shall cross the borders: all my firmness will then be required, but I look to Heaven for support, from whence comes all good and evil; and it is my firm belief, that no more is imposed upon us than we are able to bear."]

sequences of the defeat were of far greater consequence than could have been either the capture of guns and prisoners, or the acquisition of territory. It had the effect, evidently desired by Napoleon, of disposing the Emperor Alexander to peace. The former could not but feel that he was engaged with a more obstinate enemy in Russia, than any he had yet encountered. After so many bloody battles, he was scarce arrived on the frontiers of an immense empire, boundless in its extent, and almost inexhaustible in resources; while the French, after suffering extremely in defeating an army that was merely auxiliary, could scarce be supposed capable of undertaking a scheme of invasion so gigantic, as that of plunging into the vast regions of Muscovy.

Such an enterprise would have been peculiarly hazardous in the situation in which the French Emperor now stood. The English expedition to the Baltic was daily expected. Gustavus was in Swedish Pomerania, at the head of a considerable army, which had raised the siege of Stralsund. A spirit of resistance was awakening in Prussia, where the resolute conduct of Blucher had admirers and imitators, and the nation seemed to be reviving from the consternation inflicted by the defeat of Jena. The celebrated Schill, a partisan of great courage and address, had gained many advantages, and was not unlikely, in a nation bred to arms, to acquire the command of a numerous body of men. Hesse, Hanover, Brunswick, and the other provinces of Germany, deprived of their ancient princes, and subjected to heavy exactions by the conquerors, were ripe for insurrection. All these

dangers were of a nature from which little could be apprehended, while the Grand Army was at a moderate distance; but were it to advance into Russia, especially were it to meet with a check there, these sparks of fire, left in the rear, might be expected to kindle a dreadful conflagration.

Moved by such considerations, Napoleon had fully kept open the door for reconciliation betwixt the Czar and himself, abstaining from all those personal reflections against him, which he usually showered upon those who thwarted his projects, and intimating more than once, by different modes of communication, that a peace, which should enable Russia and France to divide the world betwixt them, should be placed within Alexander's reach so soon as he was disposed to accept it.

The time was now arrived when the Emperor of Russia was disposed to listen to terms of accommodation with France. He had been for some time dissatisfied with his allies. Against Frederick William, indeed, nothing could be objected, save his bad fortune; but what is it that so soon deprives us of our friends as a constant train of bad luck, rendering us always a burden more than an aid to them? The King of Sweden was a feeble ally at best, and had become so unpopular with his subjects, that his dethronement was anticipated; and it was probably remembered, that the Swedish province of Finland extended so near to St Petersburgh, as to be a desirable acquisition, which, in the course of a treaty with Buonaparte, might be easily attained.

The principal ally of the Czar had been Britain.

But he was displeased, as we have already noticed, with the economy of the English Cabinet, who had declined, in his instance, the loans and subsidies, of which they used to be liberal to allies of far less importance. A subsidy of about eighty thousand pounds, was all which he had been able to extract from them. England had, indeed, sent an army into the north to join the Swedes, in forming the siege of Stralsund; but this was too distant an operation to produce any effect upon the Polish campaign. Alexander was also affected by the extreme sufferings of his subjects. His army had been to him, as to most young sovereigns, a particular object of attention; and he was justly proud of his noble regiments of Guards, which, maltreated as they had been in the desperate actions of which we have given some account, remained scarce the shadow of themselves, in numbers and appearance. His fame, moreover, suffered little in withdrawing from a contest in which he was engaged as an auxiliary only; and Alexander was no doubt made to comprehend, that he might do more in behalf of the King of Prussia, his ally, by negotiation, than by continuation of the war. The influence of Napoleon's name, and the extraordinary splendour of his talents and his exploits, must also have had an effect upon the youthful imagination of the Russian Emperor. He might be allowed to feel pride (high as his own situation was) that the Destined Victor, who had subdued so many princes, was willing to acknowledge an equality in his case; and he might not yet be so much aware of the nature of ambition, as to know that it holds

the world as inadequate to maintain two co-ordinate sovereigns.

The Russian Emperor's wish of an armistice was first hinted at by Bennigsen, on the 21st of June, was ratified on the 23d of the same month, and was soon afterwards followed, not only by peace with Russia and Prussia, on a basis which seemed to preclude the possibility of future misunderstanding, but by the formation of a personal intimacy and friendship between Napoleon and the only sovereign in Europe, who had the power necessary to treat with him on an equal footing.

The negotiation for this important pacification was not conducted in the usual style of diplomacy, but in that which Napoleon had repeatedly shown a desire to substitute for the conferences of inferior agents, by the intervention, namely, of the high-contracting parties in person.

The armistice was no sooner agreed upon, than preparations were made for a personal interview betwixt the two Emperors.[1] It took place upon a

[1] ["I saw in the hands of M. de Talleyrand, who had just arrived at Konigsberg, the letter in which the Emperor directed him to come to Tilsit, and which contained this observation, 'If peace be not concluded in a fortnight, I cross the Niemen.' At the same time, I received orders to prepare the bridge-equipage. I mentioned this circumstance to M. de Talleyrand. 'Do not hurry yourself,' replied he: 'where is the utility of going beyond the Niemen? what are we to find beyond that river? the Emperor must renounce his views respecting Poland: that country is good for nothing: we can only organize disorder there: we have now a favourable opportunity of making an end of this business, and we must not let it escape.' At first I was at a loss to comprehend all this; and it was not until our diplomatist unfolded his projects with respect to *Spain*, that I understood the hints he had thrown out."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 74.]

raft prepared for the purpose, and moored in the midst of the river Niemen, which bore an immense tent or pavilion. At half past nine, 25th June, 1807, the two Emperors, in the midst of thousands of spectators, embarked at the same moment from the opposite banks of the river. Buonaparte was attended by Murat, Berthier, Bessières, Duroc, and Caulaincourt; Alexander, by his brother the Archduke Constantine, Generals Bennigsen and Ouwarrow, with the Count de Lieven, one of his aides-de-camp. Arriving on the raft, they disembarked and embraced, amid the shouts and acclamations of both armies, and entering the pavilion which had been prepared, held a private conference of two hours. Their officers, who remained at a distance during the interview, were then reciprocally introduced, and the fullest good understanding seemed to be established between the sovereigns, who had at their disposal so great a portion of the universe.[1] It is not to be doubted, that on this momentous occasion Napoleon exerted all those personal powers of attraction, which, exercised on the part of one otherwise so distinguished, rarely failed to acquire the good-will of all with whom he had intercourse, when he was disposed to employ them.[2] He possessed also, in

[1] [Eighty-sixth Bulletin of the Grand Army; Savary, t. ii. p. 75; Jomini, t. ii. p. 423.]

[2] The impression which Buonaparte's presence and conversation, aided by the preconceived ideas of his talents, made on all who approached his person, was of the most striking kind. The captain of a British man-of-war, who was present at his occupying the island of Elba, disturbed on that occasion the solemnity and gravity of a levee, at which several British functionaries attend-

an eminent degree, the sort of eloquence which can make the worse appear the better reason, and which, turning into ridicule the arguments derived from general principles of morality or honesty, which he was accustomed to term idiosyncrasy, makes all reasoning rest upon existing circumstances. Thus, all the maxims of truth and honour might be plausibly parried by those arising out of immediate convenience; and the direct interest, or what seemed the direct interest, of the party whom he wished to gain over, was put in immediate opposition to the dictates of moral sentiment, and of princely virtue. In this manner he might plausibly represent, in many points, that the weal of Alexander's empire might require him to strain some of the maxims of truth and justice, and to do a little wrong in order to attain a great national advantage.

The town of Tilsit was now declared neutral. Entertainments of every kind followed each other in close succession, and the French and Russian, nay, even the Prussian officers, seemed so delighted with each other's society, that it was difficult to conceive that men, so courteous and amiable, had been for so many months drenching trampled snows and muddy wastes with each other's blood. The two Emperors were constantly together in public and in private, and on those occasions their intimacy approached to the character of that of two young men of rank, who are comrades in sport or

ed, by bearing a homely, but certainly a striking testimony to his powers of attraction, while he exclaimed, that "Boney was a d—d good fellow, after all!"

frolic, as well as accustomed to be associates in affairs, and upon occasions, of graver moment. They are well known to have had private and confidential meetings, where gaiety and even gallantry seemed to be the sole purpose, but where politics were not entirely forgotten.[1]

Upon the more public occasions, there were guests at the imperial festivities, for which they contained small mirth. On the 28th, the unfortunate King of Prussia arrived at Tilsit, and was presented to his formidable victor. Buonaparte did not admit him to the footing of equality on which he treated the Emperor Alexander, and made an early intimation, that it would only be for the purpose of obliging his brother of the North, that he might consent to relax his grasp on the Prussian territories. Those in the King's own possession were reduced to the petty territory of Memel, with the fortresses of Colberg and Graudentz. It was soon plain, that the terms on which he was to be restored to a part of his dominions, would deprive Prussia of almost all the accessions which had been made since 1773, under the system and by the talents of the Great Frederick, and reduce her at once from a first-rate power in Europe to one of the second class.

The beautiful and unfortunate Queen, whose high spirit had hastened the war, was anxious, if possible, to interfere with such weight as female intercession might use to diminish the calamities of the peace. It was but on the first day of the foregoing April, that when meeting the Emperor

[1] [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 218.]

Alexander at Konigsberg, and feeling the full difference betwixt that interview, and those at Berlin which preceded the war, Alexander and Frederick William had remained locked for a time in each other's arms; the former shedding tears of compassion, the latter of grief. On the same occasion, the Queen, as she saluted the Emperor, could only utter amidst her tears the words, "Dear cousin!" intimating at once the depth of their distress, and their affectionate confidence in the magnanimity of their ally. This scene was melancholy, but that which succeeded it at Tilsit was more so, for it was embittered by degradation. The Queen, who arrived at the place of treaty some days after her husband, was now not only to support the presence of Napoleon, in whose official prints she was personally abused, and who was the author of all the misfortunes which had befallen her country; but if she would in any degree repair these misfortunes, it could only be by exciting his compassion, and propitiating his favour. "Forgive us," she said, "this fatal war—the memory of the Great Frederick deceived us—we thought ourselves his equals because we are his descendants—alas, we have not proved such!" With a zeal for the welfare of Prussia, which must have cost her own feelings exquisite pain, she used towards Napoleon those arts of insinuation, by which women possessed of high rank, great beauty, wit, and grace, frequently exercise an important influence. Desirous to pay his court, Napoleon on one occasion offered her a rose of uncommon beauty. The Queen at first seemed to decline receiving the courtesy—

then accepted it, adding the stipulation—"At least with Magdeburg."[1] Buonaparte, as he boasted to Josephine, was proof against these lady-like artifices, as wax-cloth is against rain. "Your Majesty will be pleased to remember," he said, "that it is I who offer, and that your Majesty has only the task of accepting."[2]

It was discourteous to remind the unfortunate princess how absolutely she was at the mercy of the victor, and unchivalrous to dispute that a lady, accepting a courtesy, has a right to conceive herself, as conferring an obligation, and is therefore entitled to annex a condition. But it is true, on the other hand, as Napoleon himself urged, that it would have been playing the gallant at a high price, if he had exchanged towns and provinces in return for civilities. It is not believed that the Queen of Prussia succeeded to any extent in obtaining a modification of the terms to which her husband was subjected; and it is certain, that she felt so deeply the distress into which her country was plunged, that her sense of it brought her to an untimely grave. The death of this interesting and beautiful Queen,[3]

[1] ["The Queen often called to her recollection that part of English history which states that Mary, the daughter of Henry VIII., after the taking of Calais, which had so long been an appanage to the English crown, and which had often been attempted in vain by the Duke of Guise, during her reign, and its subsequent cession to France,—was accustomed to say, 'That if her heart could be opened, the name of Calais would be found traced there in letters of blood.' The same might be said of the Queen of Prussia in regard to Magdeburg."—MAD. DE BERG.]

[2] [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 213.

[3] [The Queen of Prussia died on the 19th July, 1810. The following letter was written by her a few days after the signing of

not only powerfully affected the mind of her husband and family, but the Prussian nation at large; who, regarding her as having died a victim to her patriotic sorrow for the national misfortunes, recorded her fate as one of the many injuries, for which they were to call France and Napoleon to a severe accompting.

The terms imposed on Prussia by the treaty of Tilsit,[1] were briefly these:—

That portion of Poland acquired by Prussia in the partition of 1772, was disunited from that kingdom, and erected into a separate territory, to be called the Grand Duchy of Warsaw. It was to be held by the King of Saxony, under the character of Grand Duke; and it was stipulated that he was to have direct communication with this new acquisition by means of a military road across Silesia, a privilege likely to occasion constant jealousy betwixt the courts of Berlin and Warsaw. Thus ended the hope of the Poles to be restored to the condition of an independent nation. They merely exchanged the dominion of one German master for another—Prussia for Saxony, Frederick William for Augustus—the only difference being, that the latter was descended from the ancient Kings

the treaty of Tilsit:—"Peace is concluded; but at how painful a price! Our frontiers will not henceforth extend beyond the Elbe: the King, however, after all, has proved himself a greater man than his adversary. He has been compelled by necessity to negotiate with his enemy, but no alliance has taken place between them. This will one day or other bring a blessing upon Prussia. Again I say, the King's just dealing will bring good fortune to Prussia; this is my firm belief."]

[1] [For a copy of the Treaty of Tilsit, see *Annual Register* vol. xlix. p. 720.]

of Poland. They were however, subjected to a milder and more easy yoke than that which they had hitherto borne; nor does it appear that the King (as he had been created) of Saxony derived any real addition of authority and consequence from the grand duchy of Warsaw. It seems indeed probable, that the erection of this sovereignty was the effect of a composition between the Emperors; Napoleon, on the one hand, renouncing all attempts at the liberation of Poland, which he could not have persevered in without continuing the war with Russia, and perhaps with Austria also; and Alexander consenting that Prussia should be deprived of her Polish dominions, under the stipulation that they were to be transferred to Saxony, from whose vicinity his empire could apprehend little danger.

The constitution arranged for the grand duchy, also, was such as was not liable to lead to disturbances among those provinces of Poland which were united with Austria and Russia. Slavery was abolished, and the equality of legal rights among all ranks of citizens was acknowledged The Grand Duke held the executive power. A Senate, or Upper House, of eighteen members, and a Lower House of nuncios, or deputies, amounting to a hundred, passed into laws, or rejected at their pleasure, such propositions as the Duke laid before them. But the Diets, the Pospolite, the *Liberum Veto*, and all the other turbulent privileges of the Polish nobles, continued abolished, as they had been under the Prussian government.

Buonaparte made it his boast that he had returned the Prussian territories not to the House of Brandenburgh, but to Alexander; so that if Frederick William yet reigned, it was only, he said, by the friendship of Alexander,—"a term," he added, "which he himself did not recognise in the vocabulary of sovereigns, under the head of state affairs." Alexander, however, was not altogether so disinterested, as Buonaparte, with something like a sneer, thus seemed to insinuate. There was excepted from the grand duchy of Warsaw, and added to the territory of Russia at the expense of Prussia, the province of Bialystock, serving materially to improve the frontier of the empire. Thus the Czar, in some degree, profited by the distress of his ally. The apology for his conduct must rest, first, on the strength of the temptation to stretch his empire towards the Vistula, as a great natural boundary; secondly, on the plea, that if he had declined the acquisition from a point of delicacy, Saxony, not Prussia, would have profited by his self-denial, as the territory of Bialystock would, in that event, have gone to augment the duchy of Warsaw. Russia ceded the lordship of Jever to Holland, as an ostensible compensation for her new acquisition.[1]

Dantzic, with a certain surrounding territory, was, by the treaty of Tilsit, recognised as a free city, under the protection of Prussia and Saxony.

[1] ["This does not appear to me to be correct: according to the terms of the treaty, this country was ceded personally to me, and my first act was to unite it to Holland. I establish this fact merely for the sake of truth."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 53.]

There can be little doubt, that the further provision, that France should occupy the town until the conclusion of a maritime peace, was intended to secure for the use of Napoleon a place of arms, so important in case of a new breach betwixt him and Russia.

It followed, as a matter of course, that the Emperor Alexander, and the King of Prussia, ratified all the changes which Napoleon had wrought on Europe, acknowledged the thrones which he had erected, and recognised the leagues which he had formed. On the other hand, out of deference to the Emperor, Buonaparte consented that the Dukes of Saxe-Coburg, Oldenburg, and Mecklenburg-Schwerin, German princes connected with Alexander, should remain in possession of their territories; the French, however, continuing to occupy the seaports of the two countries last named, until a final peace betwixt France and England.

While these important negotiations were proceeding, a radical change took place in the councils of the British nation; what was called the Fox and Grenville administration being dissolved, and their place supplied by one formed under the auspices of the Duke of Portland, and comprehending Lords Liverpool, Castlereagh, Mr Canning, and other statesmen, professing the principles of the late William Pitt. It was an anxious object with the new cabinet to reconcile the Czar to the alliance of England, and atone for the neglect with which he considered himself as having been treated by their predecessors. With this purpose, Lord

Leveson Gower[1] was despatched with power to make such offers of conciliation as might maintain or renew an amicable intercourse between Britain and Russia. But the Emperor Alexander had taken his part, at least for the present; and, being predetermined to embrace the course recommended by his new ally Buonaparte, he avoided giving audience to the British ambassador, and took his measures at Tilsit, without listening to the offers of accommodation which Lord Gower was empowered to propose.

By the treaty of Tilsit, so far as made public, Russia offered her mediation betwixt Britain and France, on condition that the first named kingdom should accept the proffer of her interference within a month. So far, therefore, the Czar appeared to a certain extent careful of the interest of his late ally. But it is now perfectly well understood, that among other private articles of this memorable treaty, there existed one by which the Emperor bound himself, in case of Britain's rejecting the proposed mediation, to recognise and enforce what Buonaparte called the Continental System, by shutting his ports against British vessels, and engaging the Northern Courts in a new coalition, having for its object the destruction of English maritime superiority. In a word, the armed Northern Neutrality, originally formed under the auspices of Catherine, and in an evil hour adopted by the unfortunate Paul, was again to be

[1] [Now Earl Granville.]

established under the authority of Alexander. Denmark, smarting under the recollections of the battle of Copenhagen, only waited, it was thought, the signal to join such a coalition, and would willingly consent to lend her still powerful navy to its support; and Sweden was in too weak and distracted a state to resist the united will of France and Russia, either regarding war with Britain, or any other stipulations which it might be intended to impose upon her. But as there is no country of Europe to which the commerce of England is so beneficial as Russia, whose gross produce she purchases almost exclusively, it was necessary to observe strict secrecy upon these further objects. The ostensible proposal of mediation was therefore resorted to, less in the hope, perhaps, of establishing peace betwixt France and England, than in the expectation of affording a pretext, which might justify in the eye of the Russian nation a rupture with the latter power. But in spite of every precaution which could be adopted, the address of the British ambassador obtained possession of the secret which France and Russia deemed it so important to conceal; and Lord Gower was able to transmit to his court an exact account of this secret article, and particularly of the two Emperors having resolved to employ the Danish fleet in the destruction of the maritime rights of Britain, which had been so lately put upon a footing, that, to Alexander at least, had, till his recent fraternization with Buonaparte, seemed entirely satisfactory.

There were, no doubt, other secret articles named in the treaty of Tilsit, by which it seems to

have been the object of these two great Emperors, as they loved to term themselves, of the North and of the South, to divide the civilized world between them.[1] It may be regarded as certain, that Buonaparte opened to Alexander the course of unprincipled policy which he intended to pursue respecting the kingdom of Spain, and procured his acquiescence in that daring usurpation. And it has been affirmed, that he also stipulated for the aid of Russia to take Gibraltar, to recover Malta and Egypt, and to banish the British flag from the Mediterranean. All these enterprises were more or less directly calculated to the depression, or rather the destruction of Great Britain, the only formidable enemy who still maintained the strife against France, and so far the promised cooperation of Russia must have been in the highest degree grateful to Napoleon. But Alexander, however much he might be Buonaparte's personal admirer, did not follow his father's simplicity in becoming his absolute dupe, but took care, in return for his compliance with the distant, and in some degree visionary projects of Buonaparte's ambition, to exact his countenance and cooperation in gaining certain acquisitions of the highest importance to Russia, and which were found at a future period to have added powerfully to her means of defence, when she once more matched her strength with

[1] ["In the secret treaty, Alexander and Napoleon shared between them the continental world: all the south was abandoned to Napoleon, already master of Italy and arbiter of Germany, pushing his advanced post as far as the Vistula, and making Dantzic one of the most formidable arsenals."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 310.]

that of France. To explain this, we must look back to the ancient policy of France and of Europe, when, by supporting the weaker states, and maintaining their dependence, it was the object to prevent the growth of any gigantic and over-bearing power, who might derange the balance of the civilized world.

The growing strength of Russia used in former times to be the natural subject of jealousy to the French Government, and they endeavoured to counterbalance these apprehensions by extending the protection of France to the two weaker neighbours of Russia, the Porte and the kingdom of Sweden, with which powers it had always been the policy of France to connect herself, and which connexion was not only honourable to that kingdom, but useful to Europe. But, at the treaty of Tilsit, and in Buonaparte's subsequent conduct relating to these powers, he lost sight of this national policy, or rather sacrificed it to his own personal objects.

One of the most important private articles of the treaty of Tilsit seems to have provided, that Sweden should be despoiled of her provinces of Finland in favour of the Czar, and be thus, with the consent of Buonaparte, deprived of all effectual means of annoying Russia. A single glance at the map will show, how completely the possession of Finland put a Swedish army, or the army of France as an ally of Sweden, within a short march of St Petersburgh; and how, by consenting to Sweden's being stripped of that important province, Napoleon relinquished the grand advantage to be derived from it, in case of his ever being again obliged to

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contend with Russia upon Russian ground. Yet there can be no doubt, that at the treaty of Tilsit he became privy to the war which Russia shortly after waged against Sweden, in which Alexander deprived that ancient kingdom of her frontier province of Finland, and thereby obtained a covering territory of the last and most important consequence to his own capital.

The Porte was no less made a sacrifice to the inordinate anxiety, which, at the treaty of Tilsit, Buonaparte seems to have entertained, for acquiring at any price the accession of Russia to his extravagant desire of destroying England. By the public treaty, indeed, some care seems to have been taken of the interests of Turkey, since it provides that Turkey was to have the benefit of peace under the mediation of France, and that Russia was to evacuate Moldavia and Wallachia, for the acquisition of which she was then waging an unprovoked war. But by the secret agreement of the two Emperors, it was unquestionably understood, that Turkey in Europe was to be placed at the mercy of Alexander, as forming naturally a part of the Russian Empire, as Spain, Portugal, and perhaps Great Britain, were, from local position, destined to become provinces of France. At the subsequent Congress betwixt the Emperors at Erfurt, their measures against the Porte were more fully adjusted.

It may seem strange, that the shrewd and jealous Napoleon should have suffered himself to be so much over-reached in his treaty with Alexander, since the benefits stipulated for France, in the

treaty of Tilsit, were in a great measure vague, and subjects of hope rather than certainty. The British naval force was not easily to be subdued—Gibraltar and Malta are as strong fortresses as the world can exhibit—the conquest of Spain was at least a doubtful undertaking, if the last war of the Succession was carefully considered. But the Russian objects were nearer, and were within her grasp. Finland was seized on with little difficulty, nor did the conquest even of Constantinople possess any thing very difficult to a Russian army, if unopposed save by the undisciplined forces of the Turkish empire. Thus it is evident, that Napoleon exchanged, for distant and contingent prospects, his acquiescence in the Russian objects, which were near, essential, and, in comparison, of easy attainment. The effect of this policy we shall afterwards advert to. Mean while, the two most ancient allies of France, and who were of the greatest political importance to her in case of a second war with Russia, were most unwisely abandoned to the mercy of that power, who failed not to despoil Sweden of Finland, and, but for intervening causes, would probably have seized upon Constantinople with the same ease.

If the reader should wonder how Buonaparte, able and astucious as he was, came to be overreached in the treaty of Tilsit, we believe the secret may be found in a piece of private history. Even at that early period Napoleon nourished the idea of fixing, as he supposed, the fate of his own family, or dynasty, by connecting it by marriage with the blood of one of the established monarchies of Eu-

rope. He had hopes, even then, that he might obtain the hand of one of the Archduchesses of Russia, nor did the Emperor throw any obstacle in the way of the scheme. It is well known that his suit was afterwards disappointed by the Empress Mother, who pleaded the difference of religion; but at the time of the treaty of Tilsit, Napoleon was actually encouraged, or deceived himself into an idea that he received encouragement, to form a perpetual family connexion with Russia.[1] This induced him to deal easily with Alexander in the matters which they had to discuss together, and to act the generous, almost the prodigal friend. And this also seems to have been the reason why Napoleon frequently complained of Alexander's insincerity, and often termed him *The Greek*, according to the Italian sense of the name, which signifies a trickster or deceiver.

But we must return from the secret articles of the Tilsit treaty, which opened such long vistas in futurity, to the indisputable and direct consequences of that remarkable measure.

The treaty betwixt Russia and France was signed upon the 7th—that betwixt France and Prussia on the 9th July.[2] Frederick William published

[1] ["It was perhaps a misfortune to me that I had not married a sister of the Emperor Alexander, as proposed to me by Alexander himself at Erfurth. But there were inconveniences in that union arising from her religion. I did not like to allow a Russian priest to be the confessor of my wife, as I considered that he would have been a spy in the Tuileries for Alexander."—NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c., vol. ii. p. 150.]

[2] [See the treaty between Prussia and France, Annual Register, vol. xlix. p. 714.]

upon the 24th of the same month one of the most dignified, and at the same time the most affecting proclamations, that ever expressed the grief of an unfortunate sovereign.

"Dear inhabitants of faithful provinces, districts, and towns," said this most interesting document, "my arms have been unfortunate. The efforts of the relics of my army have been of no avail. Driven to the extreme boundaries of my empire, and having seen my powerful ally conclude an armistice, and sign a peace, no choice remained for me save to follow his example. That peace was necessarily purchased upon terms corresponding to imperious circumstances. It has imposed on me, and on my house—it has imposed upon the whole country, the most painful sacrifices. The bonds of treaties, the reciprocalities of love and duty, the work of ages, have been broken asunder. My efforts have proved in vain. Fate ordains it, and a father parts from his children. I release you completely from your allegiance to myself and to my house. My most ardent prayers for your welfare will always attend you in your relations to your new sovereign. Be to him what you have ever been to me. Neither force nor fate shall ever efface the remembrance of you from my heart."

To trace the triumphant return of the victor is a singular contrast to those melancholy effusions of the vanquished monarch. The treaty of Tilsit had ended all appearance of opposition to France upon the Continent. The British armament, which had been sent to Pomerania too late in the campaign, was re-embarked, and the King of Sweden,

evacuating Stralsund, retired to the dominions which he was not very long destined to call his own. After having remained together for twenty days, during which they daily maintained the most friendly intercourse, and held together long and secret conferences, the two Emperors at last separated, with demonstrations of the highest personal esteem, and each heaping upon the other all the honours which it was in his power to bestow. The congress broke up on the 9th July; and on his return to France, Napoleon visited Saxony, and was there met at Bautzen (doomed for a very different reason to be renowned in his history) by King Augustus, who received him with the honours due to one who had, in outward appearance at least, augmented the power which he might have overthrown.

On 29th July, Napoleon, restored to his palace at St Cloud, received the homage of the Senate, and other official and constitutional bodies. The celebrated naturalist Lacepède, as the organ of the former body, made a pompous enumeration of the miracles of the campaign; and avowed, that the accomplishment of such wonderful actions as would seemingly have required ages, was but to Napoleon the work of a few months; while at the same time his ruling genius gave motion to all the domestic administration of his vast empire, and, although four hundred leagues distant from the capital, was present with and observant of the most complicated as well as extensive details. "We cannot," concludes the orator, "offer to your Majesty praises worthy of you. Your glory is too much

raised above us. It will be the task of posterity, removed at a distance from your presence, to estimate with greater truth its real degree of elevation. Enjoy, sire, the recompense the most worthy of the greatest of monarchs, the happiness of being beloved by the greatest of nations, and may our great-grandchildren be long happy under your Majesty's reign."

So spoke the President of the French Senate; and who, that wished to retain the name of a rational being, dared have said, that, within the period of seven years, the same Senate would be carrying to the downfallen and dejected King of Prussia their congratulations on his share in the overthrow of the very man, whom they were now adoring as a demigod!

The fortunes and fame of Napoleon were, indeed, such as to excite in the highest degree the veneration with which men look upon talents and success. All opposition seemed to sink before him, and Fortune appeared only to have looked doubtfully upon him during a part of the last campaign, in order to render still brighter the auspicious aspect under which she closed it. Many of his most confirmed enemies, who, from their proved attachment to the House of Bourbon, had secretly disowned the authority of Buonaparte, and doubted the continuance of his success, when they saw Prussia lying at his feet, and Russia clasping his hand in friendship, conceived they should be struggling against the decrees of Providence, did they longer continue to resist their predestined master. Austerlitz had shaken their constancy;

Tilsit destroyed it: and with few and silent exceptions, the vows, hopes, and wishes of France, seemed turned on Napoleon as her Heir by Destiny Perhaps he himself, only, could finally have disappointed their expectations. But he was like the adventurous climber on the Alps, to whom the surmounting the most tremendous precipices, and ascending to the most towering peaks only shows yet dizzier heights and higher points of elevation.

CHAPTER XXXVII.

British Expedition to Calabria, under Sir John Stuart.—Character of the People.—Opposed by General Reynier.—Battle of Maida, 4th July, 1806.—Defeat of the French.—Calabria evacuated by the British.—Erroneous Commercial Views, and Military Plans, of the British Ministry.—Unsuccessful Attack on Buenos Ayres.—General Whitelocke—is cashiered.—Expedition against Turkey, and its Dependencies.—Admiral Duckworth's Squadron sent against Constantinople.—Passes and repasses the Dardanelles, without accomplishing any thing.—Expedition against Alexandria.—Rosetta attacked.—British troops defeated—and withdrawn from Egypt, September, 1807.—Curaçoa and Cape of Good Hope taken by England.—British Expedition against Copenhagen—its Citadel, Forts, and Fleet, surrendered to the British.—Effects of this proceeding upon France—and Russia.—Coalition of France, Russia, Austria, and Prussia, against British Commerce.

THE treaty of Tilsit is an important point in the history of Napoleon. At no time did his power seem more steadfastly rooted, more feebly assailed The canker-worm by which it was ultimately to be destroyed, was, like that of the forest-tree, intrenched and hidden in the bosom of him whom it was destined to sap and consume. It is a fitting time, therefore, to take a general survey of the

internal character of his government, when the arrangements seemed to be at his own choice, and ere misfortune, hitherto a stranger, dictated his course of proceeding, which had before experienced no control save his own will. We propose, therefore, in the next chapter, to take a brief review of the character of Buonaparte's government during this the most flourishing period of his power.

But, ere doing so, we must shortly notice some circumstances, civil and military, which, though they had but slight immediate effect upon the general current of events, yet serve to illustrate the character of the parties concerned, and to explain future incidents which were followed by more important consequences. These we have hitherto omitted, in order to present, in a continuous and uninterrupted form, the history of the momentous warfare, in the course of which Prussia was for the time subjugated, and Russia so far tamed by the eventful struggle, as to be willing to embrace the relation of an ally to the conqueror, whose course she had proposed to stem and to repel.

Among these comparatively minor incidents, must be reckoned the attempt made by the British Government to rescue the Calabrian dominions of the Neapolitan Bourbons from the intrusive government of Joseph Buonaparte. The character of the inhabitants of that mountainous country is well known. Bigots in their religion, and detesting a foreign yoke, as is usual with natives of a wild and almost lawless region; sudden in their passions, and readily having recourse to the sword, in revenge whether of public or private injury; enticed also

by the prospect of occasional booty, and retaining a wild species of attachment to Ferdinand, whose manners and habits were popular with the Italians, and especially with those of the inferior order, the Calabrians were readily excited to take arms by the agents sent over to practise among them by the Sicilian court. Lawless at the time, cruel in their mode of conducting war, and incapable of being subjected to discipline, the bands which they formed amongst themselves, acted rather in the manner, and upon the motives of banditti, than of patriots. They occasionally, and individually, showed much courage, and even a sort of instinctive skill, which taught them how to choose their ambushes, defend their passes, and thus maintain a sort of predatory war, in which the French sustained considerable losses. Yet if their efforts remained unassisted by some regular force, it was evident that these insurrectionary troops must be destroyed in detail by the disciplined and calculated exertions of the French soldiers. To prevent this, and to gratify, at the same time, the anxious wishes of the Court of Palermo, Sir John Stuart, who commanded the British troops which had been sent to defend Sicily, undertook an expedition to the neighbouring shore of Italy, and disembarked in the Gulf of St Euphemia, near the frontier of Lower Calabria, in the beginning of July, 1806, with some thing short of five thousand men.

The disembarkation was scarcely made, ere the British commander learned that General Reynier, who commanded for Joseph Buonaparte in Calabria, had assembled a force nearly equal to his own,

and had advanced to Maida, a town about ten miles distant from St Euphemia, with the purpose of giving him battle. Sir John Stuart lost no time in moving to meet him, and Reynier, confident in the numbers of his cavalry, the quality of his troops, and his own skill in tactics, abandoned a strong position on the further bank of the river Amata, and on the 4th July came down to meet the British in the open plain. Of all Buonaparte's generals, an Englishman would have desired, in especial, to be opposed to this leader, who had published a book on the evacuation of Egypt,[1] in which he denied every claim on the part of the British to skill or courage, and imputed the loss of the province exclusively to the incapacity of Menou, under whom Reynier, the author, had served as second in command. He was now to try his own fate with the enemy, for whom he had expressed so much contempt.

At nine in the morning, the two lines were opposite to each other, when the British light infantry brigade, forming the right of the advanced line, and the 1ere Légère on the French left, a favourite regiment, found themselves confronted. As if by mutual consent, when at the distance of about one hundred yards, the opposed corps threw in two or three close fires reciprocally, and then rushed on to charge each other with the bayonet. The British commanding officer, perceiving that his men were embarrassed by the blankets which they carried at their backs, halted the line that they

[1] ["De l'Egypte après la Bataille d'Héliopolis."]

might throw them down. The French saw the pause, and taking it for the hesitation of fear, advanced with a quickened pace and loud acclamations. An officer, our informer, seeing their veteran appearance, moustached countenances, and regularity of order, could not forbear a feeling of anxiety as he glanced his eye along the British line, which consisted in a great measure of young and beardless recruits. But disembarrassed of their load, and receiving the order to advance, they cheered, and in their turn hastened towards the enemy with a rapid pace and levelled bayonets. The French officers were now seen encouraging their men, whose courage began to falter when they found they were to be the assailed party, not the assailants. Their line halted; they could not be brought to advance by the utmost efforts of their officers, and when the British were within bayonet's length, they broke and ran; but too late for safety, for they were subjected to the most dreadful slaughter. An attempt made by Reynier to redeem the day with his cavalry, was totally unsuccessful.[1] He was beaten on all points, and in such a manner as left it indisputable, that the British soldier, man to man, has a superiority over his enemy, similar to that which the British seaman possesses upon his peculiar element.[2]

[1] [For Sir John Stuart's detail of the memorable battle of Maida, see *Annual Register*, vol. xlviii. p. 590; see also Jomini, t. ii. p. 238.]

[2] ["The French soldiers had a great contempt for the English troops at the beginning of the war, caused, perhaps, by the failure of the expeditions under the Duke of York, the great want of alertness in the English advanced posts, and the misfortunes

It would be in vain to enquire whether this superiority, which we do not hesitate to say has been made manifest, with very few exceptions, wherever the British have met foreign troops upon equal terms, arises from a stronger conformation of body, or a more determined turn of mind; but it seems certain that the British soldier, inferior to the Frenchman in general intelligence, and in individual acquaintance with the trade of war, has a decided advantage in the bloody shock of actual conflict, and especially when maintained by the bayonet, body to body. It is remarkable also, that the charm is not peculiar to any one of the three united nations, but is common to the natives of all, different as they are in habits and education. The Guards, supplied by the city of London, may be contrasted with a regiment of Irish recruited among their rich meadows, or a body of Scotch from their native wildernesses; and while it may be difficult to assign the palm to either over the other two, all are found to exhibit that species of dogged and desperate courage, which, without staying to measure force or calculate chances, rushes on the enemy as the bull-dog upon the bear. This great moral encouragement was the chief advantage derived

which befell your armies. In this they were fools, as the English were well known to be a brave nation. It was probably by a similar error that Reynier was beaten by General Stuart; as the French imagined you would run away and be driven into the sea. Reynier was a man of talent, but more fit to give counsel to an army of twenty or thirty thousand men, than to command one of five or six. It is difficult to conceive how little the French soldiers thought of yours, until they were taught the contrary." —NAPOLEON, *Voice*, &c. vol. ii. p. 47.]

from the battle of Maida; for such was the tumultuous, sanguinary, and unmanageable character of the Calabrian insurgents, that it was judged impossible to continue the war with such assistants. The *malaria* was also found to affect the British troops; and Sir John Stuart, re-embarking his little army, returned to Sicily, and the efforts of the British were confined to the preservation of that island. But the battle of Maida was valuable as a corollary to that of Alexandria. We have not learned whether General Reynier ever thought it equally worthy of a commentary.[1]

The eyes of the best-informed men in Britain were now open to the disadvantageous and timid policy, of conducting this momentous war by petty expeditions and experimental armaments, too inadequate to the service to be productive of any thing but disappointment. The paltry idea of making war for British objects, as it was called, that is, withholding from the general cause those efforts which might have saved our allies, and going in search of some petty object in which Britain might see an individual interest, was now universally acknowledged; although it became more difficult than ever to select points of attack where our limited means might command success. It was also pretty distinctly seen, that the plan of opening a market for British manufactures, by

[1] [Reynier died at Paris in 1814, at the age of forty-four Besides his work on Egypt, he published "Conjectures sur les anciens habitans de l'Egypte," and "Sur les Sphinx qui accompagnent les Pyramides."]

conquering distant and unhealthy provinces, was as idle as immoral. In the latter quality, it some what resembled the proceedings of the surgeon mentioned in Le Sage's satirical novel, who converted passengers into patients by a stroke of his poniard, and then hastened, in his medical capacity, to cure the wounds he had inflicted. In point of profit, we had frequently to regret, that the colonists whom we proposed to convert by force of arms into customers for British goods, were too rude to want, and too poor to pay for them. Nothing deceives itself so willingly as the love of gain. Our principal merchants and manufacturers, among other commercial visions, had imagined to themselves an unlimited market for British commodities, in the immense plains surrounding Buenos Ayres, which are, in fact, peopled by a sort of Christian savages called Gauchos, whose principal furniture is the skulls of dead horses, whose only food is raw beef and water, whose sole employment is to catch wild cattle, by hampering them with a Gaucho's noose, and whose chief amusement is to ride wild horses to death.[1] Unfortunately, they were found to prefer their national independence to cottons and muslins.

Two several attempts were made on this miserable country, and neither redounded to the honour or advantage of the British nation. Buenos Ayres was taken possession of by a handful of British

[1] [See the very extraordinary account of the Pampas, published by Captain Head of the Engineers.]

troops on the 27th June, 1806, who were attacked by the inhabitants and by a few Spanish troops; and, surrounded in the market place of the town, under a general and galling fire, were compelled to lay down their arms and surrender prisoners of war. A small remnant of the invading forces retained possession of a town on the coast, called Maldonado. In October, 1806, an expedition was sent out to reinforce this small body, and make some more material impression upon the continent of South America, which the nation were under the delusion of considering as a measure extremely to the advantage of British trade. Monte Video was taken, and a large body of troops, under command of General Whitelocke, a man of factitious reputation, and who had risen high in the army without having seen much service, marched against Buenos Ayres. This person proved both fool and coward. He pushed his columns of attack into the streets of Buenos Ayres, knowing that the flat roofs and terraces were manned by excellent though irregular marksmen; and, that the British might have no means of retaliation, they were not permitted to load their muskets,—as if stone walls could have been carried by the bayonet. One of the columns was obliged to surrender; and although another had, in spite of desperate opposition, possessed themselves of a strong position, and that a few shells might have probably ended the sort of defence which had been maintained, Whitelocke thought it best to conclude a treaty with the enemy for recovery of the British prisoners, and so to renounce all further attempts on the colony. For

this misconduct he was cashiered by the sentence of a court-martial.[1]

An expedition against Turkey and its dependencies, was as little creditable to the councils of Britain, and eventually to her arms, as were her attempts on South America. It arose out of a war betwixt England and the Porte, her late ally against France; for, so singular had been the turns of chance in this extraordinary conflict, that allies became enemies, and enemies returned to a state of close alliance, almost before war or peace could be proclaimed between them. The time was long past when the Sublime Ottoman Porte could regard the quarrels and wars of Christian powers with the contemptuous indifference with which men look on the strife of the meanest and most unclean animals.[2] She was now in such close contact with them, as to feel a thrilling interest in their various revolutions.

The invasion of Egypt excited the Porte against France, and disposed them to a close alliance with Russia and England, until Buonaparte's assumption of the Imperial dignity; on which occasion the Turks, overawed by the pitch of power to which he had ascended, sent an embassy to congratulate his succession, and expressed a desire to cultivate his friendship.

[1] [See Annual Register, vol. xlix. p. 223.]

[2] [In the time of Louis XIV., when the French envoy at the court of Constantinople came, in a great hurry, to intimate as important intelligence, some victory of his master over the Prussians, "Can you suppose it of consequence to his Serene Highness," said the Grand Vizier, with infinite contempt, "whether the dog bites the hog, or the hog bites the dog?"]

Napoleon, whose eyes were sometimes almost involuntarily turned to the East, and who besides desired, at that period, to break off the good understanding betwixt the Porte and the cabinet of St Petersburgh, despatched Sebastiani as his envoy to Constantinople; a man well known for his skill in Oriental intrigues, as was displayed in the celebrated Report which had so much influence in breaking through the peace of Amiens.

The effect of this ambassador's promises, threats, and intrigues, was soon apparent. The Turks had come under an engagement that they would not change the Hospodars, or governors, of Moldavia and Wallachia. Sebastiani easily alarmed Turkish pride on the subject of this stipulation, and induced them to break through it. The two Hospodars were removed, in defiance of the agreement made to the contrary; and although the Turks became aware of the risk to which they had exposed themselves, and offered to replace the governors whom they had dismissed, Russia, with precipitate resentment, declared war, and invaded the two provinces in question. They overran and occupied them, but to their own cost; as an army of fifty thousand men thus rashly engaged against the Turks, might have been of the last consequence in the fields of Eylau, Heilsberg, or Friedland.

In the mean while, Great Britain sent a squadron, under Sir Thomas Duckworth, to compel the Porte to dismiss the French ambassador, and return to the line of politics which Sebastiani had induced them to abandon. Admiral Duckworth passed the Dardanelles in spite of the immense cannon by

which they are guarded, and which hurled from their enormous muzzles massive fragments of marble instead of ordinary bullets. But if ever it was intended to act against the Turks by any other means than intimidation, the opportunity was suffered to escape; and an intercourse by message and billet was permitted to continue until the Turks had completed a line of formidable fortifications, while the state of the weather was too unfavourable to allow even an effort at the destruction of Constantinople, which had been the alternative submitted to the Turks by the English admiral. The English repassed the Dardanelles in no very creditable manner, hated for the threats which they had uttered, and despised for not having attempted to make their menaces good.[1]

Neither was a subsequent expedition to Alexandria more favourable in its results. Five thousand men, under General Fraser, were disembarked, and occupied the town with much ease. But a division, despatched against Rosetta, was the cause of renewing in a different part of the world the calamity of Buenos Ayres. The detachment was, incautiously and unskilfully on our part, decoyed into the streets of an Oriental town, where the enemy, who had manned the terraces and the flat roofs of their houses, slaughtered the assailants with much ease and little danger to themselves. Some subsequent ill-combined attempts were made for reducing the same place, and after sustaining a

[1] [See "Particulars from Sir J. Duckworth to Lord Collingwood, relative to the Affairs of the Dardanelles," Annual Register, vol. xlix. p. 659.]

loss of more than a fifth of their number, by climate and combat, the British troops were withdrawn from Egypt on the 23d of September, 1807.

It was no great comfort, under these repeated failures, that the British were able to secure the Dutch island of Curaçoa. But the capture of the Cape of Good Hope was an object of deep importance; and the more so, as it was taken at a small expense of lives. Its consequence to our Indian trade is so great, that we may well hope it will be at no future time given up to the enemy. Upon the whole, the general policy of England was, at this period, of an irresolute and ill-combined character. Her ministers showed a great desire to do something, but as great a doubt what that something was to be. Thus, they either mistook the importance of the objects which they aimed at, or, undertaking them without a sufficient force, failed to carry them into execution. If the wealth and means, more especially the brave troops, frittered away in the attempts at Calabria, Buenos Ayres, Alexandria, and elsewhere, had been united with the forces sent to Stralsund, and thrown into the rear of the French army before the fatal battle of Friedland, Europe might, in all probability, have escaped that severe, and, for a time, decisive blow.

The evil of this error, which had pervaded our continental efforts from the beginning of the original war with France down to the period of which we are treating, began now to be felt from experience. Britain gained nothing whatever by her partial efforts, not even settlements or sugar-islands. The enemy maintained against her revenues and

commerce a constant and never-ceasing war—her resistance was equally stubborn, and it was evident that the strife on both sides was to be mortal. Ministers were, therefore, called upon for bolder risks, the nation for greater sacrifices, than had yet been demanded; and it became evident to every one, that England's hope of safety lay in her own exertions, not for petty or selfish objects, but such as might have a decided influence on the general events of the war. The urgent pressure of the moment was felt by the new Administration, whose principles being in favour of the continuance of the war, their efforts to conduct it with energy began now to be manifest.

The first symptoms of this change of measures were exhibited in the celebrated expedition to Copenhagen, which manifested an energy and determination not of late visible in the military operations of Britain on the continent. It can hardly be made matter of serious doubt, that one grand object by which Buonaparte meant to enforce the continental system, and thus reduce the power of England without battle or invasion, was the re-establishment of the great alliance of the Northern Powers, for the destruction of Britain's maritime superiority. This had been threatened towards the conclusion of the American war, and had been again acted upon in 1801, when the unnatural compact was dissolved by the cannon of Nelson, and the death of the Emperor Paul. The treaty of Tilsit, according to the information which the British ambassador had procured, certainly contained an article to this purpose, and ministers received from other quarters

the most positive information of what was intended. Indeed, the Emperor Alexander had shown, by many indications, that in the new friendship which he had formed with the Emperor of the East, he was to embrace his resentment, and further his plans, against England. The unfortunate Gustavus of Sweden could scarcely be expected voluntarily to embrace the proposed northern alliance, and his ruin was probably resolved upon. But the accession of Denmark was of the utmost consequence. That country still possessed a fleet, and the local situation of the island of Zealand gave her the key of the Baltic. Her confessed weakness could not have permitted her for an instant to resist the joint influence of Russia and France, even if her angry recollection of the destruction of her fleet by Nelson, had not induced her inclinations to lean in that direction. It was evident that Denmark would only be permitted to retain her neutrality, till it suited the purposes of the more powerful parties to compel her to throw it off. In this case, and finding the French troops approaching Holstein, Jutland, and Fiume, the British Government, acting on the information which they had received of the purpose of their enemies, conceived themselves entitled to require from Denmark a pledge as to the line of conduct which she proposed to adopt on the approach of hostilities, and some rational security that such a pledge, when given, should be redeemed..

A formidable expedition was now fitted out, humanely, as well as politically, calculated on a scale of such magnitude, as, it might be expected,

would render impossible the resistance which the Danes, as a high-spirited people, might offer to such a harsh species of expostulation. Twenty-seven sail of the line, and twenty thousand men, under the command of Lord Cathcart, were sent to the Baltic, to support a negotiation with Denmark, which it was still hoped might terminate without hostilities. The fleet was conducted with great abillty through the intricate passages called the Belts, and was disposed in such a manner, that ninety pendants flying round Zealand, entirely blockaded the shores of that island.

Under these auspices the negotiation was commenced. The British envoy, Mr Jackson, had the delicate task of stating to the Crown Prince in person, the expectation of England that his royal highness should explain unequivocally his sentiments, and declare the part which he meant to take between her and France. The unpleasant condition was annexed, that, to secure any protestation which might be made of friendship or neutrality, it was required that the fleet and naval stores of the Danes should be delivered into the hands of Great Britain, not in right of property, but to be restored so soon as the state of affairs, which induced her to require possession of them, should be altered for more peaceful times. The closest alliance, and every species of protection which Britain could afford, was proffered, to obtain compliance with these proposals. Finally, the Crown Prince was given to understand, that so great a force was sent in order to afford him an apology to France, should he choose to urge it, as having been compelled to

submit to the English demands; but at the same time it was intimated, that the forces would be actually employed to compel the demands, if they should be refused.

In the ordinary intercourse betwixt nations, these requisitions, on the part of Britain, would have been, with respect to Denmark, severe and unjustifiable. The apology arose out of the peculiar circumstances of the times. The condition of England was that of an individual, who, threatened by the approach of a superior force of mortal enemies, sees close beside him, and with arms in his hand, one, of whom he had a right to be suspicious, as having cooperated against him on two former occasions, and who, he has the best reason to believe, is at the very moment engaged in a similar alliance to his prejudice. The individual, in the case supposed, would certainly be warranted in requiring to know this third party's intention, nay, in disarming him, if he had strength to do so, and retaining his weapons, as the best pledge of his neutrality.

However this reasoning may be admitted to justify the British demands, we cannot wonder that it failed to enforce compliance on the part of the Crown Prince. There was something disgraceful in delivering up the fleet of the nation under a menace that violence would otherwise be employed; and although, for the sake of his people and his capital, he ought, in prudence, to have forborne an ineffectual resistance, yet it was impossible to blame a high-minded and honourable man for making the best defence in his power.

So soon as the object of the Danes was found to

be delay and evasion, while they made a hasty preparation for defence, the soldiers were disembarked, batteries erected, and a bombardment commenced, which occasioned a dreadful conflagration. Some forces which had been collected in the interior of the island, were dispersed by the troops under Sir Arthur Wellesley, a name already famous in India, but now for the first time heard in European warfare. The unavailing defence was at last discontinued, and upon the 8th September the citadel and forts of Copenhagen were surrendered to the British general. The Danish ships were fitted out for sea with all possible despatch, together with the naval stores, to a very large amount; which, had they fallen into the hands of the French, must have afforded them considerable facility in fitting out a fleet.[1]

As the nature and character of the attack upon Copenhagen were attended by circumstances which were very capable of being misrepresented, France —who, through the whole war, had herself shown the most total disregard for the rights of neutral nations, with her leader Napoleon, the invader of Egypt, when in profound peace with the Porte; of Hanover, when in amity with the German empire; and who was at this very moment meditating the appropriation of Spain and Portugal—France was filled with extreme horror at the violence practised on the Danish capital. Russia was also offended, and to a degree which showed that a

[1] [See "Papers relating to the Expedition to Copenhagen," Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 221; and "Proceedings before Copenhagen," Annual Register, vol. xlix. p. 681.]

feeling of disappointed schemes mingled with her affectation of zeal for the rights of neutrality.[1] But the daring and energetic spirit with which England had formed and accomplished her plan, struck a wholesome terror into other nations, and showed neutrals, that if, while assuming that character, they lent their secret countenance to the enemies of Great Britain, they were not to expect that it was to be done with impunity. This was, indeed, no small hardship upon the lesser powers, many of whom would, no doubt, have been well contented to have observed a strict neutrality, but for the threats and influence of France, against whom they had no means of defence; but the furious conflict of such two nations as France and England, is like the struggle of giants, in which the smaller and more feeble, who have the misfortune to be in the neighbourhood, are sure to be borne down and trodden upon by one or both parties.

The extreme resentment expressed by Buonaparte, when he received intelligence of this critical and decisive measure, might serve to argue the depth of his disappointment at such an unexpected anticipation of his purposes. He had only left to him the comfort of railing against Britain in the *Moniteur;* and the breach of peace, and of the law of nations, was gravely imputed to England as an inexpiable crime by one, who never suffered his regard either for his own word, or the general good

[1] ["Russia felt severely the loss which Denmark had sustained. The Danish fleet was a good third of the guarantee of the neutrality of the Baltic."—SAVARY, t. ii. p. 112.]

faith observed amongst nations, to interfere with any wish or interest he had ever entertained.[1]

The conduct of Russia was more singular. An English officer of literary celebrity was employed by Alexander, or those who were supposed to share his most secret counsels, to convey to the British Ministry the Emperor's expressions of the secret satisfaction which his Imperial Majesty felt at the skill and dexterity which Britain had displayed in anticipating and preventing the purposes of France, by her attack upon Copenhagen.[2] Her ministers were invited to communicate freely with the Czar, as with a prince, who, though obliged to give way to circumstances, was, nevertheless, as much attached as ever to the cause of European independence. Thus invited, the British Cabinet entered into an explanation of their views for establishing a counterbalance to the exorbitant power of France, by a northern confederacy of an offensive and defensive character. It was supposed that Sweden would enter with pleasure into such an alliance, and that Denmark would not decline it if encouraged by the example of Russia, who was proposed as the head and soul of the coalition.

[1] ["The attack upon Copenhagen by the English was the first blow given to the secret stipulations of Tilsit, in virtue of which the navy of Denmark was to be placed at the disposal of France. Since the catastrophe of Paul the First, I never saw Napoleon abandon himself to more violent transports. What most struck him in this vigorous enterprise, was the promptness of the resolution of the English ministry."—FOUCHÉ, t. i. p. 312.]

[2] [Lord Hutchinson. See Parliamentary Debates, vol. x. p. 602.]

Such a communication was accordingly made to the Russian ministers, but was received with the utmost coldness. It is impossible now to determine, whether there had been some over-confidence in the agent; whether the communication had been founded on some hasty and fugitive idea of a breach with France, which the Emperor had afterwards abandoned; or finally, whether, as is more probable, it originated in a wish to fathom the extent of Great Britain's resources, and the purposes to which she meant to devote them. It is enough to observe, that the countenance with which Russia received the British communication, was so different from that with which she had invited the confidence of her ministers, that the negotiation proved totally abortive.

Alexander's ultimate purpose was given to the world, so soon as Britain had declined the offered mediation of Russia in her disputes with France. In a proclamation, or manifesto, sent forth by the Emperor, he expressed his repentance for having entered into agreements with England, which he had found prejudicial to the Russian trade; he complained (with justice) of the manner in which Britain had conducted the war by petty expeditions, conducive only to her own selfish ends; and the attack upon Denmark was treated as a violation of the rights of nations. He therefore annulled every convention entered into between Russia and Britain, and especially that of 1801; and he avowed the principles of the Armed Neutrality, which he termed a monument of the wisdom of the Great

Catherine.[1] In November 1807, an ukase, or imperial decree, was issued, imposing an embargo on British vessels and property. But, by the favour of the Russian nation, and even of the officers employed by Government, the shipmasters were made aware of the impending arrest; and not less than eighty vessels, setting sail with a favourable wind, reached Britain with their cargoes in safety.

Austria and Prussia found themselves under the necessity of following the example of Russia, and declaring war against British commerce; so that Buonaparte had now made an immense stride towards his principal object, of destroying every species of intercourse which could unite England with the continent.

[1] [See Declaration of the Emperor of Russia, dated St Petersburgh, 20th (31st) October, 1807, Annual Register, vol xlix. p. 761; and Parl. Debates, vol. x. p. 218.]

CHAPTER XXXVIII.

View of the Internal Government of Napoleon at the period of the Peace of Tilsit.— The Tribunate abolished.— Council of State.— Prefectures— Their nature and objects described.— The Code Napoleon—Its Provisions—Its Merits and Defects— Comparison betwixt that Code and the Jurisprudence of England—Laudable efforts of Napoleon to carry it into effect.

At this period of Buonaparte's elevation, when his power seemed best established, and most permanent, it seems proper to take a hasty view, not indeed of the details of his internal government, which is a subject that would exhaust volumes; but at least of its general character, of the means by which his empire was maintained, and the nature of the relations which it established betwixt the sovereign and his subjects.

The ruling, almost the sole principle on which the government of Buonaparte rested, was the simple proposition upon which despotism of every kind has founded itself in every species of society; namely, that the individual who is to exercise the authority and power of the state, shall, on the one hand, dedicate himself and his talents exclusively to the public service of the empire, while, on the other, the nation subjected to his rule shall requite

this self-devotion on his part by the most implicit obedience to his will. Some despots have rested this claim to universal submission upon family descent, and upon their right, according to Filmer's doctrine, of representing the original father of the tribe, and becoming the legitimate inheritors of a patriarchal power. Others have strained scripture and abused common sense, to establish in their own favour a right through the especial decree of Providence. To the hereditary title Buonaparte could of course assert no claim; but he founded not a little on the second principle, often holding himself out to others, and no doubt occasionally considering himself, in his own mind, as an individual destined by Heaven to the high station which he held, and one who could not therefore be opposed in his career, without an express struggle being maintained against Destiny, who, leading him by the hand, and at the same time protecting him with her shield, had guided him by paths as strange as perilous, to the post of eminence which he now occupied. No one had been his tutor in the lessons which led the way to his preferment—no one had been his guide in the dangerous ascent to power—scarce any one had been of so much consequence to his promotion, as to claim even the merit of an ally, however humble. It seemed as if Napoleon had been wafted on to this stupendous pitch of grandeur by a power more effectual than that of any human assistance, nay, which surpassed what could have been expected from his own great talents, unassisted by the especial interposition of Destiny in his favour. Yet it was not to this

principle alone that the general acquiescence in the unlimited power which he asserted is to be imputed. Buonaparte understood the character of the French nation so well, that he could offer them an acceptable indemnification for servitude; first, in the height to which he proposed to raise their national pre-eminence; secondly, in the municipal establishments, by means of which he administered their government, and which, though miserably defective in all which would have been demanded by a nation accustomed to the administration of equal and just laws, afforded a protection to life and property that was naturally most welcome to those who had been so long, under the republican system, made the victims of cruelty, rapacity, and the most extravagant and unlimited tyranny, rendered yet more odious as exercised under the pretext of liberty.

To the first of these arts of government we have often adverted; and it must be always recalled to mind whenever the sources of Buonaparte's power over the public mind in France come to be treated of. He himself gave the solution in a few words, when censuring the imbecility of the Directors, to whose power he succeeded. "These men," he said, "know not how to work upon the imagination of the French nation." This idea, which, in phraseology, is rather Italian than French, expresses the chief secret of Napoleon's authority. He held himself out as the individual upon whom the fate of France depended—of whose hundred decisive victories France enjoyed the glory. It was he whose sword, hewing down obstacles which

her bravest monarchs had accounted insurmountable, had cut the way to her now undeniable supremacy over Europe. He alone could justly claim to be Absolute Monarch of France, who, raising that nation from a perilous condition, had healed her discords, reconciled her factions, turned her defeats into victory, and, from a disunited people, about to become the prey to civil and external war, had elevated her to the situation of Queen of Europe. This had been all accomplished upon one condition; and, as we have stated elsewhere, it was that which the Tempter offered in the wilderness, after his ostentatious display of the kingdoms of the earth—"All these will I give thee, if thou wilt fall down and worship me."

Napoleon had completed the boastful promise, and it flattered a people more desirous of glory than of liberty; and so much more pleased with hearing of national conquests in foreign countries, than of enjoying the freedom of their own individual thoughts and actions, that they unreluctantly surrendered the latter in order that their vanity might be flattered by the former.

Thus did Napoleon avail himself of, or, to translate his phrase more literally, play upon the imagination of the French people. He gave them public festivals, victories, and extended dominion; and in return, claimed the right of carrying their children in successive swarms to yet more distant and yet more extended conquests, and of governing, according to his own pleasure, the bulk of the nation which remained behind.

To attain this purpose, one species of idolatry

was gradually and ingeniously substituted for another, and the object of the public devotion was changed, while the worship was continued. France had been formerly governed by political maxims—she was now ruled by the name of an individual. Formerly the Republic was every thing—Fayette, Dumouriez, or Pichegru, were nothing. Now, the name of a successful general was of more influence than the whole code of the Rights of Man France had submitted to murder, spoliation, revolutionary tribunals, and every species of cruelty and oppression, while they were gilded by the then talismanic expressions, "Liberty and Equality—Fraternization—the public welfare, and the happiness of the people." She was now found equally compliant, when the watchword was, "The honour of his Imperial and Royal Majesty—the interests of the Great Empire—the splendours of the Imperial Throne." It must be owned, that the sacrifices under the last form were less enormous; they were limited to taxes at the Imperial pleasure, and a perpetual anticipation of the conscription. The Republican tyrants claimed both life and property, the Emperor was satisfied with a tithe of the latter, and the unlimited disposal of that portion of the family who could best support the burden of arms, for augmenting the conquests of France. Such were the terms on which this long-distracted country attained once more, after its Revolution, the advantage of a steady and effective government.

The character of that government, its means and principles of action, must now be briefly traced.

It cannot be forgotten that Buonaparte, the heir

of the Revolution, appropriated to himself the forms and modifications of the Directorial government, altered, in some degree, by the ingenuity of Siêyes; but they subsisted as forms only, and were carefully divested of all effectual impulse on the government. The Senate and Legislative Bodies became merely passive and pensioned creatures of the Emperor's will, whom he used as a medium for promulgating the laws which he was determined to establish. The Tribunate had been instituted for the protection of the people against all acts of arbitrary power, whether by imprisonment, exile, assaults on the liberty of the press, or otherwise; but after having gradually undermined the rights and authority of this body, after having rendered its meetings partial and secret, and having deprived it of its boldest members, Buonaparte suppressed it entirely, on account, as he alleged, of the expense which it occasioned to the government. It had, indeed, become totally useless;[1] but this was because its character had been altered, and because, originating from the Senate, and not from popular election, the Tribunate never consisted of that class of persons, who are willing to encounter the frown of power when called upon to impeach its aggressions. Yet, as the very name of this body, while it subsisted, recalled some ideas of Republican freedom, the Emperor thought fit altogether to abolish it.

[1] ["It is certain that the Tribunate was absolutely useless, while it cost nearly half a million; I therefore suppressed it. I was well aware that an outcry would be raised against the violation of the law; but I was strong: I possessed the full confidence of the people, and I considered myself a reformer."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. i. p. 289.]

The deliberative Council of the Emperor existed in his own personal Council of State, of whose consultations, in which he himself presided, he made frequent use during the course of his reign. Its functions were of an anomalous character, comprehending political legislation, or judicial business, according to the order of the day. It was, in short, Buonaparte's resource, when he wanted the advice, or opinion, or information, of others in aid of his own; and he often took the assistance of the Council of State, in order to form those resolutions which he afterwards executed by means of his ministers. Monsieur de Las Cases, himself a member of it, has dwelt with complaisance upon the freedom which Buonaparte permitted to their debates, and the good-humour with which he submitted to contradiction, even when expressed with obstinacy or vivacity;[1] and would have us consider the Council as an important barrier afforded to the citizens against the arbitrary will of the Sovereign. What he has said, however, only amounts to this,—that Buonaparte, desirous to have the advice of his counsellors, tolerated their freedom of speech, and even

[1] ["So little was the Council of State understood by the people in general, that it was believed no one dared utter a word in that assembly in opposition to the Emperor's opinion. Thus I very much surprised many persons, when I related the fact, that one day, during a very animated debate, the Emperor, having been interrupted three times in giving his opinion, turned towards the individual who had rather rudely cut him short, and said in a sharp tone: 'I have not yet done, I beg you will allow me to continue; I believe every one here has a right to deliver his opinion.' The smartness of his reply, notwithstanding the solemnity of the occasion, excited a general laugh, in which the Emperor himself joined."—Las Cases, t. i. p. 280.]

of remonstrance. Mahmoud, or Amurath, seated in their divan, must have done the same, and yet would not have remained the less absolutely masters of the lives of those who stood around them. We have no doubt that Buonaparte, on certain occasions, permitted his counsellors to take considerable freedoms, and that he sometimes yielded up his opinion to theirs without being convinced; in such cases, at least, where his own passions or interest were no-way concerned.[1] But we further read of the Emperor's using, to extremely stubborn persons, such language as plainly intimated, that he would not suffer contradiction beyond a certain point. "You are very obstinate," he said to such a disputant; "what if I were to be as much so as you? You are wrong to push the powerful to extremity —you should consider the weakness of humanity." To another he said, after a scene of argumentative violence, "Pray, pay some attention to accommodate yourself a little more to my humour. Yesterday, you carried it so far as to oblige me to

[1] Ségur gives example of a case in which Buonaparte deferred his own opinion to that of the Council. A female of Amsterdam, tried for a capital crime, had been twice acquitted by the Imperial Courts, and the Court of Appeal claimed the right to try her a third time. Buonaparte alone contended against the whole Council of State, and claimed for the poor woman the immunity which, in justice, she ought to have obtained, considering the prejudices that must have been excited against her. He yielded, at length, to the majority, but protesting he was silenced, and not convinced. To account for his complaisance, it may be remarked first, that Buonaparte was no way personally interested in the decision of the question; and, secondly, if it concerned him at all, the fate of the female was in his hands, since he had only to grant her a pardon if she was condemned by the Court of Appeal.—[See also Las Cases, t. i. p. 278.]

scratch my temple. That is a great sign with me —take care in future not to drive me to such an extremity."[1]

Such limits to the freedom of debate in the Imperial Council of State, correspond with those laid down in the festive entertainments of Sans Souci, where the Great Frederick professed to support and encourage every species of familiar raillery, but, when it attained a point that was too personal, used to hint to the facetious guests, that he heard the King's step in the gallery. There were occasions, accordingly, when, not satisfied with calling their attention to the distant murmurs of the Imperial thunder, Napoleon launched its bolts in the midst of his trembling counsellors. Such a scene was that of Portalis. This statesman, a man of talent and virtue, had been eminently useful, as we have seen, in bringing about the Concordat, and had been created, in recompense, minister of religious affairs, and counsellor of state. In the subsequent disputes betwixt the Pope and Buonaparte, a relation of the minister had been accused of circulating the bulls, or spiritual admonitions of the Pope; and Portalis had failed to intimate the circumstance to the Emperor. On this account, Napoleon, in full council, attacked him in the severest terms, as guilty of having broken his oath as a counsellor and minister of state, deprived him of both offices, and expelled him from the assembly, as one who had betrayed his sovereign.[2] If

[1] [Las Cases, t. i. p. 281.]

[2] [Las Cases, t. i. p. 282. At St Helena, Napoleon reproached himself for the expulsion of M. Portalis, "I was," he

any of the members of the Council of State had ventured, when this sentence rung in their ears, to come betwixt the dragon and his wrath, for the purpose of stating that a hasty charge ought not instantly to be followed with immediate censure and punishment; that it was possible M. Portalis might have been misled by false information, or by a natural desire to screen the offence of his cousin; or, finally, that his conduct might have been influenced by views of religion which, if erroneous, were yet sincere and conscientious,—we should then have believed, that the Council of State of Buonaparte formed a body, in which the accused citizen might receive some protection against the despotism of the government. But when, or in what country, could the freedom of the nation be intrusted to the keeping of the immediate counsellors of the throne? It can only be safely lodged in some body, the authority of which emanates directly from the nation, and whom the nation therefore will protect and support, in the existence of their right of opposition or remonstrance.

The deliberations of the Council of State, or such resolutions as Buonaparte chose to adopt without communication with them, (for it may be easily sup-

said, "perhaps too severe; I should have checked myself before I ordered him to be gone. He attempted no justification, and therefore the scene should have ended, merely by my saying, *it is well*. His punishment should have awaited him at home. Anger is always unbecoming in a sovereign. But, perhaps, I was excusable in my council, where I might consider myself in the bosom of my own family; or perhaps, after all, I may be justly condemned for this act. Every one has his fault; nature will exert her sway over us all."—*Ibid.* t. iv, p. 320.]

posed that they were not admitted to share his more secret political discussions,) were, as in other countries, adjusted with and executed by the ostensible ministers.

But, that part of the organization of the Imperial government, upon which Buonaparte most piqued himself, was the establishment of the Prefectures, which certainly gave facilities for the most effectual agency of despotism that was ever exercised. There is no mistaking the object and tendency of this arrangement, since Buonaparte himself, and his most bitter opponents, hold up the same picture, one to the admiration, the other to the censure, of the world. These prefects, it must be understood, were each the supreme governor of a department, answering to the old lieutenants and governors of counties, and representing the Imperial person within the limits of the several prefectures. The individuals were carefully selected, as persons whose attachment was either to be secured or rewarded. They received large and, in some cases, exorbitant salaries, some amounting to fifteen, twenty, and even thirty thousand francs. This heavy expense Napoleon stated to be the consequence of the depraved state of moral feeling in France, which made it necessary to attach men by their interests rather than their duties; but it was termed by his enemies one of the leading principles of his government, which treated the public good as a chimera, and erected private and personal interest into the paramount motive upon which alone the state was to be served by efficient functionaries. The prefects were chosen in the general case, as

men whose birth and condition were totally unconnected with that of the department in which each was to preside; *les dépayser*, to place them in a country to which they were strangers, being an especial point of Napoleon's policy. They were entirely dependent on the will of the Emperor, who removed or cashiered them at pleasure. The administration of the departments was intrusted to these important officers.

"With the authority and local resources placed at their disposal," said Buonaparte, "the prefects were themselves emperors on a limited scale; and as they had no force excepting through the impulse which they received from the throne, as they owed their whole power to their immediate commission, and as they had no authority of a personal character, they were of as much use to the crown as the former high agents of government, without any of the inconveniences which attached to their predecessors."[1] It was by means of the prefects that an impulse, given from the centre of the government was communicated without delay to the extremities of the kingdom, and that the influence of the crown, and the execution of its commands, were transmitted, as if by magic, through a population of forty millions. It appears that Napoleon, while describing with self-complacency this terrible engine of unlimited power, felt that it might not be entirely in unison with the opinions of those favourers of liberal institutions, whose sympathy at the close of life he thought worthy of soliciting. "My

[1] [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 105.]

creating that power," he said, "was on my part a case of necessity. I was a dictator, called to that office by force of circumstances. There was a necessity that the filaments of the government which extended over the state, should be in complete harmony with the key-note which was to influence them. The organization which I had extended over the empire, required to be maintained at a high degree of tension, and to possess a prodigious force of elasticity, to enable it to resist the terrible blows directed against it without cessation."[1] His defence amounts to this—"The men of my time were extravagantly fond of power, exuberantly attached to place and wealth. I therefore bribed them to become my agents by force of places and pensions. But I was educating the succeeding race to be influenced by better motives. My son would have been surrounded by youths sensible to the influence of justice, honour, and virtue; and those who were called to execute public duty, would have considered their doing so as its own reward."

The freedom of France was therefore postponed till the return of a Golden Age, when personal aggrandisement and personal wealth should cease to have any influence upon regenerated humanity. In the mean while, she had the dictatorship and the prefects.

The *impulse*, as Napoleon terms it, by which the crown put in action these subordinate agents in the departments, was usually given by means of a cir-

[1] [Las Cases, t. iv. p. 105.]

cular letter or proclamation, communicating the particular measure which government desired to be enforced. This was subscribed by the minister to whose department the affair belonged, and concluded with an injunction upon the prefect, to be active in forwarding the matter enjoined, as he valued the favour of the Emperor, or wished to show himself devoted to the interests of the crown.[1] Thus conjured, the prefect transmitted the order to the sub-prefect and mayors of the communities within his department, who, stimulated by the same motives that had actuated their principal, endeavoured each to distinguish himself by his active compliance with the will of the Emperor, and thus merit a favourable report, as the active and unhesitating agent of his pleasure.

It was the further duty of the prefects, to see that all honour was duly performed towards the head of the state, upon the days appointed for public rejoicings, and to remind the municipal authorities of the necessity of occasional addresses to the government, declaring their admiration of the talents, and devotion to the person of the Emperor. These effusions were duly published in the *Moniteur*, and, if examined closely, would afford some of the most

[1] ["Your Majesty," is the usual conclusion, "relies upon the zeal which you will display on this business, in order to prove your devotion to his person, and your attachment to the interests of the throne." Each of the prefects amplifies the circular. The warmest expressions and the strongest colours are employed; no figure of rhetoric is forgotten, and the circular is transmitted to the sub-prefects of the department. The sub-prefects in their turn season it with still stronger language, and the mayors improve upon that of the sub-prefects."—FABER, *Notices sur l'Intérieur de la France*, p. 13.]

extraordinary specimens of composition which the annals of flattery can produce. It is sufficient to say, that a mayor, we believe of Amiens, affirmed, in his ecstasy of loyal adoration, that the Deity, after making Buonaparte, must have reposed, as after the creation of the universe. This, and similar flights of rhetoric, may appear both impious and ridiculous, and it might have been thought that a person of Napoleon's sense and taste would have softened or suppressed them. But he well knew the influence produced on the public mind, by ringing the changes to different time on the same unvaried subject. The ideas which are often repeated in all variety of language and expression, will at length produce an effect on the public mind, especially if no contradiction is permitted to reach it. A uniform which may look ridiculous on a single individual, has an imposing effect when worn by a large body of men; and the empiric, whose extravagant advertisement we ridicule upon the first perusal, often persuades us, by sheer dint of repeating his own praises, to make trial of his medicine. Those who practise calumny know, according to the vulgar expression, that if they do but throw dirt sufficient, some part of it will adhere; and acting on the same principle, for a contrary purpose, Buonaparte was well aware, that the repetition of his praises in these adulatory addresses was calculated finally to make an impression on the nation at large, and to obtain a degree of credit as an expression of public opinion.

Faber, an author too impassioned to obtain unlimited credit, has given several instances of igno-

rance amongst the prefects; many of whom, being old generals, were void of the information necessary for the exercise of a civil office, and all of whom, having been, upon principle, nominated to a sphere of action with the local circumstances of which they were previously unacquainted, were sufficiently liable to error. But the same author may be fully trusted, when he allows that the prefects could not be accused of depredation or rapine, and that such of them as improved their fortune during the date of their office, did so by economising upon their legitimate allowances.[1]

Such was the outline of Napoleon's provincial administration, and of the agency by which it was carried on, without check or hesitation, in every province of France at the same moment. The machinery has been in a great measure retained by the royal government, to whom it appeared preferable, doubtless, to the violent alterations which an attempt to restore the old appointments, or create others of a different kind, must necessarily have occasioned.

But a far more important change, introduced by the Emperor, though not originating with him, was the total alteration of the laws of the kingdom of France, and the introduction of that celebrated code to which Napoleon assigned his name, and on the execution of which his admirers have rested his claim to be considered as a great benefactor to the country which he governed. Bacon has indeed informed us, that when laws have been heaped

[1] [Faber, *Notices*, p. 31.]

upon laws, in such a state of confusion as to render it necessary to revise them, and collect their spirit into a new and intelligible system, those who accomplish such an heroic task have a good right to be named amongst the legislators and benefactors of mankind. It had been the reproach of France before the Revolution, and it was one of the great evils which tended to produce that immense and violent change, that the various provinces, towns, and subordinate divisions of the kingdom, having been united in different periods to the general body of the country, had retained in such union the exercise of their own particular laws and usages; to the astonishment, as well as to the great annoyance of the traveller, who, in journeying through France, found that, in many important particulars, the system and character of the laws to which he was subjected, were altered almost as often as he changed his post-horses. It followed, from this discrepancy of laws and subdivision of jurisdiction, that the greatest hardships were sustained by the subjects, more especially when, the district being of small extent, those authorities who acted there were likely neither to have experience, nor character sufficient for exercise of the trust reposed in them.

The evils attending such a state of things had been long felt, and, at various periods before the Revolution, it had been proposed repeatedly to institute a uniform system of legislation for the whole kingdom. But so many different interests were compromised, and such were, besides, the

pressing occupations of the successive administrations of Louis XVI., and his grandfather, that the project was never seriously adopted or entered upon. When, however, the whole system of provinces, districts, and feudal jurisdictions, great and small, had fallen at the word of the Abbé Siêyes, like an enchanted castle at the dissolution of a spell, and their various laws, whether written or consuetudinary, were buried in the ruins, all France, now united into one single and integral nation, lay open to receive any legislative code which the National Assembly might dictate. But the revolutionary spirit was more fitted to destroy than to establish; and was more bent upon the pursuit of political objects, than upon affording the nation the protection of just and equal laws. Under the Directory, two or three attempts towards classification of the laws had been made in the Council of Five Hundred, but never had gone farther than a preliminary and general report. Cambacérès, an excellent lawyer and enlightened statesman, was one of the first to solicit the attention of the state to this great and indispensable duty. The various successive authorities had been content with passing such laws as affected popular subjects of the day, and which (like that which licensed universal divorce) partook of the extravagance that gave them origin. The project of Cambacérès, on the contrary, embraced a general classification of jurisprudence through all its branches, although too much tainted, it is said, with the prevailing revolutionary opinions of the period, to admit its being taken for a basis, when

Buonaparte, after his elevation, determined to supersede the Republican by Monarchical forms of government.

After the revolution of the 18th Brumaire, Napoleon saw no way more certain of assuring the popularity of that event, and connecting his own authority with the public interests of France, than to resume a task which former rulers of the Republic had thought too heavy to be undertaken, and thus, at once, show a becoming confidence in the stability of his own power, and a laudable desire of exercising it for the permanent advantage of the nation. An order of the Consuls, dated 24th Thermidor, in the year VIII., directed the minister of justice, with a committee of lawyers of eminence, to examine the several projects, four in number, which had been made towards compiling the civil code of national law, to give their opinion on the plan most desirable for accomplishing its formation. and to discuss the bases upon which legislation in civil matters ought to be rested.

The preliminary discourse upon the first project of the Civil Code, is remarkable for the manner in which the reporters consider and confute the general and illusory views entertained by the uninformed part of the public, upon the nature of the task to which they had been called. It is the common and vulgar idea, that the system of legislation may be reduced and simplified into a few general maxims of equity, sufficient to lead any judge of understanding and integrity, to a just decision of all questions which can possibly occur betwixt man and man. It follows, as a corollary to this

proposition, that the various multiplications of authorities, exceptions, particular cases, and especial provisions, which have been introduced among civilized nations, by the address of those of the legal profession, are just so many expedients to embarrass the simple course of justice with arbitrary modifications and refinements, in order to procure wealth and consequence to those educated to the law, whose assistance must be used as its interpreters, and who became rich by serving litigants as guides through the labyrinth of obscurity which had been raised by themselves and their predecessors.

Such were the ideas of the law and its professors, which occurred to the Parliament of Praise-God Barebones, when they proposed to Cromwell to abrogate the whole common law of England, and dismiss the lawyers, as drones who did but encumber the national hive. Such was also the opinion of many of the French statesmen, who, as rash in judging of jurisprudence as in politics, imagined that a system of maxims, modified on the plan of the Twelve Tables of the ancient Romans, might serve all the purposes of a civil code in modern France. They who thought in this manner had entirely forgotten, how soon the laws of these twelve tables became totally insufficient for Rome herself —how, in the gradual change of manners, some laws became obsolete, some inapplicable—how it became necessary to provide for emerging cases, successively by the decrees of the Senate, the ordinances of the people, the edicts of the Consuls, the regulations of the Prætors, the answers or

opinions of learned Jurisconsults, and finally, by the rescripts, edicts, and novels of the Emperors, until such a mass of legislative matter was assembled, as scarcely the efforts of Theodosius or Justinian were adequate to bring into order, or reduce to principle. But this, it may be said, was the very subject complained of. The simplicity of the old laws, it may be urged, was gradually corrupted; and hence, by the efforts of interested men, not by the natural progress of society, arose the complicated system, which is the object of such general complaint.

The answer to this is obvious. So long as society remains in a simple state, men have occasion for few and simple laws. But when that society begins to be subdivided into ranks; when duties are incurred, and obligations contracted, of a kind unknown in a ruder or earlier period, these new conditions, new duties, and new obligations, must be regulated by new rules and ordinances, which accordingly are introduced as fast as they are wanted, either by the course of long custom, or by precise legislative enactment. There is no doubt one species of society in which legislation may be much simplified; and that is, where the whole law of the country, with the power of enforcing it, is allowed to reside in the bosom of the King, or of the judge who is to administer justice. Such is the system of Turkey, where the Cadi is bound by no laws nor former precedents, save what his conscience may discover from perusing the Koran. But so apt are mankind to abuse unlimited power,

and indeed so utterly unfit is human nature to possess it, that in all countries where the judge is possessed of such arbitrary jurisdiction, he is found accessible to bribes, or liable to be moved by threats. He has no distinct course prescribed, no beacon on which to direct his vessel; and trims, therefore, his sails to the pursuit of his own profit.

The French legislative commissioners, with these views, wisely judged it their duty to produce their civil code, upon such a system as might afford, as far as possible, protection to the various kinds of rights known and acknowledged in the existing state of society. Less than this they could not do; nor, in our opinion, is their code as yet adequate to attain that principal object. By the implied social contract, an individual surrenders to the community his right of protecting and avenging himself, under the reserved and indispensable condition that the public law shall defend him, or punish those by whom he has sustained injury. As revenge has been said by Bacon to be a species of wild justice, so the individual pursuit of justice is often a modified and legitimate pursuit of revenge, which ought, indeed, to be qualified by the moral and religious sentiments of the party, but to which law is bound to give free way, in requital for the bridle which she imposes on the indulgence of man's natural passions. The course of litigation, therefore, cannot be stopt; it can only be diminished, by providing beforehand as many regulations as will embrace the greater number of cases likely to occur, and trusting to the authority of the judges

acting upon the spirit of the law, for the settlement of such as cannot be decided according to its letter.

The organization of this great national work was proceeded in with the caution and deliberation which the importance of the subject eminently deserved. Dividing the subjects of legislation according to the usual distinctions of jurisconsults, the commissioners commenced by the publication and application of the laws in general; passed from that preliminary subject to the consideration of personal rights under all their various relations; then to rights respecting property; and, lastly, to those legal forms of procedure, by which the rights of citizens, whether arising out of personal circumstances, or as connected with property, are to be followed forth, explicated, and ascertained. Thus adopting the division, and in some degree the forms, of the Institutes of Justinian, the commission proceeded, according to the same model, to consider each subdivision of this general arrangement, and adopt respecting each such maxims or brocards of general law, as were to form the future basis of French jurisprudence. Their general principles being carefully connected and fixed, the ingenuity of the commissioners was exerted in deducing from them such a number of corollaries and subordinate maxims, as might provide, so far as human ingenuity could, for the infinite number of questions that were likely to emerge on the practical application of the general principles to the varied and intricate transactions of human life. It may be easily supposed, that a task so difficult gave rise to much discussion

among the commissioners; and as their Report, when fully weighed among themselves, was again subjected to the Council of State, before it was proposed to the Legislative Body, it must be allowed, that every means which could be devised were employed in maturely considering and revising the great body of national law, which finally, under the name of the Code Napoleon, was adopted by France, and continues, under the title of the Civil Code, to be the law by which her subjects still possess and enforce their civil rights.

It would be doing much injustice to Napoleon, to suppress the great personal interest, which amid so many calls upon his time, he nevertheless took in the labours of the commission. He frequently attended their meetings, or those of the Council of State, in which their labours underwent revision; and, though he must be supposed entirely ignorant of the complicated system of jurisprudence as a science, yet his acute, calculating, and argumentative mind enabled him, by the broad views of genius and good sense, often to get rid of those subtleties by which professional persons are occasionally embarrassed; and to treat as cobwebs, difficulties of a technical or metaphysical character, which, to the jurisconsults, had the appearance of bonds and fetters.

There were times, however, on the other hand, when Napoleon was led, by the obvious and vulgar views of a question, to propose alterations which would have been fatal to the administration of justice, and the gradual enlargement and improvement of municipal law. Such was his idea, that

advocates and solicitors ought only to be paid in the event of the cause being decided in favour of their client;[1] a regulation which, had he ever adopted it, would have gone far to close the gates of justice; since, what practitioner would have forfeited at once one large portion of the means of his existence, and consented to rest the other upon the uncertainty of a gambling transaction? A lawyer is no more answerable for not gaining his cause, than a horse-jockey for not winning the race. Neither can foretell with any certainty the event of the struggle, and each, in justice, can only be held liable for the utmost exertion of his skill and abilities. Napoleon was not aware, that litigation is not to be checked by preventing lawsuits from coming into court, but by a systematic and sage course of trying and deciding points of importance, which, being once settled betwixt two litigants, cannot, in the same shape, or under the same circumstances, be again the subject of dispute among others.

The Civil Code of Napoleon is accompanied by a code of procedure in civil cases, and a code relating to commercial affairs, which may be regarded

[1] ["What litigations would thus have been prevented! On the first examination of a cause, a lawyer would have rejected it, had it been at all doubtful. There would have been little fear that a man, living by his labour, would have undertaken to conduct a lawsuit, from mere motives of vanity; and if he had, he would himself have been the only sufferer in case of failure. But my idea was opposed by a multitude of objections, and as I had no time to lose, I postponed the further consideration of the subject. Yet I am still convinced that the scheme might, with certain modifications, have been turned to the best account." —NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. vii. p. 199.]

as supplemental to the main body of municipal law. There is, besides, a Penal Code, and a code respecting the procedure against persons accused under it. The whole forms a grand system of jurisprudence, drawn up by the most enlightened men of the age, having access to all the materials which the past and the present times afford; and it is not surprising that it should have been received as a great boon by a nation, who, in some sense, may be said, previous to its establishment, to have been without any fixed or certain municipal law since the date of the Revolution.

But while we admit the full merit of the Civil Code of France, we are under the necessity of observing, that the very symmetry and theoretical consistency, which form at first view its principal beauty, render it, when examined closely, less fit for the actual purposes of jurisprudence, than a system of national law, which, having never undergone the same operation of compression, and abridgement, and condensation, to which that of France was necessarily subjected, spreads through a multiplicity of volumes, embraces an immense collection of precedents, and, to the eye of inexperience, seems, in comparison of the compact size and regular form of the French Code, a labyrinth to which no clue is afforded. It is of the greater importance to give this subject some consideration, because it has of late been fashionable to draw comparisons between the jurisprudence of England and that of France, and even to urge the necessity of new-modelling the former upon such a concise and systematic plan as the latter exhibits.

In arguing this point, we suppose it will be granted, that that code of institutions is the most perfect, which most effectually provides for every difficult case as it emerges, and therefore averts as far as possible the occurrence of doubt, and, of course, of litigation, by giving the most accurate and certain interpretation to the general rule, when applied to cases as they arise. Now, in this point, which comprehends the very essence and end of all jurisprudence,—the protection, namely, of the rights of the individual,—the English law is preferable to the French in an incalculable degree; because each principle of English law has been the subject of illustration for many ages, by the most learned and wise judges, acting upon pleadings conducted by the most acute and ingenious men of each successive age. This current of legal judgments has been flowing for centuries, deciding, as they occurred, every question of doubt which could arise upon the application of general principles to particular circumstances; and each individual case, so decided, fills up some point which was previously disputable, and becoming a rule for similar questions, tends to that extent to diminish the debateable ground of doubt and argument with which the law must be surrounded, like an unknown territory when it is first partially discovered.

It is not the fault of the French jurisconsults, that they did not possess the mass of legal authority arising out of a regular course of decisions by a long succession of judges competent to the task, and proceeding, not upon hypothetical cases supposed by themselves, and subject only to the inves-

tigation of their own minds, but upon such as then actually occurred in practice, and had been fully canvassed and argued in open court. The French lawyers had not the advantage of referring to such a train of decisions; each settling some new point, or ascertaining and confirming some one which had been considered as questionable. By the Revolution the ancient French courts had been destroyed, together with their records; their proceedings only served as matter of history or tradition, but could not be quoted in support or explanation of a code which had no existence until after their destruction. The commissioners endeavoured, we have seen, to supply this defect in their system, by drawing from their general rules such a number of corollary propositions, as might so far as possible serve for their application to special and particular cases. But rules, founded in imaginary cases, can never have the same weight with precedents emerging in actual practice, where the previous exertions of the lawyers have put the case in every possible light, and where the judge comes to the decision, not as the theorist, whose opinion relates only to an ideal hypothesis of his own mind, but as the solemn arbiter of justice betwixt man and man, after having attended to, and profited by, the collision and conflict of opposite opinions, urged by those best qualified to state and to illustrate them. The value of such discussion is well known to all who have experience of courts of justice, where it is never thought surprising to hear the wisest judge confess, that he came into court with a view of the case at issue wholly different from that which he was

induced to form after having given the requisite attention to the debate before him. But this is an advantage which can never be gained, unless in the discussion of a real case; and therefore the opinion of a judge, given *tota re cognita*, must always be a more valuable precedent, than that which the same learned individual could form upon an abstract and hypothetical question.

It is, besides, to be considered, that the most fertile ingenuity with which any legislator can be endued, is limited within certain bounds; and that when he has racked his brain to provide for all the ideal cases which his prolific imagination can supply, it will be found that he has not anticipated or provided for the hundredth part of the questions which are sure to occur in actual practice. To make a practical application of what we have stated, to the relative jurisprudence of France and England, it may be remarked, that the Title V. of the 1st Book of the Civil Code, upon the subject of Marriage, contains only one hundred and sixty-one propositions respecting the rights of parties, arising in different circumstances out of that contract, the most important known in civilized society. If we deduce from this gross amount, the great number of rules which are not doctrinal, but have only reference to the forms of procedure, the result will be greatly diminished. The English law, on the other hand, besides its legislative enactments, is guarded, as appears from Roper's Index, by no less than a thousand decided cases, or precedents, each of which affords ground to rule any other case in similar circumstances. In this view, the certainty

of the law of England, compared to that of France, bears the proportion of ten to one.

It is, therefore, a vulgar, though a natural and pleasing error, to prefer the simplicity of an ingenious and philosophic code of jurisprudence, to a system which has grown up with a nation, augmented with its wants, extended according to its civilisation, and only become cumbrous and complicated, because the state of society to which it applies has itself given rise to a complication of relative situations, to all of which the law is under the necessity of adapting itself. In this point of view, the Code of France may be compared to a warehouse built with much attention to architectural uniformity, showy in the exterior, and pleasing from the simplicity of its plan, but too small to hold the quantity of goods necessary to supply the public demand; while the Common Law of England resembles the vaults of some huge Gothic building, dark indeed, and ill arranged, but containing an immense store of commodities, which those acquainted with its recesses seldom fail to be able to produce to such as have occasion for them. The practiques, or adjudged cases, in fact, form a breakwater, as it were, to protect the more formal bulwark of the statute law; and although they cannot be regularly jointed or dovetailed together, each independent decision fills its space on the mound, and offers a degree of resistance to innovation, and protection to the law, in proportion to its own weight and importance.

The certainty of the English jurisprudence, (for, in spite of the ordinary opinion to the contrary, it

has acquired a comparative degree of certainty,) rests upon the multitude of its decisions. The views which a man is disposed to entertain of his own rights, under the general provisions of the law, are usually controlled by some previous decision on the case; and a reference to precedents, furnished by a person of skill, saves, in most instances, the expense and trouble of a lawsuit, which is thus stifled in its very birth. If we are rightly informed, the number of actions at common law, tried in England yearly, does not exceed betwixt five-and-twenty and thirty on an average, from each county; an incredibly small number, when the wealth of the kingdom is considered, as well as the various and complicated transactions incident to the advanced and artificial state of society in which we live.

But we regard the multitude of precedents in English law as eminently favourable, not only to the certainty of the law, but to the liberty of the subject; and especially as a check upon any judge, who might be disposed to innovate either upon the rights or liberties of the lieges. If a general theoretical maxim of law be presented to an unconscientious or partial judge, he may feel himself at liberty, by exerting his ingenuity, to warp the right cause the wrong way. But if he is bound down by the decisions of his wise and learned predecessors, that judge would be venturous indeed, who should attempt to tread a different and more devious path, than that which is marked by the venerable traces of their footsteps; especially, as he well knows that the professional persons around him, who might be blinded by the glare of his

ingenuity in merely theoretical argument, are perfectly capable of observing and condemning every departure from precedent.[1] In such a case he becomes sensible, that, fettered as he is by previous decisions, the law is in his hands, to be administered indeed, but not to be altered or tampered with; and that if the evidence be read in the court, there are and must be many present, who know as well as himself, what must, according to precedent, be the verdict, or the decision. These are considerations which never can restrain or fetter a judge, who is only called upon to give his own explanation of the general principle briefly expressed in a short code, and susceptible therefore of a variety of interpretations, from which he may at pleasure select that which may be most favourable to his unconscientious or partial purposes.

It follows, also, from the paucity of laws afforded by a code constructed not by the growth of time, but suggested by the ingenuity of theorists suddenly called to the task, and considering its immense importance, executing it in haste, that many provisions, most important for the exercise of justice, must, of course, be neglected in the French Code. For example, the whole law of evidence, the very key and corner-stone of justice between man and man, has been strangely overlooked in the French jurisprudence. It is plain, that litigation may proceed for ever, unless there

[1] The intelligent reader will easily be aware, that we mean not to say that every decision of their predecessors is necessarily binding on the judges of the day. Laws themselves become obsolete, and so do the decisions which have maintained and enforced them.

be some previous adjustment (called technically an issue) betwixt the parties, at the sight of the judge, tending to ascertain their averments in point of fact, as also the relevancy of those averments to the determination of the cause. In England, chiefly during the course of last century, the Law of Evidence has grown up to a degree of perfection, which has tended, perhaps more than any other cause, at once to prevent and to shorten litigation. If we pass from the civil to the penal mode of procedure in France, the British lawyer is yet more shocked by a course, which seems in his view totally to invert and confound every idea which he has received upon the law of evidence. Our law, it is well known, is in nothing so scrupulous as in any conduct towards the prisoner, which may have the most indirect tendency to entrap him into bearing evidence against himself. Law sympathizes in such a case with the frailties of humanity, and, aware of the consequence which judicial enquiries must always have on the mind of the timid and ignorant, never pushes the examination of a suspected person farther than he himself, in the natural hope of giving such an account of himself as may procure his liberty, shall choose to reply to it.

In France, on the contrary, the whole trial sometimes resolves into a continued examination and cross-examination of the prisoner, who is not only under the necessity of giving his original statement of the circumstances on which he founds his defence, but is confronted repeatedly with the witnesses, and repeatedly required to reconcile his

own statement of the case with that which these have averred. With respect to the character of evidence, the same looseness of practice exists. No distinction seems to be made between that which is hearsay and that which is direct; that which is spontaneously given, and that which is extracted, or perhaps suggested, by leading questions. All this is contrary to what we are taught to consider as the essence of justice towards the accused. The use of the rack is, indeed, no longer admitted to extort the confession, but the mode of judicial examination seems to us a species of moral torture, under which a timid and ignorant, though innocent man, is very likely to be involved in such contradictions and inextricable confusion, that he may be under the necessity of throwing away his life by not knowing how to frame his defence.

We shall not protract these remarks on the Code Napoleon; the rather that we must frankly confess, that the manners and customs of a country make the greatest difference with respect to its laws, and that a system may work well in France, and answer all the purposes of jurisprudence, which in England would be thought very inadequate to the purpose. The humane institution which allows the accused the benefit of counsel, is a privilege which the English law does not permit to the accused, and may have its own weight in counterbalancing some of the inconveniences to which he is subjected in France. It seems also probable, that the deficiences in the Code, arising from its recent origin and compressed form, must be gradually remedied, as in England, by the course of

decisions pronounced by intelligent and learned judges; and that what we now state as an objection to the system, will gradually disappear under the influence of time.

Considered as a production of human science, and a manual of legislative sagacity, the Code may challenge general admiration for the clear and wise manner in which the axioms are drawn up and expressed. There are but few peculiarities making a difference betwixt its principles and those of the Roman law, which has in most contracts claimed to be considered as the mother of judicial regulation. The most remarkable occurs, perhaps, in the articles regulating what is called the Family Council; a subject which does not seem of importance sufficient to claim much attention.

The Civil Code being thus ascertained, provision was made for its regular administration by suitable courts; the judges of which did not, as before the Revolution, depend for their emoluments upon fees payable by the litigants, but were compensated by suitable salaries at the expense of the public. As France does not supply that class of persons who form what is called in England the unpaid magistracy, the French justices of peace received a small salary of from 800 to 1800 francs. Above them in rank came judges in the first instance, whose salaries amounted to 3000 francs at the utmost. The judges of the supreme tribunals enjoyed about four or five thousand francs; and those of the High Court of Cassation had not more than ten thousand francs, which scarcely enabled them to live and keep some rank in the metropolis. But, though thus underpaid, the situation of the French judges was honour-

able in the eyes of the country, and they maintained its character by activity and impartiality in their judicial functions.

The system of juries had been introduced in criminal cases, by the acclamation of the Assembly. Buonaparte found them, however, scrupulously restive and troublesome. There may be some truth in the charge, that they were averse from conviction, where a loop-hole remained for acquitting the criminal; and that many audacious crimes remained unpunished, from the punctilious view which the juries took of their duty. But it was from other motives than those of the public weal that Napoleon made an early use of his power, for the purpose of forming special tribunals, invested with a half-military character, to try all such crimes as assumed a political complexion, with power to condemn without the suffrage of a jury.[1] We have already alluded to this infringement of the most valuable political rights of the subject, in giving some account of the trials of Georges, Pichegru, and Moreau. No jury would ever have brought in a verdict against the latter, whose sole crime was his communication with Pichegru; a point of suspicion certainly, but no proof whatever of positive guilt. Political causes being out of the field, the trial by jury was retained in the French Code,

[1] ["In the Code Napoleon, and even in the Criminal Code, some good principles remain, derived from the Constituent Assembly; the institution of juries, for instance, the anchor of French hope: but of what value were legal institutions, when extraordinary tribunals, named by the Emperor, special courts, and military commissions, judged all political offences—the very offences on which the unchangeable ægis of the law is most required."—MAD. DE STAËL, t. ii. p. 364.

so far as regarded criminal questions; and the general administration of justice seems to have been very well calculated for protecting the right, and punishing that which is wrong.

The fiscal operations of Buonaparte were those of which the subjects complained the most, as indeed these are generally the grievances to which the people in every country are the most sensible. High taxes were imposed on the French people, rendered necessary by the expenses of the government, which, with all its accompaniments, were very considerable; and although Buonaparte did all in his power to throw the charge of the eternal wars which he waged upon the countries he overran or subdued, yet so far does the waste of war exceed any emolument which the armed hand can wrest from the sufferers, so imperfect a proportion do the gains of the victor bear to the losses of the vanquished, that after all the revenue which was derived from foreign countries, the continual campaigns of the Emperor proved a constant and severe drain upon the produce of French industry. So rich, however, is the soil of France, such are the extent of her resources, such the patience and activity of her inhabitants, that she is qualified, if not to produce at once the large capitals which England can raise upon her national credit, yet to support the payment of a train of heavy annual imposts for a much longer period, and with less practical inconvenience. The agriculture of France had been extremely improved since the breaking up of the great estates into smaller portions, and the abrogation of those feudal burdens which had

pressed upon the cultivators; and it might be considered as flourishing, in spite of war taxes, and, what was worse, the conscription itself.[1] Under a fixed and secure, though a severe and despotic government, property was protected, and agriculture received the best encouragement, namely, the certainty conferred on the cultivator of reaping the crop which he sowed.

It was far otherwise with commerce, which the maritime war, carried on so long and with such unmitigated severity, had very much injured, and the utter destruction of which was in a manner perfected by Buonaparte's adherence to the continental system. This, indeed, was the instrument by which, in the long run, he hoped to ruin the commerce of his rival, but the whole weight of which fell in the first instance on that of France, whose seaports showed no other shipping save coasters and fishing vessels; while the trade of Marseilles, Bourdeaux, Nantes, and other great commercial towns, had, in a great measure, ceased to exist. The government of the Emperor was proportionally unpopular in those cities; and although men kept silence, because surrounded by the spies of a jealous and watchful despotism, their dislike to the existing state of things could not entirely be concealed.[2]

[1] ["Agriculture was continually improving during the whole course of the Revolution. Foreigners thought it ruined in France. In 1814, however, the English were compelled to admit that we had little or nothing to learn from them."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iv. p. 280.]

[2] ["Foreign trade, which in its results is infinitely inferior to agriculture, was an object of subordinate importance in my mind.

On the other hand, capitalists, who had sums invested in the public funds, or who were concerned with the extensive and beneficial contracts for the equipment and supply of Napoleon's large armies, with all the numerous and influential persons upon whom any part of the gathering in or expenditure of the public money devolved, were necessarily devoted to a government, under which, in spite of the Emperor's vigilance, immense profits were often derived, even after those by whom they were made had rendered to the ministers, or perhaps the generals, by whom they were protected, a due portion of the spoil. Economist and calculator as he was, to a most superior degree of excellence, Napoleon seems to have been utterly unable, if he really sincerely desired, to put an end to the peculations of those whom he trusted with power. He frequently, during his conversations at St Helena, alludes to the venality and corruption of such as he employed in the highest offices, but whose sordid practices seem never to have occurred to him in the way of objection to his making use of their talents. Fouché, Talleyrand, and others, are thus stigmatized; and as we well know how long, and upon how many different occasions, he employed

Foreign trade is made for agriculture and home industry, and not the two latter for the former. The interests of these three fundamental cases are diverging, and frequently conflicting. I always promoted them in their natural gradation; but I could not and ought not to have ranked them all on an equality. The difficulties, and even the total stagnation of foreign trade during my reign, arose out of the force of circumstances, and the accidents of the time. One brief interval of peace would immediately have restored it to its natural level."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iv. p. 280.]

those statesmen, we cannot but suppose that, whatever may have been his sentiments as to the *men*, he was perfectly willing to compound with their peculation, in order to have the advantage of their abilities. Even when practices of this kind were too gross to be passed over, Napoleon's mode of censuring and repressing them was not adapted to show a pure sense of morality on his own part, or any desire to use extraordinary rigour in preventing them in future. This conclusion we form from the following anecdote which he communicated to Las Cases :—

Speaking of generals, and praising the disinterestedness of some, he adds, Massena, Augereau, Brune, and others, were undaunted depredators. Upon one occasion, the rapacity of the first of these generals had exceeded the patience of the Emperor. His mode of punishing him was peculiar. He did not dispossess him of the command, of which he had rendered himself unworthy by such an unsoldier-like vice—he did not strip the depredator by judicial sentence of his ill-won gains, and restore them to those from whom they were plundered—but, in order to make the general sensible that he had proceeded too far, Buonaparte drew a bill upon the banker of the delinquent, for the sum of two or three millions of francs, to be placed to Massena's debit, and the credit of the drawer. Great was the embarrassment of the banker, who dared not refuse the Imperial order, while he humbly hesitated, that he could not safely honour it without the authority of his principal. "Pay the money," was the Emperor's reply, "and

let Massena refuse to give you credit at his peril." The money was paid accordingly, and placed to that general's debit, without his venturing to start any objections.[1] This was not punishing peculation, but partaking in its gains; and the spirit of the transaction approached nearly to that described by Le Sage, where the Spanish minister of state insists on sharing the bribes given to his secretary.

Junot, in like manner, who, upon his return from Portugal, gave general scandal by the display of diamonds, and other wealth, which he had acquired in that oppressed country, received from Buonaparte a friendly hint to be more cautious in such exhibitions. But his acknowledged rapacity was never thought of as a reason disqualifying him for being presently afterwards sent to the government of Illyria.

We are informed, in another of the Emperor's communications, that his Council of State was of admirable use to him in the severe inquisition which he was desirous of making into the public accounts. The proceedings of this Star Chamber, and the fear of being transmitted to the cognition of the Grand Judge, usually brought the culprits to composition; and when they had disgorged one, two, or three millions, the government was enriched, or, according to Buonaparte's ideas, the laws were satisfied.[2] The truth seems to be, that Buonaparte, though he contemned wealth in his own person, was aware that avarice, which, after all, is but a secondary and sordid species of ambition, is

[1] [Las Cases, t. ii. p. 230.] [2] Ibid. t. ii. p. 256.

the most powerful motive to mean and vulgar minds; and he willingly advanced gold to those who chose to prey upon it, so long as their efforts facilitated his possessing and retaining the unlimited authority to which he had reached. In a country where distress and disaster of every kind, public and private, had enabled many to raise large fortunes by brokerage and agiotage, a monied interest of a peculiar character was soon formed, whose hopes were of course rested on the wonderful ruler, by whose gigantic ambition new schemes of speculation were opened in constant succession, and whose unrivalled talents seemed to have found the art of crowning the most difficult undertakings with success.

It might be thought that the manufacturing interest must have perished in France, from the same reasons which so strongly and unfavourably afflicted the commerce of that country. In ceasing to import, there must indeed have been a corresponding diminution of the demand for goods to be exported, whether these were the growth of the soil, or the productions of French labour. Accordingly, this result had, in a great degree, taken place, and there was a decrease to a large amount in those goods which the French were accustomed to export in exchange for the various commodities supplied to them by British trade. But, though the real and legitimate stimulus to manufactures had thus ceased, Napoleon had substituted an artificial one, which had, to a certain extent, supplied the place of the natural trade. We must remark,

that Napoleon, practically and personally frugal, was totally a stranger to the science of Political Economy. He never received or acted upon the idea, that a liberal system of commerce operates most widely in diffusing the productions which are usually the subjects of exchange, and in affording to every country the greatest share of the bounties of nature, or the produce of industry at the easiest rates. On the contrary, he had proceeded to act against the commerce of England, as, in a military capacity, he would have done in regard to the water which supplied a besieged city. He strove to cut it off, and altogether to destroy it, and to supply the absence of its productions, by such substitutes as France could furnish.[1] Hence, the factitious encouragement given to the French manufactures, not by the natural demand of the country, but by the bounties and prohibitions by which they were guarded. Hence, the desperate efforts made to produce a species of sugar from various substances, especially from the beet-root. To this unnatural and unthrifty experiment, Buonaparte used to attach so much consequence, that a piece of the new composition, which, with much time and trouble, had been made to approximate the quality of ordinary loaf-sugar, was preserved in a glass-case over the Imperial mantel-piece; and a pound

[1] ["The system of commercial licenses was no doubt mischievous. Heaven forbid that I should have laid it down as a principle. It was the invention of the English; with me it was only a momentary resource. Even the continental system, in its extent and rigour, was by me regarded as a measure occasioned by the war and temporary circumstances."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iv. p. 280, 283.]

or two of beet-sugar, highly-refined, was sent to foreign courts, to illustrate the means by which Napoleon consoled his subjects for the evils incumbent on the continental system. No way of flattering or gratifying the Emperor was so certain, as to appear eager in supporting these views; and it is said that one of his generals, when tottering in the Imperial good graces, regained the favour of his master, by planting the whole of a considerable estate with beet-root. In these, and on similar occasions, Napoleon, in his eager desire to produce the commodity desiderated, became regardless of those considerations which a manufacturer first ascertains when about to commence his operations, namely, the expense at which the article can be produced, the price at which it can be disposed of, and its fitness for the market which it is intended to supply. The various encouragements given to the cotton manufacturers, and others, in France, by which it was designed to supply the want of British goods, proceeded upon a system equally illiberal and impolitic. Still, however, the expensive bounties, and forced sales, which the influence of government afforded, enabled these manufacturers to proceed, and furnished employment to a certain number of men, who were naturally grateful for the protection which they received from the Emperor. In the same manner, although no artificial jet-d'eau, upon the grandest scale of expense, can so much refresh the face of nature, as the gentle and general influence of a natural shower, the former will nevertheless have the effect of feeding and nourishing such vegetable productions as are within

the reach of its limited influence. It was thus, that the efforts of Napoleon at encouraging arts and manufactures, though proceeding on mistaken principles, produced, in the first instance, results apparently beneficial.[1]

We have already had occasion to observe the immense public works which were undertaken at the expense of Buonaparte's government. Temples, bridges, and aqueducts, are, indeed, the coin with which arbitrary princes, in all ages, have endeavoured to compensate for the liberty of which the people are deprived. Such monuments are popular with the citizens, because the enjoyment of them is common to all, and the monarch is partial to a style of expenditure promising more plausibly than any other, to extend the memory of his present greatness far into the bosom of futurity. Buonaparte was not, and could not be, insensible to either of these motives. His mind was too much enlarged to seek enjoyment in any of the ordinary objects of exclusive gratification; and undoubtedly, he who had done so much to distinguish himself during his life above ordinary mortals, must have naturally desired that his public works should preserve his fame to future ages. Accordingly, he undertook and executed some of the most splendid labours of modern times. The road over the Simplon, and the basins at Antwerp,

[1] ["Industry or manufactures, and internal trade, made immense progress during my reign. The application of chemistry to the manufactures, caused them to advance with giant strides. I gave an impulse, the effects of which extended throughout Europe."—NAPOLEON, *Las Cases*, t. iv. p. 280.]

may be always appealed to as gigantic specimens of his public spirit.

On the other hand, as we have before hinted, Napoleon sometimes aimed at producing immediate effect, by proposals and plans hastily adopted, as hastily decreed, and given in full form to the government journal; but which were either abandoned immediately after having been commenced, or perhaps, never advanced farther than the plan announced in the *Moniteur*. Buonaparte's habits of activity, his powers of deciding with a single glance upon most points of either military or civil engineering, were liberally drawn upon to strike his subjects with wonder and admiration. During the few peaceful intervals of his reign, his impatience of inaction found amusement in traversing, with great rapidity, and often on the shortest notice, the various departments in France. Travelling with incredible celerity, though usually accompanied by the Empress Josephine, he had no sooner visited any town of consequence, than he threw himself on horseback, and, followed only by his aide-de-camp and his Mameluke Rustan, who with difficulty kept him in view, he took a flying survey of the place, its capacities of improvement, or the inconveniences which attached to it. With this local knowledge, thus rapidly acquired, he gave audience to the municipal authorities, and overwhelmed them very often with liberal and long details concerning the place round which he had galloped for the first time, but in which they had spent their days. Amazement at the extent and facility of the Emperor's powers of observation, was thus universally

excited, and his hints were recorded in the *Moniteur*, for the admiration of France. Some public work, solicited by the municipality, or suggested by the enlightened benevolence of the Emperor himself, was then projected, but which, in many, if not most cases, remained unexecuted; the imperial funds not being in all circumstances adequate to the splendour of Napoleon's undertakings, or, which was the more frequent case, some new absorbing war, or project of ambition, occasioning every other object of expenditure to be postponed.

Even if some of Buonaparte's most magnificent works of public splendour had been completed, there is room to doubt whether they would have been attended with real advantage to his power, bearing the least proportion to the influence which their grandeur necessarily produces upon the imagination. We look with admiration, and indeed with astonishment, on the splendid dock-yards of the Scheldt; but had they been accomplished, what availed the building of first-rates, which France could hardly find sailors to man; which, being manned, dared not venture out of the river; or, hazarding themselves upon the ocean, were sure to become the prizes of the first British men-of-war with whom they chanced to encounter? Almost all this profuse expense went to the mere purposes of vain glory; for more mischief would have been done to British commerce, which Buonaparte knew well was the assailable point, by six privateers from Dunkirk, than by all the ships of the line which he could build at the new and most ex-

pensive dock-yard of Antwerp, with Brest and Toulon to boot.

In such cases as these, Napoleon did, in a most efficient manner, that which he ridiculed the Directory for being unable to do—he wrought on the imagination of the French nation, which indeed had been already so dazzled by the extraordinary things he had accomplished, that, had he promised them still greater prodigies than were implied in the magnificent works which he directed to be founded, they might still have been justified in expecting the performance of his predictions. And it must be admitted, looking around the city of Paris, and travelling through the provinces of France, that Buonaparte has, in the works of peaceful grandeur, left a stamp of magnificence, not unworthy of the soaring and at the same time profound spirit, which accomplished so many wonders in warfare.

The personal and family life of Napoleon was skilfully adapted to his pre-eminent station. If he had foibles connected with pleasure and passion, they were so carefully veiled to remain unknown to the world—at least, they were not manifested by any of those weaknesses which might serve to lower the Emperor to the stamp of common men. His conduct towards the Empress Josephine was regular and exemplary. From their accession to grandeur till the fatal divorce, as Napoleon once termed it, they shared the privacy of the same apartment, and for many years partook the same bed. Josephine is said, indeed, to have given her

husband, upon whom she had many claims, some annoyance by her jealousy, to which he patiently submitted, and escaped the reproach thrown on so many heroes and men of genius, that, proof to every thing else, they are not so against the allurements of female seduction. What amours he had were of a passing character. No woman, excepting Josephine and her successor, who exercised their lawful and rightful influence, was ever known to possess any power over him.[1]

The dignity of his throne was splendidly and magnificently maintained, but the expense was still limited by that love of order which arose out of Buonaparte's powers of arithmetical calculation, habitually and constantly employed, and the trusting to which, contributed, it may be, to that external regularity and decorum which he always supported. In speaking of his own peculiar taste, Buonaparte said that his favourite work was a book of logarithms, and his choicest amusement was working out the problems. The individual to whom the Emperor made this singular avowal mentioned it with surprise to an officer near his person, who assured him, that not only did Napoleon amuse himself with arithmetical ciphers, and the theory of computation, but that he frequently brought it to bear on his domestic expenses, and diverted himself with comparing the price at which particular articles were charged to him, with the rate which they ought to have cost at the fair market price, but which, for reasons unnecessary to state, was in

[1] [Las Cases, t. iii. p. 297.]

general greatly exceeded. Las Cases mentions his detecting such an overcharge in the gold fringe which adorned one of his state apartments. A still more curious anecdote respects a watch which the most eminent artist of Paris had orders to finish with his utmost skill, in a style which might become a gift from the Emperor of France to his brother the King of Spain. Before the watch was out of the artist's hands, Napoleon received news of the battle of Vittoria. "All is now over with Joseph," were almost his first words after receiving the intelligence. "Send to countermand the order for the watch."[1]

Properly considered, this anecdote indicates no indifference as to his brother's fate, nor anxiety about saving a petty sum; it was the rigid calculation of a professed accountant, whose habits of accuracy induce him to bring every loss to a distinct balance, however trivial the off-set may be. But although the Emperor's economy descended to minute trifles, we are not to suppose that among such was its natural sphere. On the contrary, in the first year of the Consulate, he discovered and rectified an error in the statement of the revenue, to the amount of no less than two millions of francs, to the prejudice of the state. In another instance, with the skill which only a natural taste for calculation brought to excellence by constant practice could have attained, he discovered an enormous overcharge of more than sixty thousand francs in the pay-accounts of the garrison of Paris. Two

[1] The watch, half completed, remained in the hands of the artist, and is now the property of the Duke of Wellington.

such discoveries, by the head magistrate, must have gone far to secure regularity in the departments in which they were made, in future.

Attending to this remarkable peculiarity throws much light on the character of Buonaparte. It was by dint of his rapid and powerful combinations that he succeeded as a general; and the same laws of calculation can be traced through much of his public and private life.

The palace charges, and ordinary expenses of the Emperor, were completely and accurately regulated by his Imperial Majesty's own calculation. He boasted to have so simplified the expenditure of the ancient kings of France, that his hunting establishment, though maintained in the utmost splendour, cost a considerable sum less than that of the Bourbons. But it must be recollected, first, that Napoleon was free from the obligation which subjected the Bourbons to the extravagant expenses which attended the high appointments of their household; secondly, that under the Imperial government, the whole establishment of falconry was abolished; a sport which is, in the opinion of many, more strikingly picturesque and interesting than any other variety of the chase, and which, as it infers a royal expense, belongs properly to sovereign princes.

The Imperial court was distinguished not only by a severe etiquette, but the grandees, by whom its principal duties were discharged, were given to understand, that the utmost magnificence of dress and equipage was required from them upon public occasions. It was, indeed, a subject of complaint

amongst the servants of the Crown, that though Buonaparte was in many respects attentive to their interests, gave them opportunities of acquiring wealth, invested them with large dotations and endowments, and frequently assisted them with an influence not easily withstood in the accomplishment of advantageous marriages; yet still the great expenditure at which they were required to support their appearance at the Imperial court, prevented their realizing any fortune which could provide effectually for their family. This expense Buonaparte loved to represent, as a tax which he made his courtiers pay to support the manufactures of France; but it was extended so far as to show plainly, that, determined as he was to establish his nobility on such a scale as to grace his court, it was far from being his purpose to permit them to assume any real power, or to form an existing and influential barrier between the crown and the people. The same inference is to be drawn from the law of France concerning succession in landed property, which is in ordinary cases equally divided amongst the children of the deceased; a circumstance which must effectually prevent the rise of great hereditary influence. And although, for the support of dignities granted by the Crown, and in some other cases, an entail of a portion of the favoured person's estate, called a *Majorat*, is permitted to follow the title, yet the proportion is so small as to give no considerable weight to those upon whom it devolves.

The composition of Buonaparte's court was singular. Amid his military dukes and mareschals

were mingled many descendants of the old noblesse, who had been struck out of the lists of emigration. On these Buonaparte spread the cruel reproach, "I offered them rank in my army—they declined the service;—I opened my antechambers to them —they rushed in and filled them." In this the Emperor did not do justice to the ancient noblesse of France. A great many resumed their natural situation in the military ranks of their country, and a still greater number declined, in any capacity, to bend the knee to him, whom they could only consider as a successful usurper.

The ceremonial of the Tuileries was upon the most splendid scale, the public festivals were held with the utmost magnificence, and the etiquette was of the most strict and indefeasible character. To all this Buonaparte himself attached consequence. as ceremonies characterising the spirit and dignity of his government; and he had drilled even his own mind into a veneration for all those outward forms connected with royalty, as accurately as if they had been during his whole life the special subject of his attention. There is a curious example given by Monsieur Las Cases. Buonaparte, in good-humoured trifling, had given his follower the titles of your highness, your lordship, and so forth, amidst which it occurred to him, in a fit of abstraction, to use the phrase, "Your Majesty." The instant that the word, sacred to his own ears, had escaped him, the humour of frolic was ended, and he resumed a serious tone, with the air of one who feels that he has let his pleasantry trespass upon an unbecoming and almost hallowed subject.

There were many of Buonaparte's friends and followers, bred, like himself, under the influence of the Revolution, who doubted the policy of his entering into such a strain of imitation of the ancient courts of Europe, and of his appearing anxious to emulate them in the only points in which he must necessarily fail, antiquity and long observance giving to ancient usages an effect upon the imagination, which could not possibly attach to the same ceremonial introduced into a court of yesterday. These would willingly have seen the dignity of their master's court rested upon its real and pre-eminent importance, and would have desired, that though republican principles were abandoned, something of the severe and manly simplicity of Republican manners should have continued to characterise a throne whose site rested upon the Revolution. The courtiers who held such opinions were at liberty to draw consolation from the personal appearance and habits of Napoleon. Amid the gleam of embroidery, of orders, decorations, and all that the etiquette of a court demands to render ceremonial at once accurate and splendid, the person of the Emperor was to be distinguished by his extreme simplicity of dress and deportment. A plain uniform, with a hat having no other ornament than a small three-coloured cockade, was the dress of him who bestowed all these gorgeous decorations, and in honour of whom these costly robes of ceremonial had been exhibited. Perhaps Napoleon might be of opinion, that a person under the common size, and in his latter days somewhat corpulent, was unfit for the display of rich dresses; or

it is more likely he desired to intimate, that although he exacted from others the strict observance of etiquette, he held that the Imperial dignity placed him above any reciprocal obligation towards them.

Perhaps, also, in limiting his personal expenses, and avoiding that of a splendid royal wardrobe, Buonaparte might indulge that love of calculation and order, which we have noticed as a leading point of his character. But his utmost efforts could not carry a similar spirit of economy among the female part of his Imperial family; and it may be a consolation to persons of less consequence to know, that in this respect the Emperor of half the world was nearly as powerless as they may feel themselves to be. Josephine, with all her amiable qualities, was profuse, after the general custom of Creoles, and Pauline de Borghese was no less so. The efforts of Napoleon to limit their expenses, sometimes gave rise to singular scenes. Upon one occasion, the Emperor found in company of Josephine a certain milliner of high reputation and equal expense, with whom he had discharged his wife to have any dealings. Incensed at this breach of his orders, he directed the *marchande des modes* to be conducted to the Bicêtre; but the number of carriages which brought the wives of his principal courtiers to consult her in captivity, convinced him that the popularity of the milliner was too powerful even for his Imperial authority; so he wisely dropped a contention which must have appeared ludicrous to the public, and the artist was set at

liberty, to charm and pillage the gay world of Paris at her own pleasure.[1]

On another occasion, the irregularity of Josephine in the article of expense, led to an incident which reminds us of an anecdote in the history of some Oriental Sultan. A creditor of the Empress, become desperate from delay, stopped the Imperial *calèche*, in which the Emperor was leaving St Cloud, with Josephine by his side, and presented his account, with a request of payment. Buonaparte did as Saladin would have done in similar circumstances—he forgave the man's boldness in consideration of the justice of his claim, and caused the debt to be immediately settled. In fact, while blaming the expense and irregularity which occasioned such demands, his sense of justice, and his family affection, equally inclined him to satisfy the creditor.

The same love of order, as a ruling principle of his government, must have rendered Buonaparte a severe censor of all public breaches of the decencies of society. Public morals are in themselves the accomplishment and fulfilment of all laws; they alone constitute a national code. Accordingly, the manners of the Imperial court were under such regulation as to escape public scandal, if they were not beyond secret suspicion.[2] In the same manner,

[1] [Las Cases, t. vii. p. 120.]

[2] We again repeat, that we totally disbelieve the gross infamies imputed to Napoleon within his own family, although sanctioned by the evidence of the Memoirs of Fouché. Neither Buonaparte's propensities nor his faults were those of a voluptuary.

gambling, the natural and favourite vice of a court, was not practised in that of Buonaparte, who discountenanced high play by every means in his power. But he suffered it to be licensed to an immense and frightful extent, by the minister of police; nor can we give him the least credit when he affirms, that the gambling-houses which paid such immense rents to Fouché, existed without his knowledge. Napoleon's own assertion cannot make us believe that he was ignorant of the principal source of revenue which supported his police. He compounded, on this as on other occasions, with a good-will, in consideration of the personal advantage which he derived from it.

In the public amusements of a more general kind, Buonaparte took a deep interest. He often attended the theatre, though commonly in private, and without eclat. His own taste, as well as political circumstances, led him to encourage the amusements of the stage; and the celebrated Talma, whose decided talents placed him at the head of the French performers, received, as well in personal notice from the Emperor, as through the more substantial medium of a pension, an assurance, that the kindness which he had shown in early youth to the little Corsican student had not been forgotten. The strictest care was taken that nothing should be admitted on the stage which could awaken feelings or recollections unfavourable to the Imperial Government. When the acute wit of the Parisian audience seized on some expression or incident which had any analogy to public affairs, the greatest pains were taken, not

only to prevent the circumstance from recurring, but even to hinder it from getting into general circulation. This secrecy respecting what occurred in public, could not be attained in a free country, but was easily accomplished in one where the public papers, the general organs of intelligence, were under the strict and unremitted vigilance of the government.

There were periods when Buonaparte, in order to gain the approbation and sympathy of those who claim the exclusive title of lovers of liberty, was not unwilling to be thought the friend of liberal opinions, and was heard to express himself in favour of the liberty of the press, and other checks upon the executive authority. To reconcile his opinions (or rather what he threw out as his opinions) with a practice diametrically opposite, was no easy matter, yet he sometimes attempted it. On observing one or two persons, who had been his silent and surprised auditors on such an occasion, unable to suppress some appearance of incredulity, he immediately entered upon his defence. "I am," he said, "at bottom, and naturally, for a fixed and limited government. You seem not to believe me, perhaps because you conceive my opinions and practice are at variance. But you do not consider the necessity arising out of persons and circumstances. Were I to relax the reins for an instant, you would see a general confusion. Neither you nor I, probably, would spend another night in the Tuileries."

Such declarations have often been found in the mouths of those, who have seized upon an unlawful

degree of authority over their species. Cromwell was forced to dissolve the Parliament, though he besought the Lord rather to slay him. State necessity is the usual plea of tyrants, by which they seek to impose on themselves and others; and, by resorting to such an apology, they pay that tribute to truth in their language, to which their practice is in the most decided opposition. But if there are any to whom such an excuse may appear valid, what can be, or must be, their sentiments of the French Revolution, which, instead of leading to national liberty, equality, and general happiness, brought the country into such a condition, that a victorious soldier was obliged, contrary to the conviction of his own conscience, to assume the despotic power, and subject the whole empire to the same arbitrary rules which directed the followers of his camp?

The press, at no time, and in no civilized country, was ever so completely enchained and fettered as at this period it was in France. The public journals were prohibited from inserting any article of public news which had not first appeared in the *Moniteur*, the organ of Government; and this, on all momentous occasions, was personally examined by Buonaparte himself. Nor were the inferior papers permitted to publish a word, whether in the way of explanation, criticism, or otherwise, which did not accurately correspond with the tone observed in the leading journal. They might, with the best graces of their eloquence, enhance the praise, or deepen the censure, which characterised the leading paragraph; but seizure of their paper, confiscation

imprisonment, and sometimes exile, were the unfailing reward of any attempt to correct what was erroneous in point of fact, or sophistical in point of reasoning. The *Moniteur*, therefore, was the sole guide of public opinion; and by his constant attention to its contents, it is plain that Napoleon relied as much on its influence to direct the general mind of the people of France, as he did upon the power of his arms, military reputation, and extensive resources, to overawe the other nations of Europe.

CHAPTER XXXIX.

System of Education introduced into France by Napoleon —National University—its nature and objects.—Lyceums.—Proposed Establishment at Meudon.

THE reputation of Buonaparte as a soldier, was the means which raised him to the Imperial dignity; and, unfortunately for himself, his ideas were so constantly associated with war and victory, that peaceful regulations of every kind were postponed, as of inferior importance; and thus war, which in the eye of reason ought always, even when most necessary and justifiable, to be regarded as an extraordinary state into which a nation is plunged by compulsion, was certainly regarded by Napoleon as almost the natural and ordinary condition of humanity. He had been bred on the battle-field, from which his glory first arose. "The earthquake voice of victory," according to the expression of Britain's noble and lost bard, "was to him the breath of life." [1] And although his powerful mind was capable of applying itself to all the various relations of human affairs, it was with war and

[1] ["The triumph, and the vanity,
The rapture of the strife—
The earthquake voice of Victory,
To thee the breath of life."
BYRON, vol. x. p. 7.]

desolation that he was most familiar, and the tendency of his government accordingly bore an aspect decidedly military.

The instruction of the youth of France had been the subject of several projects during the Republic; which was the more necessary, as the Revolution had entirely destroyed all the colleges and seminaries of public instruction, most of which were more or less connected with the church, and had left the nation almost destitute of any public means of education. These schemes were of course marked with the wild sophistry of the period. In many cases they failed in execution from want of public encouragement; in others, from want of funds. Still, however, though no fixed scheme of education had been adopted, and though the increasing vice and ignorance of the rising generation was sufficiently shocking, there existed in France two or three classes of schools for different purposes; as indeed it is not to be supposed that so great and civilized a nation could, under any circumstances, tolerate a total want of the means of educating their youth.

The schemes to which we allude had agreed in arranging, that each commune (answering, perhaps, to our parish) should provide a school and teacher, for the purpose of communicating the primary and most indispensable principles of education. This plan had in a great measure failed, owing to the poverty of the communes on whom the expense was thrown. In some cases, however, the communes had found funds for this necessary purpose; and, in others, the expense had been divided be-

twixt the public body, and the pupils who received the benefit of the establishment. So that these primary schools existed in many instances, though certainly in a precarious and languishing state.

The secondary schools were such as qualified persons, or those who held themselves out as such, had established upon speculation, or by the aid of private contributions, for teaching the learned and modern languages, geography, and mathematics.

There was besides evinced on the part of the Catholic clergy, so soon as the Concordat had restored them to some rank and influence, a desire to resume the task of public education, which, before the Revolution, had been chiefly vested in their hands. Their seminaries had been supported by the public with considerable liberality, and being under the control of the bishop, and destined chiefly to bring up young persons intended for the church, they had obtained the name of Ecclesiastical Schools.

Matters were upon this footing when Buonaparte brought forward his grand project of a National University, composed of a Grand Master, a Chancellor, a treasurer, ten counsellors for life, twenty counsellors in ordinary, and thirty inspectors-general; the whole forming a sort of Imperial council, whose supremacy was to be absolute on matters respecting education. All teachers, and all seminaries of education, were subjected to the supreme authority of the National University, nor could any school be opened without a brevet or diploma from the Grand Master, upon which a considerable tax was imposed. It was indeed the policy of the

government to diminish as far as possible the number of Secondary and of Ecclesiastical Schools, in order that the public education might be conducted at the public seminaries, called Lyceums, or Academies.

In these Lyceums the discipline was partly military, partly monastic. The masters, censors, and teachers, in the Lyceums and Colleges, were bound to celibacy; the professors might marry, but in that case were not permitted to reside within the precincts. The youth were entirely separated from their families, and allowed to correspond with no one save their parents, and then only through the medium, and under the inspection, of the censors. The whole system was subjected to the strict and frequent investigation of the University. The Grand Master might dismiss any person he pleased, and such a sentence of dismission disqualified the party receiving it from holding any civil employment.

In the general case, it is the object of a place of learning to remove from the eyes of youth that pomp and parade of war, by which at an early age they are so easily withdrawn from severe attention to their studies. The Lyceums of Buonaparte were conducted on a contrary principle; every thing was done by beat of drum, all the interior arrangements of the boys were upon a military footing. At a period when the soldier's profession held out the most splendid prospects of successful ambition, it was no wonder that young men soon learned to look forward to it as the only line worthy of a man of spirit to pursue. The devotion of the young students to the Emperor, carefully in-

fused into them by their teachers, was farther excited by the recollection, that he was their benefactor for all the means of instruction afforded them; and thus they learned from every circumstance around them, that the first object of their lives was devotion to his service, and that the service required of them was of a military character.

There were in each Lyceum one hundred and fifty exhibitions, or scholarships, of which twenty were of value sufficient to cover the student's full expenses, while the rest, of smaller amount, were called half or three quarter bursaries, in which the parents or relations of the lad supplied a portion of the charge. From these Lyceums, two hundred and fifty of the most selected youth were yearly draughted into the more professional and special military schools maintained by the Emperor; and to be included in this chosen number, was the prime object of every student. Thus, every thing induced the young men brought up at these Lyceums, to look upon a military life as the most natural and enviable course they had to pursue; and thus Buonaparte accomplished that alteration on the existing generation, which he intimated, when he said "The clergy regard this world as a mere diligence which is to convey us to the next—it must be my business to fill the public carriage with good recruits for my army."

Of the whole range of national education, that which was conducted at the Lyceums, or central schools, was alone supported by the state; and the courses there taught were generally limited to Latin and mathematics, the usual accomplishments

of a military academy. Undoubtedly Brienne was in Napoleon's recollection; nor might he perhaps think a better, or a more enlarged course of education necessary for the subjects of France, than that which had advanced their sovereign to the supreme government. But there was a deeper reason in the limitation. Those who, under another system of education, might have advanced themselves to that degree of knowledge which becomes influential upon the mind of the public, or the fortunes of a state, by other means than those of violence, were disqualified for the task by that which they received in the Lyceums; and the gentle, studious, and peaceful youth, was formed, like all the rest of the generation, to the trade of war, to which he was probably soon to be called by the conscription. If the father chose to place his son at one of the Secondary Schools, where a larger sphere of instruction was opened, it was still at the risk of seeing the youth withdrawn from thence and transferred to the nearest Lyceum, if the Directors of the Academy should judge it necessary for the encouragement of the schools which appertained more properly to Government.

Yet, Napoleon appears to have been blind to the errors of this system, or rather to have been delighted with them, as tending directly to aid his despotic views. "My University," he was accustomed to say to the very last, "was a masterpiece of combination, and would have produced the most material effect on the public mind." And he was wont on such occasions to throw the blame of its failure on Monsieur Fontanes, the Grand Master.

who, he said, afterwards took merit with the Bourbons for having encumbered its operation in some of its most material particulars.

Buonaparte, it must be added, at a later period, resolved to complete his system of national education, by a species of Corinthian capital. He proposed the establishment of an institution at Meudon, for the education of his son, the King of Rome, where he was to be trained to the arts becoming a ruler, in the society of other young princes of the Imperial family, or the descendants of the allies of Napoleon. This would have been reversing the plan of tuition imposed on Cyrus, and on Henry IV., who were bred up among the common children of the peasants, that their future grandeur might not too much or too early obscure the real views of human nature and character. But it is unnecessary to speculate on a system which never was doomed to be brought to experiment; only, we may presume it was intended to teach the young Napoleon more respect to the right of property which his princely companions held in their toys and playthings, than his father evinced towards the crowns and sceptres of his brothers and allies.

CHAPTER XL.

Military Details.—Plan of the Conscription—Its Nature —and Effects—Enforced with unsparing rigour.—Its influence upon the general Character of the French Soldiery.—New mode of conducting Hostilities introduced by the Revolution.—Constitution of the French Armies, Forced Marches. —La Maraude— *Its Nature—and Effects—on the Enemy's Country, and on the French Soldiers themselves.—Policy of Napoleon, in his personal conduct to his Officers and Soldiers.—Altered Character of the French Soldiery during, and after, the Revolution.*

We have shown that the course of education practised in France was so directed, as to turn the thoughts and hopes of the youth to a military life, and prepare them to obey the call of the conscription. This means of recruiting the military force, the most formidable ever established in a civilized nation, was originally presented to the Council of Five Hundred in 1798.[1] It comprehended a series of lists, containing the names of the whole youth of the kingdom, from the age of twenty to twenty-five, and empowering government to call them out successively, in such numbers as the exigences of the state should require. The classes were five in

[1] [By General Jourdan.]

number. The first contained those who were aged twenty years complete, before the commencement of the year relative to which the conscription was demanded, and the same rule applied to the other four classes of men, who had attained the twenty-first, twenty-second, twenty-third, twenty-fourth, and twenty-fifth years successively, before the same period. In practice, however, the second class of conscripts were not called out until the first were actually in service, nor was it usual to demand more than the first class in any one year. But as the first class amounted to 60 or 80,000, so forcible and general a levy presented immense facilities to the government, and was proportionally burdensome to the people.[1]

This law, undoubtedly, has its general principle in the duty which every one owes to his country. Nothing can be more true, than that all men capable of bearing arms are liable to be employed in the defence of the state; and nothing can be more politic, than that the obligation which is incumbent upon all, should be, in the first instance, imposed upon the youth, who are best qualified for military service by the freshness of their age, and whose absence from the ordinary business of the country will occasion the least inconvenience. But it is obvious, that such a measure can only be vindicated in defensive war, and that the conduct of Buonaparte, who applied the system to the conduct of distant offensive wars, no otherwise necessary than for the satisfaction of his own ambition, stands liable to the

[1] [Montgaillard, t. v. p. 139. See also Mounteney's Historical Enquiry relative to Napoleon, p. 20.]

heavy charge of having drained the very life-blood of the people intrusted to his charge, not for the defence of their own country, but to extend the ravages of war to distant and unoffending regions.

The French conscription was yet more severely felt by the extreme rigour of its conditions. No distinction was made betwixt the married man, whose absence might be the ruin of his family, and the single member of a numerous lineage, who could be easily spared. The son of the widow, the child of the decrepid and helpless, had no right to claim an exemption. Three sons might be carried off in three successive years from the same desolated parents; there was no allowance made for having already supplied a recruit. Those unable to serve were mulcted in a charge proportioned to the quota of taxes which they or their parents contributed to the state, and which might vary from fifty to twelve hundred francs. Substitutes might indeed be offered, but then it was both difficult and expensive to procure them, as the law required that such substitutes should not only have the usual personal qualifications for a military life, but should be domesticated within the same district as their principal, or come within the conscription of the year. Suitable persons were sure to know their own value, and had learned so well to profit by it, that they were not to be bribed to serve without excessive bounties. The substitutes also had the practice of deserting upon the road, and thus cheated the principal, who remained answerable for them till they joined their colours. On the whole, the difficulty of obtaining exemp-

tion by substitution was so great, that very many young men, well educated, and of respectable families, were torn from all their more propitious prospects, to bear the life, discharge the duties, and die the death, of common soldiers in a marching regiment.

There was no part of Napoleon's government enforced with such extreme rigour as the levy of the conscriptions.[1] The mayor, upon whom the duty devolved of seeing the number called for selected by lot from the class to whom they belonged, was compelled, under the most severe penalties, to avoid showing the slightest indulgence,—the brand, the pillory, or the galleys, awaited the magistrate himself, if he was found to have favoured any individuals on whom the law of conscription had claims. The same laws held out the utmost extent of their terrors against refractory conscripts, and the public functionaries were every where in search of them. When arrested, they were treated like convicts of the most infamous description. Clothed in a dress of infamy, loaded with chains, and dragging weights which were attached to them, they were condemned like galley slaves to work upon the public fortifications. Their relations did not escape, but were often rendered liable for fines and penalties.

[1] ["The Emperor constantly insisted on subjecting the whole nation to the laws of the conscription. 'I am inexorable on the subject of exemption,' said he, one day in the Council of State, 'it would be criminal. How could I acquit my conscience with having exposed the life of one man, for the advantage of another? I do not even think I would exempt my own son.'"—Las Cases, vii. p. 197.]

But perhaps the most horrible part of the fate of the conscript, was, that it was determined for life. Two or three, even four or five years spent in military service, might have formed a more endurable, though certainly a severe tax upon human life, with its natural prospects and purposes. But the conscription effectually and for ever changed the character of its victims. The youth, when he left his father's hearth, was aware that he was bidding it adieu, in all mortal apprehension, for ever; and the parents, who had parted with him, young, virtuous, and ingenuous, and with a tendency, perhaps, to acquire the advantages of education, could only expect to see him again (should so unlikely an event ever take place) with the habits, thoughts, manners, and morals, of a private soldier.

But whatever distress was inflicted on the country by this mode of compulsory levy, it was a weapon particularly qualified to serve Buonaparte's purposes. He succeeded to the power which it gave the government, amongst other spoils of the Revolution, and he used it to the greatest possible extent.

The conscription, of course, comprehended recruits of every kind, good, bad, and indifferent; but chosen as they were from the mass of the people, without distinction, they were, upon the whole, much superior to that description of persons among whom volunteers for the army are usually levied in other countries, which comprehends chiefly the desperate, the reckless, the profligate, and those whose unsettled or vicious habits render them unfit for peaceful life. The number of young men of

some education who were compelled to serve in the ranks, gave a tone and feeling to the French army of a very superior character, and explains why a good deal of intellect and power of observation was often found amongst the private sentinels. The habits of the nation also being strongly turned towards war, the French formed, upon the whole, the most orderly, most obedient, most easily commanded, and best regulated troops, that ever took the field in any age or country. In the long and protracted struggle of battle, their fiery courage might sometimes be exhausted before that of the determined British; but in all that respects the science, practice, and usages of war, the French are generally allowed to have excelled their more stubborn, but less ingenious rivals. They excelled especially in the art of shifting for themselves; and it was one in which the wars of Napoleon required them to be peculiarly adroit.[1]

The French Revolution first introduced into Europe a mode of conducting hostilities, which transferred almost the whole burden of the war to the country which had the ill-fortune to be the seat of its operations, and rendered it a resource rather than a drain to the successful belligerent. This we shall presently explain.

At the commencement of a campaign, nothing could be so complete as the arrangement of a French army. It was formed into large bodies, called *corps d'armée*, each commanded by a king, viceroy, mareschal, or general officer of high pre-

[1] [Mad. de Staël, t. ii. p. 351.]

tensions, founded on former services. Each corps d'armée formed a complete army within itself, and had its allotted proportion of cavalry, infantry, artillery, and troops of every description. The corps d'armée consisted of from six to ten divisions, each commanded by a general of division. The divisions, again, were subdivided into brigades, of which each, comprehending two or three regiments, (consisting of two or more battalions,) was commanded by a general of brigade. A corps d'armée might vary in number from fifty to eighty thousand men, and upwards; and the general of such a body exercised the full military authority over it, without the control of any one excepting the Emperor himself. There were very few instances of the Emperor's putting the officers who were capable of this high charge under command of each other; indeed so very few, as might almost imply some doubt on his part, of his commands to this effect being obeyed, had they been issued. This system of dividing his collected forces into separate and nearly independent armies, the generals of which were each intrusted with and responsible for his execution of some separate portion of an immense combined plan, gave great celerity and efficacy to the French movements; and, superintended as it was by the master spirit which planned the campaign, often contributed to the most brilliant results. But whenever it became necessary to combine two corps d'armée in one operation, it required the personal presence of Napoleon himself.

Thus organized, the French army was poured

into some foreign country by forced marches, without any previous arrangement of stores or magazines for their maintenance, and with the purpose of maintaining them solely at the expense of the inhabitants. Buonaparte was exercised in this system; and the combination of great masses, by means of such forced marches, was one great principle of his tactics. This species of war was carried on at the least possible expense of money to his treasury; but it was necessarily at the greatest possible expenditure of human life, and the incalculable increase of human misery. Napoleon's usual object was to surprise the enemy by the rapidity of his marches, defeat him in some great battle, and then seize upon his capital, levy contributions, make a peace with such advantages as he could obtain, and finally return to Paris.

In these dazzling campaigns, the army usually began their march with provisions, that is, bread or biscuit, for a certain number of days, on the soldiers' backs. Cattle also were for a time driven along with them, and slaughtered as wanted. These articles were usually provided from some large town or populous district, in which the troops might have been cantoned. The horses of the cavalry were likewise loaded with forage, for the consumption of two or three days. Thus provided, the army set forward on its expedition by forced marches. In a very short time the soldiers became impatient of their burdens, and either wasted them by prodigal consumption, or actually threw them away. It was then that the officers, who soon entertained just apprehensions of the troops suffering scar-

city before another regular issue of provisions, gave authority to secure supplies by what was called *la maraude*, in other words, by plunder. To ensure that these forced supplies should be collected and distributed systematically, a certain number of soldiers from each company were despatched to obtain provisions at the villages and farm-houses in the neighbourhood of the march, or of the ground upon which the army was encamped. These soldiers were authorized to compel the inhabitants to deliver their provisions without receipt or payment; and such being their regular duty, it may be well supposed that they did not confine themselves to provisions, but exacted money and articles of value, and committed many other similar abuses.

It must be owned, that the intellectual character of the French, and the good-nature which is the real ground of their national character, rendered their conduct more endurable under the evils of this system than could have been expected, provided always that provisions were plenty, and the country populous. A sort of order was then observed, even in the disorder of the *maraude*, and pains were taken to divide regularly the provisions thus irregularly obtained. The general temper of the soldiery, when unprovoked by resistance, made them not wholly barbarous; and their original good discipline, the education which many had received, with the habits of docility which all had acquired, prevented them from breaking up into bands of absolute banditti, and destroying themselves by their own irregularities. No troops ex-

cept the French could have subsisted in the same manner; for no other army is sufficiently under the command of its officers.

But the most hideous features of this system were shown when the army marched through a thinly-peopled country, or when the national character, and perhaps local facilities, encouraged the natives and peasants to offer resistance. Then the soldiers became animated alike by the scarcity of provisions, and irritated at the danger which they sometimes incurred in collecting them. As their hardships increased, their temper became relentless and reckless, and, besides indulging in every other species of violence, they increased their own distresses by destroying what they could not use. Famine and sickness were not long of visiting an army which traversed by forced marches a country exhausted of provisions. These stern attendants followed the French columns as they struggled on. Without hospitals, and without magazines, every straggler who could not regain his ranks fell a victim to hunger, to weather, to weariness, to the vengeance of an incensed peasantry. In this manner, the French army suffered woes, which, till these tremendous wars, had never been the lot of troops in hostilities carried on between civilized nations. Still Buonaparte's object was gained; he attained, amid these losses and sacrifices, and at the expense of them, the point which he had desired; displayed his masses to the terrified eyes of a surprised enemy; reaped the reward of his despatch in a general victory; and furnished new subjects of triumph to the *Moni-*

teur. So much did he rely upon the celerity of movement, that if an officer asked time to execute any of his commands, it was frequently his remarkable answer,—"Ask me for any thing except time." That celerity depended on the uncompromising system of forced marches, without established magazines; and we have described how wasteful it must have been to human life.[1] But when the battle was over, the dead were at rest, and could not complain; the living were victors, and soon forgot their sufferings; and the loss of the recruits who had been wasted in the campaign, was supplied by another draught upon the youth of France, in the usual forms of the conscription.

Buonaparte observed, with respect to his army, an adroit species of policy. His mareschals, his generals, his officers of high rank, were liberally honoured and rewarded by him; but he never treated them with personal familiarity. The forms of etiquette were, upon all occasions, strictly maintained. Perhaps he was of opinion that the original equality in which they had stood with regard to each other, would have been too strongly recalled by a more familiar mode of intercourse. But to the common soldier, who could not misconstrue or intrude upon his familiarity, Buonaparte observed a

[1] ["This is not correct. Activity of movement and rapidity of attack are as conducive to the well-being of mankind, as they are favourable to victory. Where did Sir Walter Scott learn that the system of forced marches pursued by the Emperor Napoleon was always without magazines? On the contrary, his administrative system was admirable, and his calculations on this head worthy of his plans: without the one, the other could not have succeeded."—Louis Buonaparte, p. 54.]

different line of conduct. He permitted himself to be addressed by them on all suitable occasions, and paid strict attention to their petitions, complaints, and even their remonstrances. What they complained of was, in all instances, enquired into and reformed, if the complaints were just. After a battle, he was accustomed to consult the regiments which had distinguished themselves, concerning the merits of those who had deserved the Legion of Honour, or other military distinction. In these moments of conscious importance, the sufferings of the whole campaign were forgotten; and Napoleon seemed, to the soldiery who surrounded him, not as the ambitious man who had dragged them from their homes, to waste their valour in foreign fields, and had purchased victory at the expense of subjecting them to every privation, but as the father of the war, to whom his soldiers were as children, and to whom the honour of the meanest private was as dear as his own.

Every attention was paid, to do justice to the claims of the soldier, and provide for his preferment as it was merited. But with all this encouragement, it was the remark of Buonaparte himself, that the army no longer produced, under the Empire, such distinguished soldiers as Pichegru, Kleber, Moreau, Massena, Desaix, Hoche, and he himself above all, who, starting from the ranks of obscurity, like runners to a race, had astonished the world by their progress. These men of the highest genius, had been produced, as Buonaparte thought, in and by the fervour of the Revolution; and he appears to have been of opinion, that, since

things had returned more and more into the ordinary and restricted bounds of civil society, men of the same high class were no longer created. There is, however, some fallacy in this statement. Times of revolution do not create great men, but revolutions usually take place in periods of society when great principles have been under discussion, and the views of the young and of the old have been turned, by the complexion of the times, towards matters of grand and serious consideration, which elevate the character and raise the ambition. When the collision of mutual violence, the explosion of the revolution itself actually breaks out, it neither does nor can *create* talent of any kind. But it brings forth, (and in general destroys,) in the course of its progress, all the talent which the predisposition to discussion of public affairs had already encouraged and fostered; and when that talent has perished, it cannot be replaced from a race educated amidst the furies of civil war. The abilities of the Long Parliament ceased to be seen under the Commonwealth, and the same is true of the French Convention, and the Empire which succeeded it. Revolution is like a conflagration, which throws temporary light upon the ornaments and architecture of the house to which it attaches, but always ends by destroying them.

It is said also, probably with less authority, that Napoleon, even when surrounded by those Imperial Guards, whose discipline had been so sedulously carried to the highest pitch, sometimes regretted the want of the old Revolutionary soldiers, whose war-cry, "Vive la Republique!" identified each

individual with the cause which he maintained. Napoleon, however, had no cause to regret any circumstance which referred to his military power. It was already far too great, and had destroyed the proper scale of government in France, by giving the military a decided superiority over all men of civil professions, while he himself, with the habits and reasoning of a despotic general, had assumed an almost unlimited authority over the fairest part of Europe. Over foreign countries, the military renown of France streamed like a comet, inspiring universal dread and distrust; and whilst it rendered indispensable similar preparations for resistance, it seemed as if peace had departed from the earth for ever, and that its destinies were hereafter to be disposed of according to the laws of brutal force alone.

END OF VOLUME TWELFTH.